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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the trading on the London Stock Exchange, a multiple 
dealership market. It consists of four chapters. Chapter one motivates the 
study and summarises the major findings of the thesis.
Chapter two examines the individual quoting behaviour of market makers. 
Quote revisions are often first made by one of the few price leaders in response 
to market information, and the rest follow suit. Price leaders tend to quote 
one side of the yellow strip to attract unbalanced orders; price followers often 
straddle the strip, which results in smaller but more balanced order flows. 
Moreover, the negative correlation between effective spreads and orders flows 
is detected in all but very small trades.
The third chapter attempts to solve an apparent puzzle on the Exchange: 
market makers appear to charge different costs from different market partic­
ipants. The chapter uses the theories of market microstructure to explain 
why the costs are different, and examines the extent to which the difference 
is related to the collusion of market makers or to the trading mechanisms. 
The evidence suggests the negotiation power of trading parties may play an 
important role in determining the costs of trades.
The last chapter presents a new approach to estimate bid-ask spreads in 
multiple dealership markets. The traditional approach of estimating spreads 
is not apphcable in those markets because observed prices cannot be ordered 
sequentially. An alternative method is proposed for which data sequentiality 
is not needed. The model is put into state space form to use the Kalman 
filter to estimate the fundamental price and the spread. The new method is 
implemented to the data of three liquid stocks on the Exchange.
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Chapter 1
OVERVIEW
This thesis attempts to explain how market makers post bid and ask quotes in 
dealership markets, and how the transaction prices are determined. Because 
the investigations are based on the data collected from the London Stock 
Exchange, it is necessary to give a brief description about how the Exchange 
is operated. Three main topics of this thesis will be introduced in Section 
1.2, Section 1.3 and Section 1.4 respectively. Section 1.5 explains some of 
the notions used in this thesis.
1.1 The operation
The investigations of this thesis are based on the data collected between 
January and June 1996, when the London Stock Exchange (LSE) was stiU 
a typical multiple dealership market.^ According to the Exchange (1997), 
there are 299 member firms of the Exchange in 1996. Member firms are 
free to register as market makers. During 1996, thirty-three market mak­
ers post bid and ask prices of more than 2,600 stocks on Stock Exchange 
Automated Quotation system (SEAQ). The registered market makers are 
obliged to maintain two-way quotes on SEAQ between 8:30 and 16:30 every 
trading day. The middle of SEAQ screen of each security shows the current 
highest bid and lowest ask prices, and up to four names of market makers
 ^ Although an electronic order book was introduced for the trading of FTSE-100 stocks 
in October 1997, the order book only captures 30% of the trading volumes of those stocks, 
and the rest of the trades are still executed by dealers (Board and Wells 1998; Martinson 
1998).
who are posting the best quotes on each side. As the best-quote informa­
tion is highhghted with yellow colour, the best quotes are often referred to 
“the yellow strip” . Furthermore, those market makers who post the best 
quotes are “on the yellow strip” despite the fact that some of their names 
may not be hterally on the yellow strip when more than four market makers 
quote the best bid or ask prices. Those market makers who do not quote the 
best bid nor the best ask are said to “straddle the yellow strip” (Reiss and 
Werner 1996). Another synonym of yellow strip is “touch”. Market makers 
honour the trades up to a certain number of shares, which is often equal to 
the Normal Market Size (NMS), a measure which attempts to capture the 
equivalence of 2.5% of daily trading volumes; see Appendix A.l. If the or­
der is smaller than 10% of the NMS, the market participants may execute 
the trade through a computer network called Small-order Automated Execu­
tion Facihty (SAEF), otherwise they will negotiate the price with the market 
makers through telephones. If the trade size is smaller than or equal to that 
honoured in the SEAQ screen, the market maker is allowed to trade at the 
price better than what is currently displayed in the screen. If the trade size 
is bigger than the quote size, then the market maker is free to quote any 
price on the phone.
The SEAQ screen provides the relevant information for the customers of 
market makers to decide whether to trade and with whom to trade, but the 
member firms of the Exchange are free to choose anybody to trade with. 
Therefore, those market makers who do not post the best quotes may ob­
tain preferenced orders. Non-member firms can even trade with one another 
without the involvement of any market maker, but such trades do not occur 
frequently. For those investors who are not members of the Exchange, they 
can trade with market makers through a broker who is a member firm. The 
brokers are essentially “broker-dealers”. They can trade with market makers 
on their own accounts, or t h ^  can act on behalf of their customers. More­
over, market makers are allowed to trade with their private chents, who are 
almost exclusively institutional investors.
The inter-dealer trading on the Exchange is conducted in two ways. First,
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mcirket makers can trade with one another in SEAQ in the same way as 
trading with any other member firms, in which case the trades are called 
IMM trades (Board and Sutcliffe 1995). Second, they can trade with one 
another in the inter-dealer broker (IDB) market, in which the trades are 
called IDB trades. IDB market is one to which only market makers have 
exclusive access. Four IDEs operate separate electronic bulletin systems to 
allow market to place hmit orders, and the computer screens only display the 
best buy and sell orders. Trades are not executed electronically. If another 
market makers wish to take the orders, they may call the IDB to execute the 
trades. More negotiation may take place if one of the market makers wish 
to trade more shares (Reiss and Werner 1997). Unlike SEAQ, trading in the 
IDB market is anonymous: only the IDB knows who place and who take 
the limit orders. On the other hand, both SEAQ and IDB trades are under 
the same post-trade publication rules. Tirades are reported to the Exchange 
within three minutes of executions. The Exchange publishes small trades 
immediately, and it publishes the trades one hour after the executions if the 
trade sizes are more than six times NMS. If the trade sizes are more than 
seventy-five times NMS, then the trading parties may request the Exchange 
to delay the publication up to five days or until 90% of the trades are off­
loaded.
1.2 Changing the quotes
In theory, investors do not pay much attention to the quotes by individual 
market makers. They regard the best quote, the lowest ask and highest bid 
price, as the market price. Investors are expected to reward those market 
makers who are able to execute the trades of any sizes at any time with neg­
ligible costs. Individual market makers may post only the highest bid, only 
the lowest ask, both highest bid and lowest ask, or neither of them. Those 
who post the lowest ask attract all of the buy orders, and those who post the 
highest bid attract all of the sell orders. In practice, market makers attract 
preferenced order flows. There are explicit contracts or implicit agreements
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between market makers and some of their customers, by which the latter 
are obUged to route certain amount of orders to the former, who in return 
execute the orders with the best bid or ask prices.
The objective of Chapter 2 is to explain the quoting behaviomr of market 
makers on the LSE: why some market makers quote the best prices while the 
others avoid being on the yellow strip. Before explaining the quoting behav­
iour, it is necessary to explore the consequence of being on or off the yellow 
strip. After all, if it does not make any difference for the market maker to 
post the best quote, then any talk about the quoting behaviour is meaning­
less. Most of the theoretical models in the literature take it for granted that 
posting the best quotes captures the whole order flows. However, owing to 
preferenced order flows and some other reasons, early studies on the  LSE do 
not provide strong evidence of the hnk between posting the best quotes and 
attracting order flows (Board et ai. 1996; Hansch et al. 1998). By examin­
ing the link more closely. Chapter 2 first argues that a lot of market makers 
spend most of the time on straddhng the yellow strip, but the number of 
trades executed by straddhng the strip is not proportional to the time spent 
on the strip. Second, the imbalance of buy and sell orders may obscure the 
hnk between order flow and quote status. After adjusting the overall order 
imbalance, it becomes evident that market makers attract more buy than 
sell orders by quoting only the best ask, and they attract more sell than buy 
orders by quoting only the best bid. In contrast, those market makers who 
quote both the best ask and best bid are not expected to receive unbalanced 
order flows, and they do receive balance orders. Third, when market makers 
quote the best bid or best ask, the order flows they receive depend on how 
many market makers are posting the best quote at the same time. Since “a 
market maker quotes both best bid and best ask” often means ‘“everybody 
else quotes both best bid and ask”, the order flows market makers receive 
while on both sides of yeUow strip are not different from when they straddle 
the strip. Fourth, posting the best quote attracts orders bigger than the 
quote size shown in the SEAQ screen, which implies the presence on the yel­
low strip has signalhng effects. Finally, not only the quote spreads but also
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the effective spreads matter: the order flows are negatively related to the 
effective spreads for the medium and large trades. Based on those findings, 
Chapter 2 concludes that market makers do attract additional order flows by 
quoting the yellow strip prices, and how substantial the orders are depends 
on the number of market makers on the strip.
This chapter then explores the patterns of quote change and investi­
gates the events before the quote change. Cross-sectional regressions are 
conducted. The dependent variable is the change in the mid-quote of indi­
vidual market makers. The independent variables are the number of trades, 
the volumes of trades, and the inventory levels before the quote change, as 
well as the preceding quote change. The evidence from Section 2.5 suggests 
the majority of the market makers are price followers while a small number of 
market makers update the quote rather aggressively. There are two different 
types of quote revisions. The first type of the revision is to quote one side 
of the yellow strip aggressively in order to attract unbalanced order flows. 
The quotes are often made by price leaders in response to pubhc information. 
The upward revisions are often associated with the arrival of buy trades, and 
the downward revisions are often with seU trades. The second type of quote 
revision is to deflberately straddle the yellow strip or to quote both sides of 
the strip. The revision is often made by a price follower soon after the quote 
change of price leaders. The benefit of straddhng the yellow strip is to avoid 
receiving unbalanced order flows; the drawback is the order flows received 
tend to be less than stamding on the strip.
1.3 Charging for the liquidity
Chapter 3 focuses on the comparison of the costs of trading, and on the choice 
of the trading platforms. A large number of trades in the LSE are carried out 
by negotiation among traders. During negotiation, the trading parties may 
gather more information about the securities than merely the price and the 
quantity of the trade. When a member firm approaches the market maker to 
initiate the trade, the market maker will try to detect the motivation behind
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the trade from the negotiation and from the past experience of deahng with 
the firm. On the other hand, the trade data collected from the LSE consists 
of not only the prices and quantities of the trades, but also the identities 
of the trading parties and trading conditions. Although it is not possible to 
identify the end investors behind brokers, the data provides sufficient clues to 
understand how the market makers differentiate their customers. The data 
reveals that market makers charge different customers for different costs. 
Specifically, the small investors appear to pay more than the private chents 
of the market makers. Member firms of the Exchange who act as principals 
have favourable prices despite of the fact that they pay more when they trade 
on behalf of the investors outside the Exchange. The trading platform affects 
the costs of trading, too. Market makers trade with one another frequently 
in both SEAQ and IDB market, but the costs of trading in IDB market are 
much lower than those in SEAQ. Similar findings have been documented in 
Board and Sutcfiffe (1995), Reiss and Werner (1996, 1997) and Hansch et al. 
(1999).
Can the widely observed differences in costs be explained by the theories 
of market microstructure? This chapter attempts to answer this question 
by running a cross-sectional regression. The dependent variable is half of 
the effective spread, and the independent variables include the variables doc­
umented in the fiterature which may determine the costs of the trades, as 
well as the dummy variables representing the different types of customers. 
The analysis shows the variables suggested in the fiterature successfully ex­
plain part of the effective spreads, but they cannot explain most of the costs 
difference. It is possible, however, that different trades contains different 
information, which reflect different costs of trades and which the regression 
model fails to detect. Therefore, another regression model is used to analyse 
the effects of different trades on the quote change. The evidence reveals that 
market makers change quotes after customer trades, which imply those trades 
have certain inventory or information implications. IMM trades also tend to 
trigger the quote change which implies those trades contain information. On 
the contrary, the posters of IDB trades change their quotes to the opposite
17
direction of the one predicted by the literature.
The success of IDB market to provide a low-cost trading platform coin­
cides with the inability of IDB market to provide liquidity timely. Chapter 3 
further finds that four IDBs altogether assist merely less than six deals per 
stock per day. Market makers place limit orders only when they can afford 
waiting for unwinding their inventories. The posting in IDB market clearly 
signals the trades only have inventory imphcation, so the costs are low. In 
contrast, market makers are very sensitive to IMM trades. If a market maker 
cannot wait for trading with customers or resort to the less-hquid IDB mar­
ket, it indeed signals something unusual to the counter party, who has to 
charge the trade with higher costs to compensate the potential adverse se­
lection problem. Another interpretation of the expensive IMM trades is that 
it is one market maker exercises price discrimination against the other, since 
the latter is unable to find the liquidity elsewhere.
The cost structure of the agency trades, client trades and principal trades 
can be explained by the preferenced orders and the different bargaining pow­
ers. Most of the end customers of agency trades are individual investors, who 
do not trade very frequently nor very heavily. They have fittle if any control 
over broker-dealers, so most of their orders are preferenced and are traded 
at the touch. The private clients of market makers trade regularly, and they 
are able to negotiate with market makers to get better deals. Finally, mem­
ber firms of the Exchange trade with market makers most frequently. Their 
bargaining powers are further enhanced by the fact that they can decide to 
which market makers the customer orders are routed. Therefore, they are 
able to obtain the best deals from market makers.
1.4 Mecisuring the spread
The price of securities in financial markets consists of two main components: 
the fundamental price and the spread. Both components cannot be observed. 
There are two standard approaches to estimate the spread firom the trade 
prices. One is to use the autocovariance structure of the differenced price and
18
quote data (Roll 1984; Stoll 1989). The other is to regresis the change in prices 
on some other variables such as change in trade directions or change in quotes 
(Glosten and Harris 1988; Huang and Stoll 1997). From the theoretical point 
of view, it imphes that the parties have observed the past trades and have 
absorbed at least part of the information from the trades before conducting 
the current trade. Prom the estimation’s point of view, it follows that the 
prices must be ordered sequentially over time: at each time period only one 
price is observed.
Unfortunately, the prices reported to the LSE are not sequential. Several 
negotiations among trading parties can occur at same time without the fuU 
knowledge of the activities in the market, so it is not theoretically appealing 
to assume the trading parties have some knowledge of the other trades tak­
ing place at the same time, and to impose a trading sequence on the data. 
Furthermore, this thesis uses the trade data constructed from the settlement 
records, which are time-stamped in minutes. For the liquid stocks, several 
trades are reported to take place at the same minute on a regular basis, and 
there is no way to define a trading sequence from the data set.
Chapter 4 develops a new statistical approach to model bid-ask spreads 
for non-sequential trade markets. The model decomposes the trade price into 
an underlying fundamental price and the half bid-ask spread. The fundamen­
tal price is assumed to follow a random walk plus the information effect from 
market volumes of customer trades. The spread is determined by the size of 
the trade and the time of the day, and both effects are non-linear and are 
modelled by regression splines. Each time interval has; a different number 
of trades executed, so the dimension of the variables in  the model is not 
constant. The problem of non-sequentiahty is solved by putting the model 
into state space form and to estimate the model by maximising hkefihood 
using the Kalman filter. The updating recursions of the Kalman filter do 
not require the dimension of the observational vector to foe constant, and the 
missing observations can be dealt with in a straightforward manner. The 
model is appfied to three heavily traded stocks on the LSE. The analyses 
have been successful. It is shown the model is capable of identifying the fun-
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damental price and the spread in a strmghtforward manner. Compared with 
an alternative approach of using the mid-touch as the fundamental price, the 
proposed model explains more of the observed trade prices, and the residuals 
of the model exhibit much less autocorrelation than those from the model 
using mid-touch.
1.5 N otations
This thesis uses the term “spread” extensively. “Spread” and “bid-ask spread” , 
denoted by s, are used geneiically to refer to the unobservable component
of either the transaction price or the quote offered by market makers. This
thesis considers four different types of bid-ask spreads:
1. The quote spread is defined as the difference between bid and ask prices 
of a stock quoted by a specific market maker. Corresponding to the 
quote spread, the mid-quote is defined as the average of the bid and 
ask prices of a stock quoted by a specific market maker.
2. The touch spread is the lowest ask, a*, minus the highest bid, bt, across 
all market makers of a specific stock. Synonym for the touch spread 
include the inside spread and the touch. The definition of the touch 
is the same as the “Spread” in Board and Sutcliffe (1995) and the 
“PCT” in Chan, Christie, and Schultz (1995). Corresponding to the 
touch spread, the mid-touch rrit is the average of the best bid and ask 
prices.^
3. The effective spread is defined as
2 5  = I  2 X (p -  m t)/m t for a buy
I  2 X  (mt — p)/m t for a sell
where p is the transaction price of a specific trade and mt is the mid- 
touch at time t, when the trade is executed. The definition of the
 ^mt is denoted by qt in Huang and Stoll (1996) and by Mt in Huang and Stoll 
(1997). Occasionally, m* is also used as the mid-quote in this thesis accompanied by 
clear specification.
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effective spread used in this thesis is similar to the one in Hansch et al. 
(1999), who term it the Execution Quahty (Exqual).
The direction of a customer trade is identified from the prespective of 
the counter party of market maker. In Chapter 2, no attempt is made 
to determine the initiator of an inter-dealer trade, and the direction of 
an inter-dealer trade is identified in the same way as that of a customer 
trade. In Chapter 3, especially in Section 3.5, where it is necessary to 
identify the initiators of inter-dealer trades, the directions of the trades 
are those of initiators.
This definition of the effective spread is different from the one in Huang 
and Stoll (1996), who define the effective spread as the absolute value 
of the difference between the price and the mid-touch. The difference 
results from the fact that the identities of trading parties are given in 
TDS data, while such information is often unavailable in the transaction 
data of the exchanges in the US.
4. Finally, the Kalman-filter spread is twice the half spread df,* x 5 esti­
mated from the model proposed in (4.2) of Chapter 4. dt^ i is the trade 
indicator which takes the value 1 when the trade is a buy and —1 when 
it is a sell. It has another notation dt in Chapter 3 because the time of 
the trade is unimportant in that chapter. Note that the definition of 
trade indicator is the same as Qt in Huang and Stoll (1997) and xt in 
Madhavan et al. (1997).
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Chapter 2
POSTING QUOTES IN MULTIPLE 
DEALERSHIP MARKETS
2.1 Introduction
How market makers determine the quotes is an intriguing question, and it is 
especially true when they are in a multiple-dealer environment. In theory, 
market makers observe the pubhc information in the markets. They extract 
information from the customers with whom they trade. They observe the 
actions taken by another market makers. They need a lot of information 
to decide how to revise the quotes. The customers, on the other hand, do 
not pay much attention to the quotes by individual market makers. They 
use the best quote, the lowest ask and highest bid price, as the market price. 
Individual market makers may post only the lowest ask, only the highest bid, 
both lowest ask and highest bid, or neither of them. Two interesting ques­
tions immediately emerge. First, what makes market makers quote different 
prices? Second, what are the consequences if they do not quote the best bid 
or ask?
Both questions, especially the second one, have important policy imphca- 
tions. The spirit of a competitive dealership market is to allow market makers 
competing with one another to offer the best services to the customers. Cus­
tomers are expected to reward those market makers who are able to execute 
the trades of any sizes at any time with negligible costs. Therefore, ceteris 
paribus, the smaller bid-ask spread a market maker offers, the more orders he 
should receive. Prom the regulator’s point of view, it is essential to make sure
that at least some of the market makers commit themselves to competing in 
prices, that the best bid-ask spread is satisfactorily narrow, that the market 
price reflects available information, and that the market attracts investors.
The main theme of this chapter is to explain the quoting behaviour of 
market makers on the London Stock Exchange, a multiple dealership market. 
Much of the emphasis will be on the consequence of on and off the yellow 
strip. Market makers are wiUing to post competitive bid and ask prices if 
posting the best quotes makes a difference in attracting business. Most of the 
theoretical models in the hterature take it for granted that posting the best 
quotes captures the whole order flow. In reedity, owing to preferenced order 
flows and some other reasons, early studies on the London Stock Exchange 
do not provide strong evidence of the flnk between posting the best quotes 
and attracting order flows (Board et al. 1996; Hansch et al. 1998). Board 
et al. (1997) even challenge the commitment of market makers to price 
discovery. However, this chapter will show that posting the best quote does 
attract business, the scale of which depends on how many market makers 
are posting the best quote at the same time. In addition, there are two new 
findings. First, posting the best quotes attracts orders bigger than the quote 
size shown in the computer screen, which implies that quotes have signalhng 
effects. Second, not only the quote spreads but also the effective spreads 
matter: the order flows are negatively related to the effective spreads for the 
medium and large trades.
This chapter then explores the patterns of quote changes and provides 
descriptive statistics. Contrary to what models of competitive dealership 
markets suggest, market makers often deliberately post quotes that are away 
from the yellow strip. On the other hand, some market makers actively 
participate in the market and quote aggressively. The findings are consistent 
with Board et al. (1997) that there are different degrees of the commitments 
of market makers to price discovery. The cross-sectional regression analysis 
reveals that those who do not post the best quote tend to revise the quote 
soon after another market makers move to the yellow strip, and that quote 
changes made by price leaders often reflect trade information. The inventory
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consideration demonstrated by Hansch et al. (1998) is minor and is often 
over-shadowed by information effects. It appears market makers do not often 
resort to quote revision in response to the change in inventory.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section briefly 
reviews the literature on the quote revision and quote status. The third 
section establishes the link between order flow and quote status. Section 2.4 
further strengthens the link by demonstrating the signalling effect of quote 
status on attracting big trades. In addition, a new method is proposed to 
examine the relationship between trades and effective spreads. Section 2.5 
highlights the quoting behaviour of market makers. Section 2.6 investigates 
what trigger the change of quote and discusses the implications. Section 2.7 
concludes the chapter.
2.2 Q uote revisions: a brief survey
2.2.1 Theoretical arguments
The decision to post the bid and ask price is potentially extremely complex, 
and most of the theoretical contributions in the literature do not directly 
analyse how market makers determine the quotes in a multiple dealership 
environment. Instead, a lot of assumptions are made to simphfy the ques­
tion. Stoll (1978b), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Easley and O’Hara (1987) 
and Glosten (1989) discuss how a single dealer determines the bid and ask 
prices. In Kyle (1985) and Grossman and Miller (1988), market makers deter­
mine a single price, and the bid-ask spread is not even mentioned. Theories 
of competitive dealership markets are abundant. Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1991) study the effect of the disclosure of information on the cost of capital in 
multiple dealership markets. Madhavan (1992) compares the dealership and 
auction market. Dennert (1993) explores the relationship between the spread 
and the number of dealers in the market. The interactions among market 
makers are often introduced by including an inter-dealer market, such as the 
models by Vogler (1997), Saporta (1997) and Naik et al. (1999). Most of the 
results from their models rely on the assumptions of homogeneous market
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makers and the zero-profit condition. The justifications of zero profit come 
from the exchange regulations, Bertrand competition, or the strategic be­
haviours of market makers. The assumption of homogeneous market makers 
results in identical bid and ask prices for all of the market makers, which are 
not often observed in the real world. The exceptions are Ho and Stoll (1983) 
and Kandel and Marx (1997). Ho and Stoll assume dealers have different 
reservation prices because of different inventory levels or different opinions 
about the true price of the security. Kendal and Marx examine the decision 
of a market maker to quote according to the prevalent best bid and ask.
Two main issues dominate the discussion of quoting behaviour: inventory 
and information. The inventory consideration drives up the quote when 
the inventory level is high, and it moves down the quotes when the level is 
low. As a result, market makers prevent from keeping too much or too httle 
inventory. Even whey they do face undesirable inventory level, they have 
acquired adequate compensation. The information consideration of quote 
changes is arguably part of inventory management — market makers want to 
buy more of desired securities and to get rid of unwanted ones. The difference 
is that inventory is a firm-specific consideration, whereas information of the 
securities concerns the whole market.
Quite a few researchers have shown that there are strong information 
effects on changing the quotes, for example, Hasbrouck (1988, 1991). Ev­
idence of intraday returns such as in Glosten and Harris (1988) and Mad­
havan and Smidt (1991) may be regarded as supporting information effects 
because quotes are not difierent from transaction prices very often. Most of 
the empirical work employs single dealership models, even though the data 
are collected from multiple dealership markets (Snell and Tonks 1995, 1998). 
Moreover, very few attempts are made to explain the diversity of quotes 
posted by market makers.
2.2.2 Empirical evidence in London
Some work has been done to understand the behaviour of market makers. 
Reiss and Werner (1996) find the quoting behaviour of market makers in
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SEAQ during 1991 is different from what they imagine competitive market 
makers should be. The average market maker changes his quotes by fewer 
than seven times a day. The quoted spread of a stock is the same for almost 
all of the market makers who quote the stock. When they change the quotes, 
they raise or lower the bid and ask prices by the same amount. Market 
makers do not often post the best bid and ask price simultaneously. They 
may post the best bid, they may post the best ask, or they may post neither, 
in which case they are said to “straddle the yellow strip”. Different quotes by 
different market makers are widely observed, which appears to be in favour 
of the Ho-StoU/Kendal-Marx types of models with heterogeneous market 
makers. These properties of quotes are not hmited to only on the London 
Stock Exchange. For example, Goodhart and Figliuoh (1991) do not find 
foreign exchange dealers quote the same bid and ask prices. Chan, Christie, 
and Schultz (1995) find that market makers often quote one side of the inside 
quote in NASDAQ; almost nobody quotes both best ask and best bid at the 
same time.
Some efforts have been made to examine the change of quotes. Hansch 
et al. (1998) conduct a comprehensive survey of the inventory management 
of market makers. They find some evidence supporting the effects of inven­
tory on quote changes, but they do not consider information effects. Snell 
and Tonks (1995, 1998) propose models of monopohstic market makers and 
estimate the inventory and information effects of the change of mid-touch. 
They justify this approach by assuming market makers come from the same 
collusive group. This chapter does not hold the view that market makers 
collude. In fact, the quoting behaviours of market makers are diverse as 
shown in Board et al. (1997) and later in this chapter. Other work such as 
Hansch et al. (1999) does not find the evidence of supporting the collusion 
assumptions, either. The change in mid-touch is not at all uninteresting, but 
the scope of this chapter will be hmited to examine the change of quotes by 
individual market makers.
Any discussion of quoting behaviour is meaningful only if the quote status 
affects future order flows. If how market makers quote has nothing to do with
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the order flows, the quoting behaviour is irrelevant — there is no obvious 
reason for market makers to stay on or off the yellow strip. By definition, 
there is always a highest bid and a lowest ask in the market, and there are 
always somebody posting the best quotes. In absence of the finks between 
quote status and order flow, even if market makers seem to quote aggressively, 
it is still not the evidence to support the inventory or information hypothesis, 
and it is not the evidence to support that market makers compete with one 
another.
How strong the fink between order flows and quotes is an important em­
pirical question. Two early studies suggest that the fink is less than moderate. 
Board et al. (1996) examine the relationship of the presence on the yellow 
strip and the small trades received. They find market makers on average 
execute 19.58% of the customer trades while they are on the yellow strip. 
It implies that nearly 80% of the orders are preferenced. When a dummy 
variable of the presence of yellow strip is included into a regression model of 
the spread, they find that being on the yellow strip does not make significant 
difference on the terms of trades. Hansch et al. (1998) compare the market 
shares of the market makers on the yellow strip with the market shares of 
those market makers of the whole sample. They conclude the market shares 
increase by 6.6% if market makers quote the best bid and 5.3% if on the best 
ask.
If the quote status indeed has little to do with attracting order flows, then 
market makers may not care about the quote status very much. This is not 
the case. The next section will take appropriate measure to show that the 
quote status is closely related to order flows indeed.
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2.3 The link betw een order flow and quote 
status
2.3.1 Critiques
The finding of the hnk between order flow and quote status in the hterature 
is, at most, weak. The flnding by Board et al. (1996) demonstrates the 
scale of preferenced order flows of the hquid stocks appears to be large. 
The increase in the market shares by five to seven percents in Hansch et al. 
(1998) is difficult to interpret; in fact, it is not the evidence supporting or 
undermining the hnk between order flow and quote status. What follows is 
a simple example to illustrate the change in market shares is a function of 
many variables that may have httle to do with the ability of market makers 
to obtain order flows. The average increase in market share is defined by 
Hansch et al. (1998) as
orders of firms ^ orders of firms on
11 ^  on yellow strip ” yeUow strip at t
T  total orders of market orders of market at  ^ ^
where t is the time when some market makes are on the yellow strip. The 
first term in the square bracket is the market shares of the firm on the yeUow 
strip at time t, and the second term is the total market shares of those firms 
who are on the yellow strip. Consider the fohowing example. Suppose there 
are M  market makers who take turns to be on the yeUow strip with equal 
probability, and there are m  market makers on the yellow strip at any time. 
There is no preferenced order, market makers will receive no orders if they 
are off the yellow strip, and the market share of those market makers who are 
on the yellow strip is 100%. As a result, the total market shares of those who 
are on the yellow strip are always m / M  whoever they are, and the increase 
in the market share is (1 — m/M)  x 100%. For example, if all of the market 
makers are always on the yellow strip (m =  M), then the increase in the 
market shares is zero. Even in this simple case, the increase in the market 
shares depends on the number of market makers who are on the yellow strip.
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Following the previous example, if some of the market makers stay on the 
yellow strip longer than the others, then the change in market shares will be 
reduced. Suppose n out of the m  market makers remain on the yellow strips 
aU the time, and the rest M  — n market makers take turns on the yellow 
strip with equal probabihty. The market share of those who are always on 
the yellow strip is n / m  x 100%, and of the rest of the market makers who 
are on the yellow strip is (1 — n/m ) * (m — n)/(M  — n) x 100%. The increase 
in market share of being on the yellow strip is
* 100% =  X 100%,m m M  — n m(M — n)
which is a decreasing function of n. The more market makers who stay long 
on the yellow strip, the less the increase in the market share.
Moreover, if x% of the market share is preferenced, then the increase in 
the market share will be only hmited in the non-preferenced order flow, that 
is, the increase in the market share is
^^hqp^x(100-x)%.
m(M -  n)
It confirms the argument made by Hansch et al. (1998) that the greater 
the preferenced order flow, the smaller the increase in market share. If the 
preferenced order flows are 100%, then the increase in market shares while 
on the yellow strip is zero.^
To sum up, even in the simplest case, the increase in market shares de­
pends on how many and how often market makers are in the yellow strip, 
and how often they are on the yellow strip. Although the increase in the 
market share is less than 7% in Hansch et ai. (1998), it is not clear that such 
a small increase is the result of the preferenced order flows or the presence 
of few market makers who are always on the yellow strip. A more desirable 
way to detect the link between trades and quotes is to modify the approach 
by Board et al. (1996), which will be demonstrated below.
 ^ Here the preferenced orders are defined as those which will be always routed to a 
certain market maker. The definition is difierent from, for example, Hansch et al. (1999), 
in which they define preferenced orders as those which are executed by market makers 
who are not on the yellow strip.
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2.3.2 D ata description
Transaction and quote records are retrieved from the CD-ROM Transaction 
Data Service provided by the London Stock Exchange. Appendix A.2 pro­
vides the details of the data. Both the transaction records and quote records 
contain the identification of market makers. Best quotes are constructed by 
the quotes records, so whether or not a market maker posts the best quotes is 
known for any given time. The information of quote status is then matched 
with the transaction data. Each trade can be classified according to whether 
the market maker executing the trade is posting the best quote. The sample 
includes most of the customer and inter-dealer trades of the stocks of which 
more than one market maker posts the quotes during all the trading days 
between February and March 1996. Crosses, put-throughs, basket trades and 
trades without the involvement of market makers are excluded. Crosses are 
trades by the same market maker as the buy and the sell party. Put-throughs 
are essentially agency crosses except under the book of market makers; their 
occurrence is not the result of the quote status of market makers. Basket 
trades are trades of a portfolio of ten stocks or more simultaneously and are 
arranged one day before the execution. Although market makers may take 
into account the effects of the basket trades when posting the quotes, the 
trades themselves are not attracted by the quotes. The number of trades is 
calculated from market makers’ point of view, so a trade between a broker 
and a market maker is counted as one trade, and a trade between two mar­
ket makers is counted as two. Other procedures of editing the data are in 
appendix A.4.
Summary statistics are shown in Table 2.1. There are more than 1.2 
miUion trades in the sample, and the volumes of trades are more than 80 
billion pounds. The direction of the trade is defined as the opposite direction 
of the market maker. Sells are much more than buys in the sample, but the 
difference between trading volumes are rather small. It imphes the sample 
consists of relatively big buys and many small sells, which is also revealed in 
the average size of trade: the average size of buy is nearly eighty thousand 
pounds, and the average sell is less than sixty thousand. Some of the stocks
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are thinly traded; ten stocks are without buys and three stocks are without 
sells. The next row shows the statistics of a stock whose trading volume is the 
median volume of the sample stocks. As the FTSE-100 stocks dominate the 
trading on the Exchange, the number of trades and the trading volumes of 
the median stock are small. The next three rows are data from three different 
market makers. Market maker A has substantial market shares and makes a 
market in nearly two third of the stocks. As the market maker trades heavily 
with brokers who represent small investors, its average trade size is smaller 
than the average. The fact that the firm trades small stocks frequently also 
makes the trade size small. Market maker B is among the smallest market 
makers on the Exchange. It only quotes in twenty-one stocks and trades very 
rarely, but the average size of the trades is large. Note that Firm B is also 
a big investment bank, but it entered the market only after the “Big Bang” , 
the creation of SEAQ in 1986. Market maker C is a diflFerent type of firm. 
It quotes half of the stocks on the Exchange and trades frequently with a 
rather small average trade size. Finally, the last few rows show the number 
of trades and volumes of the trades excluded from the analysis; those trades 
only constitute a small proportion of the sample.
2.3.3 Preliminaries
A naive way to examine the relationship between order flow and quote status 
is to compare the proportion of buy and sell orders when the market makers 
are on and off the yellow strip. It is illustrated in Table 2.2. Trades are 
classified according to whether market markers quote the best bid or the 
best ask, and whether the customers are buyers or sellers. For example, the 
first two columns show the number of buys of the sample and its percentage 
as the sum of buys and sells. 193,222 trades occurred when market makers 
are on the best bid, and 312,683 trades occurred when market makers are 
off the best bid. The next two columns show the number of sells and its 
percentage. It appears the sells are always more than the buys regardless the 
quote status of market makers. Define as the percentage of the number 
of sells subtracted from the percentage of the number of buys. ranges
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from —5.6% to —24.5%. Even if the market maker posts the best ask, the 
sells are still more than the buys despite the increase of the incoming buy 
orders.
The sample consists of a lot of small sell trades and some big buy trades. If 
the trading volumes instead of number of trades are examined, the conclusion 
may be altered. The right-hand side of the table presents the volumes of buys 
and sells in the on-bid or on-ask categories. Define the percentage of sell 
volumes subtracted from the percentage of buy volumes. is positive when 
market makers do not post the best bid or when they post the best ask, and 
it is negative when they are on the best bid or when the are not on the 
best ask. Therefore, those market makers who are on the best bid attract 
more sell volumes, and those on the best ask attract more buy volumes. The 
results from trading volumes are consistent with what is expected to be a 
“normal” situation: those who post the best ask (bid) attract more buy (sell) 
orders. However, two questions remain to be answered. First, the absolute 
value of A^ ranges between 6.4% and 11.9%. Is the diflFerence an incentive 
big enough to let market makers decide to be on or off the yeUow strip? 
Second, both the number of trades and the volumes of the off-bid or off-ask 
category are always greater than those in the on-bid and on-ask category. 
Does it mean that market makers attract more orders when they are not on 
the yellow strip?
The answer to the second question is that an average market maker of 
hquid stocks spends a great deal of time in straddling the yellow strip, where 
they can still attract order flows. When market makers straddle the yellow 
strip, trades are classified into off-bid and off-ask categories in Table 2.2. 
As a large number of market makers are off the yellow strip, the number 
of trades executed off the strip is large. Does it mean that straddhng the 
yellow strip attracts more orders? Consider Table 2.3 which classifies the 
trades into three categories according to the quote status of market makers: 
on both sides of the yellow strip, on one side only, and straddhng the strip. 
Most of the trades are executed when market makers are quoting one side of 
the yeUow strip, about 30% of the trades are executed when market makers
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are straddling the strip, and less than 10% of the trades are executed when 
market makers quote both sides of the strip. The last two columns show 
the daily duration of each quote status by an average market maker. The 
percentage of daily duration closely matches the percentages of order flows in 
each quote status. However, it may not be correct to conclude that market 
makers will obtain more trades by straddhng the yellow strip or by being on 
one side of the strip. Market makers straddle the yeUow strip much more 
frequently in liquid stocks, where the majority of the trades take place. On 
the other hand, trades in less-liquid stocks are thin, but market makers are 
more likely to be on the yeUow strip.^ Hence, the numbers in the first panel 
of Table 2.3 are seriously distorted.
To clarify the distortion, the second panel classifies the trades by the 
number of market makers posting quotes during the day in which trades 
occur, so the stocks are essentiaUy sorted according to the hquidity. The 
stocks have at most nineteen market makers. To save the space, the panel 
only shows the statistics of the trades with two, ten and nineteen market 
makers. When there are two market makers, both of them tend to quote the 
same bid and ask prices, so all of them are present on both sides of the yellow 
strip more than half of the day. As a result, “quoting both sides” appears 
to attract slightly more orders. When they are ten market makers, it is 
less common to quote both sides of the yellow strip, and “quoting one side” 
attracts most orders. When there are nineteen market makers, straddling 
becomes much more common. More trades go to the market makers who 
straddle the strip, but the majority of the trades still go to those who post 
the quote on one side. For each group in the panel, the percentage of order 
flows received when market makers are on one side of the yellow strip is no 
less than the percentage of the time when they are on the yellow strip. In 
contrast, the percentage of order flows received when market makers straddle 
the yellow strip is less than the percentage of the time when they straddle 
strip.
 ^ For example, if there are only two market makers, then either one of them are on both 
sides of the yellow strip, or both of them are at least on one side of the strip.
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The last panel examines the trades of three market makers. Firm A 
spends most of the time quoting one side of the yellow strip, which contribute 
60% of the orders. However, more than 30% of the order flows arrive when 
it is straddhng the yellow strip. Firm B spends most of the time straddling 
the strip, but most of the trades occur when it is on one side of the strip. 
Firm C rarely straddles the yellow strips, and most of the trades occur when 
it is on the yellow strip. To sum up, if there are only few market makers, 
they are often present on both sides of the yellow strip, and being on both 
sides attracts orders as much as being on one side. If there are many market 
makers, straddling the yellow strip is conunon, but being on one side of the 
strip attracts more orders than straddhng the strip even after considering 
the duration of quote status.
It requires further investigation to answer the first question raised from 
the results of Table 2.2, that is, whether a difference between 6% to 12% in 
order flow is a big incentive to for market maker to post the best quotes. To 
answer the question briefly, the naive investigation of quote status and order 
flow as presented in Table 2.2 does not find a big difference between on and 
off the yellow strip for the following reasons:
1. It does not acknowledge the impact of preferenced order flows, for ex­
ample, one should expect straddhng the yellow strip brings roughly the 
same buys and sehs.
2. It does not consider the unbalanced buys and sells of the market.
3. It does not consider the number of market makers on the yeUow strip.
4. It does not consider the size of the trades, for example, big trades often 
go through lengthy negotiations, and the times of their of executions 
may have httle to do with quote status.
The remaining of this section will discuss the first three issues in turn, 
and the fourth issue will be dealt with in the next section.
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2.3.4 Four-way classification
If quote status has anything to do with the order flows, one may expect those 
market makers who post only the best ask receive more buy orders than sells, 
and those who post only the best bid receive more sell orders than buys. If 
market makers post on both sides of the yellow strip or straddle the strip, 
it is unclear that whether the market makers wish to receive more buy or 
more sell orders. In Table 2.2, the trade occurred when the market maker 
quotes both sides of the yellow strip is classified into both “on-bid” and “on- 
ask” categories. The trade occurred when the market maker straddles the 
yellow strip is classified into both “off-bid” and “off-ask” categories. Those 
trades inevitably obscure the difference of buys and sells received by those 
market makers who only quote one side of the yellow strip. Therefore, it is 
essential to examine the order flows by classifying the trades according to 
four different quote status of market makers, namely, on both sides of yellow 
strip (on-both), on best ask only (on-ask), on best bid only (on-bid) and 
straddhng the strip (straddle). The four-way classification is shown in Table 
2.4. The first panel is the summary of the sample. Similar to Table 2.2, 
is defined as the percentage difference between buys and sells, and is 
defined as the percentage difference between buy volumes and seU volumes. 
The A ^  is still always negative in the four categories, but it is the smallest 
when market makers quote only the best bid, which is -27%. The A ^  of 
on-ask category is -7%, which is the second biggest of the four categories. 
On the other hand, A^ equals 14% in the on-ask category, it equals -13 % 
in the on-bid category. For the rest of the two categories, the differences in 
volumes are small, only between -1% and -2%.
The second panel examines three subsets of the sample, that is, the groups 
of trades during the day in which two, ten and nineteen firms make the 
market. For the two-market-maker group, A ^  is smallest in the “on-bid” 
category and biggest in the “on-ask” category. Although it is consistent with 
the expectation, the magnitude of A ^  of the “on-bid” category is small. The 
magnitude of A^ is even smaller despite that it is negative for the on-bid 
category and positive for the on-ask category. As the number of market
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makers gets bigger, such as in the ten- and nineteen-market-maker groups, 
becomes all negative. The of the straddle category is the smallest 
in the ten-market-maker group, but its magnitude in the on-bid and on-ask 
category has increased. The magnitude of A^ of on-bid and on-ask category 
in the nineteen-market-maker group are the biggest of the three groups.
The last panel compares the three market makers. The and A^ of 
Firm A are similar to those in the whole sample both in directions and in 
magnitude. Firm B attracts much more buy orders than sells when on the 
best ask, and much more sells than buys when on the best bid. However, its 
A ^ and A^ of the straddle category are both negative. Firm C has com­
pletely different order patterns. Its A ^ is positive and A^ is negative in all 
four categories. To sum up, being on bid only attracts more sell orders, being 
on ask only attracts less sell orders, and the orders are relatively balanced 
when market makers are on both sides of the yellow strip or are straddhng 
the strip. Nevertheless, the results are less clear for the two-market-maker 
stocks and for Firm C who quote a lot of small stocks.
2.3.5 Adjusting for order imbalance
The four-way classification in Table 2.4 reveals that the A^ of the whole 
sample is consistent with the expectation. Although there is some evidence 
that both A ^ and A^ of the on-ask category are often bigger than those 
of on-bid group, most of the A ^ is negative. One of the main problems of 
using the percentages of buys and sells directly, as A ^ and A^ are calculated 
above, is that the order fiows of the market are unbalanced. Section 2.3.2 
reveals that the sample consists of a lot of small sells and some large buys. 
Since the total buys and sells are unbalanced, there is no reason to beheve 
the preferenced orders are balanced. Many preferenced sell orders pour into 
the market, and the orders are executed by market makers regardless of their 
quote status. The all-negative A^ just refiect the fact that the market is 
swamped with many sells. On the other hand, the difference of buy and sell 
volumes is relatively small, and presumably the preferenced buy volumes are 
not very different from the preferenced sell volumes. The balanced volumes
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between buys and sells appear to be the reason why is more consistent 
with the expectation that posting the best bid (ask) attracts more sell (buy) 
trades.
The order flows are not balanced in the aggregate level, and they are even 
more unbalanced in some individual stocks. Table 2.1 has shown that ten 
stocks are without buys and three without sells. There are stocks whose sells 
are much more than buys or the other way round. In order to assess the 
relationship between order flow and quote status correctly, first exclude the 
stocks without either buy or sells. Secondly, and A^ have to be adjusted. 
A simple way of adjustment is to subtract the means from them. Define
raw A^j j^  i =  percentage difference of the number of buy and sell 
trades of market maker i with quote status j  in stock 
k when there are I market makers quoting the stock, 
mean =  percentage difference of the number of buy and sell 
trades of stock k in the sample,
and
adjusted =  raw -  mean A f.
The adjusted AYj j^  i is defined in a similar way. Table 2.5 presents the means 
of A^j^k,i their t-statistics. The first row is the means of A ^  of all stocks 
by all market makers in different quote categories. The effect of the adjust­
ment is substantial. The mean of A ^  in the on-both category is —0.08% and 
not significantly different from zero. The mean of A ^  in the on-ask category 
is 22.04%, and that in on-bid category is —15.21%. In other words, after con- 
trolhng for the market imbalance between buy and sell orders, if a market 
maker quotes only the best bid, then it will attract more sell orders than buy 
orders by more than fifteen percentage points on average. Similarly, the mar­
ket maker who quotes only the best ask will attract on average twenty-two 
percents more the buy orders than the sells. Finally, when the market maker 
straddles the yellow strip, it will attract 2.68% more of buy orders, which is 
significantly bigger than zero statistically, but may be of less economic signif­
icance. When A ^  is averaged according to the number of market makers of
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the stocks, the results axe very similar to the aggregate result for each group.
is generally small in the on-both category, is between 15% and 40% in 
the on-ask category, is between —0.9% and —21% in the on-bid category, and 
is also small in the straddle category. Moreover, almost all of the t-statistics 
of in the on-ask and on-bid category axe significantly bigger or smaller 
than zero at 0.01 level. The last panel examines the mean A ^  of the three 
market makers. All of the three A ^ ’s in the on-ask category axe positive, 
and those in the on-bid category axe all negative. The magnitude of the A ^  
of Firm B tend to be big, but they have to be interpreted with caution. For 
example, there axe only two obsexvations of the fixm in the on-both category. 
Although the mean A ^  is huge, it is not statistically significant.
Table 2.6 summarises the means of A ^   ^ and their t-statistics. The first 
row shows the means of A^ of all stocks by all market makers in diflFerent 
quote categories. The results are very similar to those in Table 2.5. The 
means of A^ in the on-both and straddle category axe —0.08% and —4.76% 
respectively. The mean of A^ in the on-ask category is 15.13%, and that 
in on-bid category is -18.95%. Therefore, market makers attract more buy 
volumes when they quote only the best ask, and there axe more sell volumes 
when they quote only at the best bid. The magnitudes of A^ in the on-both 
and straddle category axe moderate despite statistically significant. When 
averaging A^ according to the number of market makers of the stocks, it 
ranges between 4.94% and 24.09% in the on-ask category, it ranges between 
— 13.95% and —28.78% in the on-bid category, and the t-statistics axe sig­
nificantly diflFerent from zero at 0.01 level in all but one case. The market 
maker who straddles the yellow strip or who quotes both sides of the strip 
tends to receive more balanced order fiows. There are much fewer A^ in the 
on-both or straddle category which are significantly diflFerent from zero. Even 
if they axe statistically significant, they axe almost always bigger than their 
counterparts in the on-bid category and smaller than in the on-ask category 
with only two exceptions. Finally, the last panel examines the average A^ of 
the three market makers. With the exception of Firm B in the on-both cate­
gory, the A^ in the on-ask category is always bigger than that in on-both or
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straddle category, which in turns are bigger than that in the on-bid category.
2.3.6 Num ber o f market makers on the yellow strip
Theoretical models of competitive dealership markets often assume that in­
vestors randomly select a market maker who are on the yellow strip to trade 
with (Vogler 1997). It implies the number of market makers who quote the 
best prices may affect the imbalance of order flows of those market makers. 
For example, if there are fifteen market makers quoting the best ask, the 
non-preferenced buy orders each market maker receives are presumably less 
than if only one market maker quotes the best ask. The more market makers 
on the yellow strip, the smaller order flow each market maker receives.
To investigate whether the number of market makers on the yellow strip 
indeed affects the order imbalance of those market makers, trades are classi­
fied by whether the market maker is on the yellow strip, and by how many 
market makers are on the yellow strip. Three categories are identified if the 
market maker is on the yellow strip: (a) there is only one market maker 
standing alone on the best bid (ask), (b) the number of market makers on 
the best bid (ask) is less than half of the total number of market makers who 
post the quote, and (c) the number of market makers on the best bid (ask) is 
equal to or more than half of the total number of market makers. Category 
(d) includes the trades by the market makers who are not on the yellow strip. 
Compared with the four-way classification used in Table 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6, if 
the best ask is examined, the trades in the previous “on-bid” and “straddle” 
category will fall into the category (d), the trades in the “on-both” category 
will be mostly in category (c),^ and the trades in “on-ask” category and a 
small part of the “on-both” trades will be in either category (a), (b) or (c) 
according to the number of market makers on the best ask. Likewise, if the 
best bid is examined, the trades in the previous “on-ask” and “straddle” cat­
egory will be in category (d), the “on-both” trades will be mostly in category 
(c), and the “on-bid” trades and a small proportion of “on-both” trades will
 ^ The quote of a market maker is in “on-both” category often means the quotes of 
everybody else is in “on-both”, too. See Section 2.5.
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be in one of the category (a), (b), or (c) according to the number of market 
makers on the best bid. Define hke before:
raw A^.  ^  ^ =  percentage difference of the buy and sell volumes of 
market maker i in category j  in stock k when there 
are total I market makers quoting the stock, 
mean A]  ^ =  percentage difference of the buy and sell volumes of 
stock k in the sample,
and
adjusted A^. ^, =  raw A^. ^, — mean AY.
It should be noted that A ^ can be defined in a similar way, but the 
results obtained by using A ^ are not different from those by A^. Table 
2.7 shows the means of the adjusted A^ of the four categories on the ask 
side. The mean of the percentage difference between buy and sell volumes 
is 29.68% when the market maker is alone on the best ask, is 15.72% when 
the market maker is with than less than half of the market makers on the 
best ask, is 0.39% when the market maker is with more than half of the 
market makers, and is —12.69% when the market maker is not on the best 
ask. The table also provides the t-statistics of the difference between the 
adjacent A^. The mean A^ in category (a) is significantly bigger than that 
in category (b), which is in turns significantly bigger than that in category 
(c), which is significantly bigger than that in (d). The number of market 
makers on the best ask appears to play an important role in determining 
the order imbalance: the fewer market makers on the yellow strip, the more 
unbalanced the orders each one receives.
The next panel groups the trades according to the number of market 
makers posting the quotes during the day. The mean of A^ ranges between 
12.40% and 47.37% in category (a), between 6.78% and 25.27% in category 
(b), between —10.05% and 6.95 in category (c), and between —16.88% and 
—7.19% in category (d). With only one exception, A^ in category (a) is 
always greater than that in category (b), which is in turns greater than that 
in (c), which is greater than that in (d). The t-statistics are significant at
40
0.01 level in most cases. The last panel shows the of the three chosen 
market makers. The pattern of A^ of Firm A is similar to what is observed 
in the aggregate level. For the remaining two firms, the results are less clear. 
Although A^ in category (a) is still bigger than that in (d), it does not 
monotonously decline from category (a) to (b) to (c) and to (d). Nor are 
most of the t-statistics significant.
Table 2.8 shows the means of the adjusted A^ of the four categories on 
the bid side. The results are again consistent with the hypothesis that the 
order imbalance of the market maker quoting the best bid decreases in the 
number of market makers on the best bid. The mean A^ of category (a), 
(b), (c) and (d) are respectively —28.44%, —22.75%, —11.29% and 6.31%. 
The diflferences in the adjacent A^ are all significantly smaller than zero at 
0,01 level. When the trades are grouped by the number of market makers 
posting the quotes, A^ of category (a) is almost always smaller than that of 
category (b) with only one exception, A^ of category (b) is always smaller 
than that in category (c), which is in turns smaller than that in category (d). 
More than half of the t-statistics are significant. Finally, the rising pattern 
of A^ can be found in the trading by Firm A and Firm B, but it is not the 
case for Firm C. However, many of the t-statistics at the firm’s level are not 
significant.
2.4 Q uote status, order flows, and trade 
sizes
In a dealership market, if market makers do not post the best quotes, they can 
still receive some orders from the customers. The orders come from two main 
sources. The first source is preferenced order fiows. Last section has shown 
that how preferenced orders increase the difficulty to detect the hnk between 
quote status and order fiow. The second source of the orders is large trades. 
Market makers only honour the quotes up to a certain size. The price of a 
trade with the size bigger than the quote size has to be negotiated between 
the market maker and the customer. When a customer seeks to execute a
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large order, it is not necessary for her to trade with those market makers who 
are posting the best quotes. Market makers who do not post the best quotes 
may be wiUing to offer more competitive prices for the large trades than 
those who are on the yellow strip do. It is possible, however, that posting 
the best quotes signals the willingness of the market makers to execute the 
large trades with lower costs. The signalhng effect will strengthen the link 
between quote and order flow, but the absence of the hnk between large 
trades and quotes, is by no means an indication of the lack of competition in 
the market.
2.4.1 Order imbalance and trade sizes
To know whether the link between order flow and quote status exists for any 
sizes of trades, trades are classified into ten groups based on the multiples of 
the most popular quotes sizes of the stocks in the sample (the Modal Quote 
Size, or MQS), which are often the same as the NMS.** Summary statistics 
are presented in Table 2.9. The majority of the trades are of less than 0.05 
MQS multiples, and there are much more sells than buys in this group. There 
is not much difference between buys and sells when the size becomes bigger. 
Despite the number is large, the very small trades only contribute less than 
3% of the volumes to the market. The volumes concentrate on the trades 
with the sizes between one and seventy-five times MQS.
Define similar to before as the adjusted percentage difference between 
the numbers of buys and sells in one of the four-way category of a particular 
stock by a particular market maker within a particular size range. Define 
as the percentage difference between buy and sell volumes of a stock of a 
market maker within a particular size range. Table 2.10 presents the means 
and t-statistics of A ^ and A^ in different size groups. All the percentage 
differences are adjusted for the total market imbalance. The first panel shows 
the means of A^. The familiar pattern emerges from most of the size group. 
The A ^ in the on-ask category is almost always bigger than that in on-both 
or straddle category, which is bigger than that in on-bid category. in
Transaction Data Service does not provide NMS data.
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the on-ask category is positive except for the group of trades bigger than 
75 times MQS, and it appears to be bigger in the medium-size groups than 
in the small-size or large-size groups. The biggest in the category is 
45.72%, which occurs with the trades between 0.5 and 1 times MQS. On the 
other hand, in the on-bid category is negative except for the two biggest 
groups. The smallest in the on-bid category is —28.06%, which occurs 
with the trades between 0.5 and 1 times MQS, too. The case in A^ is very 
similar, as shown in the second panel. A^ in the on-ask category in each 
size group is often bigger than that in on-both or straddle category, which 
is in turns bigger than that in on-bid category. A^ of on-ask category is 
positive for the size groups between 0.1 and 6 times MQS, but it is negative 
elsewhere. A^ of on-bid category is negative except for the group with the 
size between 6 and 75 times MQS.
Overall, the most serious order imbalance in both on-bid and on-ask cat­
egories occurs around the size of one times MQS. When market makers post 
only one side of the best quotes, they are more likely to attract the orders 
of medium-size trades from one direction. Their ability of attracting trades 
bigger than one times MQS implies that being present on the yellow strip 
essentially advertises their willingness to trade with the pubhc at any size. It 
is not surprising the means of A^ and A^ of the group with 75 times MQS 
or more show different signs in on-bid or on-ask category. The very large 
trades often experience lengthy negotiations. Some of them are pre-arranged 
(Pranks and Schaefer 1995); some of the trades are matched by market mak­
ers between two or more customers. All of the particularities of very large 
trades imply that market makers are aware of the trades long before they are 
executed. Therefore, the quote status at the time of trade execution has little 
to do with the big trades. What is really interesting is the order imbalance of 
the very small trades is less severe than all but the very large trades. Order 
preferencing seems to be prevalent in small trades, and being on one side of 
the yellow strip does not attract many orders from one direction. In fact, 
the result is consistent with the early investigation of Board et al. (1996), in 
which they examine exclusively small trades and cannot detect the difference
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between on and off the yellow strip.
2.4.2 The real spread and order flows
Numerous researchers have shown that the touch spread is wider than the 
effective spread (Wells 1992; Board and Sutcliffe 1995; Reiss and Werner 
1996). It imphes that market makers often offer better prices on the phone 
than the yellow-strip prices. It may be argued that the effective spread 
offered on the phone is the “real” spread that the customers of market makers 
obtained, and the order flows depend on the real spread instead of the touch. 
Therefore, the “real-spread hypothesis” states that those market makers who 
offer a smaller spread (on the phone) receive more orders. Unfortunately, the 
telephone conversations between market makers and the customers are not 
available, and the source of real spread is the observed effective spread from 
transaction data.^ When there is no trade, there is no way to find out what 
the real spreads are, so this hypothesis can only be examined when more 
than two market makers obtain the order flows at the same time.
To test the real-spread hypothesis, obtain the number of trades in different 
size categories by each market maker in a certain period of time, and calculate 
the average effective spread. The “certain period of time” is either a day or 
an hour. Trades are grouped according to the trade sizes because effective 
spreads are related to trade sizes (de Jong et al. 1995 and Chapter 4). Buys 
and sells are grouped separately because market makers may offer different 
spreads for the trades in different directions. For example, if a market maker 
wishes to attract more buys and less sells, then he should offer both low ask 
and low bid price relative with the mid-touch, so the effective spread of a buy 
is smaller than that of a sell. The effective spread is s defined in (1.1). An 
alternative of the effective spread is to measure the “gain” from the trade,
i.e., the distance between the transaction price and the best bid or best ask 
price (Board and Sutchffe 1995; Reiss and Werner 1997). However, Chapter 
3 will argue that this measure is undesirable when the size of touch spread
® As is argued in Chapter 4, the spread is an unobservable component of the transaction 
price. The effective spread used in this section serves as a proxy for the real spread.
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varies.
The real-spread hypothesis implies the number of trade is negatively re­
lated to s. Within each size-time-direction group, calculate the correlation 
coefficients of the number of trades and the effective spread. Table 2.11 
reports the means of the correlation coefficients. The first panel presents 
the results by grouping the trades every day. The first column shows the 
mean coefficients between the number of trades and s. The mean coeffi­
cient is 0.04, which is positive and statistically significant, contrary to the 
real-spread hypothesis. When the coefficients are grouped according to the 
size, the coefficients of the smallest and the largest trade group are positive, 
but the coefficients are negative when the trade size is between 0.1 and 75 
times MQS. The smallest coefficient is —0.12 with the group of trades be­
tween two and three times MQS. The second panel shows the coefficients 
when the trades are grouped every hour. The mean coefficient of the full 
sample violates the real-spread hypothesis. The violation of the hypothesis 
again comes from the small trades, most of which may be executed electron­
ically and without negotiation. The coefficients of medium and big trades 
are consistent with the hypothesis.
Table 2.11 provides the evidence supporting the real-spread hypothesis 
for large trades but not small trades. The “real” quotes on the phone appear 
to play a role in attracting order flows. The main problem of measuring the 
real spread, however, is the lack of the data. First, telephone conversations 
are not available, so the spread has to be measured from the transaction 
data. Second, since the spread is measured from the transaction data, there 
is a spread only if there is a trade. It is not known that whether those market 
makers who do not receive order flows during a day or an hour offer better 
or worse quotes than those who do. It is even very rare for Hquid stocks that 
two or more market makers execute the trades of the same stock within the 
same size group at the same time period in the same trade direction. The last 
two columns of Table 2.11 shows the number of trades and volumes of the 
groups. Compared with Table 2.9, the trades used in testing the real-spread 
hypothesis are only a small proportion of the fuU sample. Nevertheless, the
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bottom line is that the order flows of medium trades, and large trades to 
some extent, appear to be negatively related to the real spread offered by 
market makers on the phone.
2.5 Q uoting behaviour
2.5.1 Preliminaries
Because the quote status is related to the number and the balance of the 
orders, market makers must decide how to quote thoughtfully. The quoting 
behaviour of market makers is examined in this section. All the stocks with 
quotes in the forty-two trading days between February and March 1996 are 
included. Apart from the 1832 stocks used in Section 2.3 and 2.4, another ten 
stocks without trade data are included. For each stock, there were at least 
two market makers maintaining the quotes for all of the forty-two trading 
days during the two-month period.
The mandatory quote period is between 8:30 and 16:30 every weekday. 
Most of the market makers start posting the quotes well before 8:20, and 
most of them withdraw the quotes before 16:40. Occasionally, some of the 
market makers may be late in posting the quotes, sometimes even after 9:00, 
and some of them may withdraw the quotes before 16:30. To avoid the case in 
which some of the market makers are inactive, only the period during which 
all of the market makers are present is considered. In other words, if the quote 
of any market maker is not available, then the rest of the quotes are not used, 
either. Whether or not the quotes are inside the mandatory quote period is 
irrelevant. An implicit assumption behind this sample selection criterion is 
that quotes outside the mandatory quote period are as informative as inside.
Table 2.12 provides summary statistics of the quote data. The stocks 
are classified according to the number of market makers present during the 
day. Market makers are free to provide or withdraw the quotes for any 
stock after notifying the Stock Exchange in the previous day, the number of 
market makers for any stock is stable but not necessarily constant, and the 
stocks may be included into more than one of the market-maker groups. The
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maximum number of market makers in the sample is nineteen, more than 
those in Reiss and Werner (1996) and Hansch et al. (1998), in which both 
are seventeen. Column three and four are respectively the medians of quote 
and inside spreads. The next column shows the median of quote sizes in 
pounds sterhng, which is defined as
quote size=0.5 x (bid quote x bid quantity+ask quote x ask quantity).
The next column provides the median number of quotes per market maker 
per day. If there are few market makers, then they often maintain the same 
quotes during the day, and the median number of daily quote is one. The 
more market makers, the more quote changes they make. However, even 
thought there are nineteen market makers, a market maker on average only 
posts eight quotes per day, or in other words, changes the quote once per 
hour on average. The quote spread, the touch spread, the quote size and the 
number of quotes per day in the sample are very similar to what have been 
reported in the hterature (Board and Sutcliffe 1995; Reiss and Wemer 1996; 
Hansch et al. 1999).
The last four columns of the table indicate the means of the number of 
market makers in one of the four quote status during the day: at best ask 
only, at best bid only, at both best bid and ask, and straddhng the yehow 
strip. It is the major difference between the current sample and those in 
previous studies. The numbers of market makers who straddle the quotes 
are bigger than those found in Reiss and Werner (1996), and there are less 
market makers who are on the yehow strip. Reiss and Werner (1996) find 
the median of market makers on the best bid, ask and straddle are 4,4 and 1 
respectively. Hansch et al. (1998) report that 70% of market makers quote 
one side, and there are typicahy two to four market makers at either side at 
any time. Board et al. (1996) also report that more than a half of market 
makers are on either side of the best quote. In contrast, straddhng the yellow 
strip seems to be more common in the current sample.
Despite the apparent difference, this sample exhibits some other features 
similar to those in previous studies. Table 2.13 presents the common practices 
of quoting and trading behaviour of market makers. First, as documented
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in Board et al. (1997), market makers use a few common quote spreads, 
among which three, five, seven and ten pence are the most popular ones. 
Coincidentally, Goodhart and Figliuoli (1991) find five, seven and ten are 
commonly used values in foreign exchange markets. Second, although there 
is no formal tick rule, market makers appear to post the quotes in a certain 
units. Define the implicit tick of a stock as the minimum difference of the 
consecutive ask prices, then it turns out that most of the quotes are rounded 
in pence, similar to Board et al. (1997), where 97.5% of the quotes are 
rounded in pence. There are more trade prices that are rounded in half a 
penny, but the majority the trade prices are still in pence. Regarding the 
scale of change in quotes, it is very common for market makers to move 
the mid-quote by one or two pence. Finally, more than 99% of the quote 
changes are to move the mid-quotes upwards or downwards, mostly in the 
same direction of the preceding change (78%) and even by the same scale 
(45%). Only a tiny proportion of the quote changes involves a change in the 
quote spread or quote size.
2.5.2 Quote status
Table 2.12 suggests the market makers who straddle the yellow strip are 
usually more than those who post the best quotes. Table 2.14 provides 
further evidence of the behaviour of market makers. The quote status of 
market makers is classified into five categories: alone on both sides of the 
yellow strip, on both sides with another market makers, on one side alone, 
on one side with another market makers, and straddhng the yehow strip. As 
will be shown shortly, market makers behave very differently when they are 
alone on the best quote.
The left-hand side of Table 2.14 reports the average time during a day for 
different quote status. For example, a market maker who posts quotes in a 
two-market-maker stock is on average on both sides of the yellow strip alone 
for two minutes per day, and with the other market maker for four hours and 
thirty-five minutes. Note that the sum of the duration of each market-maker 
group may be less than eight hours (the length of mandatory quote period)
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as only the time when all market makers post the quotes is counted. The less 
the market makers, the longer they are present on both sides of the yellow 
strip. Most of the market makers of the same stock always quote the same 
spread for any given stock. If everybody quotes the same spread, then one 
market maker is on both sides of the best quote if and only if everybody 
is on both sides.® Thus, “not alone on both sides” often imphes everybody 
quotes the same bid and ask prices. When everybody quotes the same price, 
the touch spread is much wider than its average. This property is also found 
with the quotes on NASDAQ (Chan, Christie, and Schultz 1995). However, 
such occasions are not very common when there are a large number of market 
makers. “Alone on both side” , on the other hand, imphes the quote spread of 
the market maker is narrower than those of the others, and it rarely occurs. 
The time when market makers are on one side of the best quote dechnes with 
the number of market makers. The next two columns show the time when 
market makers are on one side of the yeUow strip. Again, market makers 
are much less likely to stand alone on the strip. As the number of market 
makers increases, they spend more time straddling the yeUow strip. When 
there are more than fifteen market makers, a typical market maker straddles 
the yellow strip for half of the day.
The right-hand side of the table shows the daily average frequency of 
which a market maker moves into a new quote status. A new status includes 
the opening status, the change from one of the five status to another, and 
although rarely occurred, the change between the best bid and the best ask
® Suppose M  market makers quote bid and ask price (ai, 6 1 ), (0 2 , 6 2 ), • • • » re­
spectively. The best bid is max(6 i • • • 6 Af)> and the best ask is min(ai •••aM)- Now 
suppose everybody quotes the same spread, that is, a» — 6 * =  aj — Vz, j  E {1,2- • • ,M}.  
If 3k, ttk =  min(ai • • • om) and 6 * =  max(6 i • • • Im ), then Vi,
Oi — bi =  ak — bk =  min(ai • • • üm) — max(6i • • • 6 m) ^ — 6*.
Hence, 6  ^ >  6 * =  max(6 i - - - 6 M). Similarly,
ai — bi — ak — bk =  min(ai • • • om) — max(6 i • • • 6 m) < — 6 ».
ai < ak — min(ai • • • om)- That is, for any given i, ai =  a*, bi =  bk.
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within the “on one side” categories. In general, the number of frequency 
increases with the average time of staying in the status, but it is not always 
the case. The most notable exception is the frequency of straddling the best 
quote is always less than that of on one side (not alone), even when the 
length of time of straddling is longer. It imphes market makers move out of 
the on-one-side status quicker than straddhng. The last colunm of the Table 
2.14 sums up the daily average frequency. The changes in quote status are 
more than the changes in quote posted shown in Table 2.12. Every change 
in quote status results from the change of quotes either by the market maker 
himself or by somebody else, so the quote status may change when the quotes 
are unchanged.
Although Table 2.14 shows that an average market maker straddles the 
yellow strip most of the time, the time when only one market maker stands 
on one side of the yellow strip is very long. For example, the table shows 
an average market maker in 19-market-maker group stays on one side of the 
yellow strip sixteen minutes a day. It means the time when there is only 
one market maker on one side of the yellow strip is 16 x 19 =  304 minutes. 
Suppose the time of being alone on best bid and best ask are equal, then on 
average there is only one market maker on either side for more than two and 
half hours a day. While most of the market makers are straddhng the strip, 
some market makers appear to stay on the strip very often. This finding is 
consistent with Board et al. (1997) in which they find a few market makers 
act as price leaders and update the quote rather aggressively.
2.5.3 W illingness to  post the best quote
The distinction of the source of change is important especially when the 
market maker is alone on the yeUow strip. If a market updates either the 
lowest ask or the highest bid to stand alone on the yellow strip, then he is 
a price leader. On the other hand, if a market maker is left alone on the 
yellow strip, it may imply that he is a slow mover. The attempt to make 
the distinction between the two sources of quote change is showm in Table 
2.15. Each category of quote status is further divided into two according to
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the source of the change: “S” represents the change is made by the market 
maker himself, and “O” represents the change is made by the others. Only 
the frequency of quote status is reported. First, the difference in the numbers 
of status between the S and O categories on both sides of the yellow strip 
increases proportionally to the increase in the number of market makers. 
The difference can be seen clearly by looking at the 0 /S  ratio, defined as 
the number of O changes divided by that of S changes. The ratio rises from 
1.00 when there are two market makers, to 9.34 when there are ten, and to 
17.89 when there are nineteen. If there are M  market makers, then the 0 /S  
ratio in this column is close to M — 1, which is a direct result from the fact 
that “one market maker quotes the best bid and ask price” often imphes that 
“the rest of M — 1 market makers quotes the best bid and ask price, too.”
A smaUer difference between S change and O change is in the status in 
which the market maker is on one side of the yeUow strip. In the “alone 
on one side” category, market makers are shghtly more often moved into 
the status by others than by themselves. S changes are less frequent than 
O changes when the market makers are few, and are nearly as much as O 
changes when market makers are more. S changes are less frequent in “not 
alone on one side” category. The highest 0 /S  ratio in the category is 3.1, 
where there are nineteen market makers. However, the difference in this 
category is the major contribution to the gap between the total sum of S and 
O changes: market makers do not voluntarily move to one side of the best 
quote very often. Instead, their status as on one side often results from the 
quote changes by the others. Finally, the move to straddle the yellow strip 
is also shghtly more hkely by O changes than S changes.
After the source of the change is examined, the next step is naturally to 
investigate what ends the current quote status. The end of the quote status 
may not only result from the quote change by the market maker himself or by 
somebody else, but it may also result from the withdrawal of the quote at the 
end of the day. As the proportion of withdrawal does not vary substantially 
across different quote status categories, the focus is to compare the numbers
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of s  changes and O changes/ Table 2.16 contains the 0 /S  ratio of subsequent 
changes. If the ratio is smaller than one, it imphes the status is ended by 
the market maker himself more often than by somebody else. If the ratio is 
greater than one, the status is changed more often by somebody else. If the 
source of the current status is an S change, that is, the market maker moves 
into the status by his own choice, then he should be happy to stay in the 
status, and it is more likely that somebody else forces him out. On the other 
hand, if the current status is an O change, the market maker is moved into 
the status involuntarily, then he is more likely to end the status by himself. 
To sum up, an S change is expected to be followed by a big 0 /S  ratio, and 
an O change to be by a small 0 /S  ratio.
Table 2.16 reports the subsequent 0 /S  ratios by the quotes status and 
by whether current quote is an O change or an S change. First, examine the 
two “on one side” categories. The ratios in the two S columns under “on one 
side” categories are all greater than one, and the ratios in the two O columns 
are smaller than one with only three exceptions. Moreover, the ratios of the 
O column on the “alone” category are mostly between 0.19 and 0.31, while 
those in “not alone” colunm are at least 0.50. It means that a market maker 
is much more likely to get out of the best quote voluntarily when he is left 
alone than when he is there with somebody else. The ratios are very similar 
for the two S colunms.
What if the market maker is on both sides of the yellow strip? The httle 
evidence on the two “alone” categories does not provide too many clues. 
However, the numbers in the two “not alone” columns are all greater than 
one with only one exception. Once the market maker is moved to be on 
both sides of the best quotes with other market makers, than regardless of 
the source of the change, the market maker is not hkely to move to another 
status by himself. The same is true in the straddle category: once moved in, 
the market maker often stays in the status until somebody else forces him
 ^Nonetheless, a substantial proportion of the next quote change is withdrawal, for 
example, it is 59% when there are only two market makers. If there are more market 
makers, there are more changes in the quote status during the day, and the proportion of 
withdrawal falls to 5% when there are nineteen market makers.
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out of it.
If a market maker ends the quote status by himself, to which direction 
does he move the quote? As has been shown in Table 2.13, 99.95% of the 
quote changes move the mid-quote only; the quote spread and the quote size 
remains unchanged. To examine the direction of the change, all the quote 
status preceding quote changes which only move the mid-quote are classified 
into seven categories: alone on both sides, not alone on both sides, straddle, 
alone on ask, not alone on ask, alone on bid, and not alone on bid. Take the 
means of the subsequent changes in the mid-quote by each current status in 
each stock to perform t-tests provided that there are at least five changes 
in the category. 656,737 quote changes in 1,537 stocks are used to perform 
6,153 t-tests. Instead of presenting more than six thousand numbers. Table 
2.17 groups the t-statistics by their sizes. The break-up points are 0, ±2 and 
±3.
If the quote status does not affect the way in which a market maker 
changes his quote, then the means of the changes in mid-quotes are similar 
across the status categories.® The test result shows it is not true. If market 
makers change the quotes when they are straddling or on the both sides of the 
yellow strip, then it is unclear whether they wifi move the mid-quote upwards 
or downwards. Most of the t-statistics in those categories are between -2 and 
2, neither of which is significantly greater than or smaller than zero.
If the market maker changes the quote when he is at the best ask but not 
the bid, then he is more likely to move the quote upwards instead of down­
wards. In fact, the means are significantly greater than zero in overwhelming 
majority of the stocks. The reverse is true when the market maker is on the 
best bid: he is more likely to move the quote downwards than upwards in 
most of the stocks. Moreover, the tendency is more pronounced when the 
market maker is alone on the yellow strip. 95% of the t-values of change in 
mid-quote are greater than two when market makers are alone on the best 
ask, while the proportion is 91% when market makers are with somebody
® The means of the change need not be zero. In a bull market, most of the quotes are 
adjusted upwards. In a bear market, most of the quotes are adjusted downwards.
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else. When the market makers are on the best bid, the proportions of t- 
values less than two are 91% in the “alone” category and 79% in the “not 
alone” category. Both moving up from best ask and moving down from the 
best bid means moving away from the best quote, which is consistent with 
the other findings earlier in this section that market makers prefer straddhng 
the yellow strip to standing on one side of the quote.^
To assemble the evidence together, a typical market maker exhibits cer­
tain patterns in posting the quotes. He spends a lot of time to stand on both 
sides of the yeUow strip when there are few market makers, and to straddle 
the strip when there are a lot of market makers. He does not often move to 
one side yellow strip voluntarily. When he is forced to be on one side of the 
yeUow strip, he often moves away. On the other hand, he often chooses to 
straddle the yeUow strip, and he is wiUing to straddle even it is not by his 
own choice.
2.6 Causes o f quote change
2.6.1 Regression analysis
Section 2.3 and 2.4 examine what the consequences of quote changes are. Sec­
tion 2.5 documents the patterns of quote changes, and it is time to investigate 
what trigger the quote change. The technique used here is cross-sectional re­
gressions. The dependent variable is the difference of mid-quote, and the 
independent variables are the inventory levels, the previous sum of trades, 
the previous trading volumes, and the preceding quote changes. The regres­
sion is run on the full sample, so all of the variables are transformed to avoid 
the possible distortion brought by the difference of the stocks. For example, 
liquid stocks have more trades and smaller quote change; ilhquid stocks have 
less trades and bigger quote change. If the regression were run on the unad-
® Table 2.13 shows the popular absolute quote changes are to move the mid-quote by 
one or two pence, while the popular quote spreads are five, seven, three and ten pence. 
Consequently, a quote change is generally not enough to move from one side of the best 
quote to the other.
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justed variables, a negative and false relationship between trades and quote 
change would be detected. The dependent variable of the regression model is 
Arrit^i, the mid-quote of market maker i after the change at time t minus the 
mid-quote before the change. Note that the mid-quotes of market makers are 
not necessarily the mid-touch. The quote changes which does not move the 
mid-quote are not included in the analysis. More than 99.95% of the quote 
change is to move up or down both bid and ask prices by the same amount, 
so only a few observations are dropped. To standardise Arrit i^, the variable 
is divided by the mean of the absolute value of quote change of the stock.
The independent variables can be classified into six groups:
1. The number of trades executed by market maker i between the current 
quote change and the preceding quote. Basket trades, put-throughs and 
crosses are now included as they may affect the decision of the change 
in quotes. Trades are classified according to the trade directions and 
the time of the trades, and then the number of trades are divided by 
the daily average number of the trades of the stock executed by the 
firm in the sample. Six variables are included in the regression: Xi^ bfl 
is the (standardised) number of buys executed by market maker i that 
take place less than one minute before the quote change, is the 
number of buys between one and two minutes before the quote change, 
and Xi^ b,2 is the number of trades between two minutes before the quote 
change and the time when the preceding quote is posted. The preceding 
quote is the latest quote posted in the market before the quote change, 
and it may be posted by another market maker. The number of sells 
are defined in a similar way and denoted as Xi^ s,o, Xi^ s,i, and Xi^ s,2 -
2. The trading volumes executed by market maker i between the current 
quote change and the preceding quote. Volumes are classified accord­
ing to the trade directions and the time of the trades, and then are 
divided by the average daily volumes of the stock executed by the firm 
in the sample. Six variables are included in the regression, and they 
are defined in a similar way as when the number of trades are defined: 
Vi^ b,o is the standardised buy volumes by market maker i taking place
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less than one minute before the quote change, is the buy volumes
between one and two minutes before the quote change, and Vi^ b,2 is the 
volumes between two minutes before the quote change and the time 
when the previous quote is posted. The numbers of sell volumes are 
defined in a similar way and denoted as and Vi,s,2 *
3. The number of trades without the involvement of the market maker 
who is changing the quote. The trades are classified according to the 
time of the trades and “trade directions”. When the market maker 
does not execute the trades, he cannot observe the trade directions 
directly, and the directions are identified by matching the trade prices 
with the mid-touch. That is, the trade is a buy if its price is above 
the mid-touch, it is a sell if the price is below the mid-touch, and the 
trades whose prices equal the mid-touch are excluded from the analysis. 
The number of trades is then divided by the daily average number of 
trades of the stock without the involvement of the market maker. Six 
variables are included in the regression: ^m,i 
and 2  the buys and sells without the involvement of market 
maker i. They are defined in a similar way as the counterparts
4. The trading volumes without the involvement of the market maker who 
is changing the quote. Volumes are classified according to the time of 
the trades and “trade directions”, which are determined by the prices 
of the trades and the mid-touch when the trades take place. Then the 
volumes are standardised by divided by the daily average volumes of 
the stock without the involvement of the market maker. Six variables 
are included in the regression: <6,i, < 6 ,2 . %>,o. <«,i and n? ,2 - 
They are defined in a similar way as the counterpart
5. The preceding quote change of the stock, which may be made by the 
same or different market maker. Three variables are included according 
to the time when the preceding change occurs. If the two changes are 
less than one minutes apart, then Arrit-ifi =  Arrit-i, Arut-i^i = 0, and
=  O' If the time difference of the two changes are between one
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and two minutes, then Arrit-i^ =  0 , Arrit-i^i =  Arrit-i, and Arrit-1,2 =  
0. If the time difference of the two changes are more than two minutes, 
then Arrit-ifi — 0 , Arrit-i,i = 0, and Arrit-1^ 2 =  Arrit-i. If there is no 
preceding quote change, for example, the preceding quote is an opening 
quote, then Arut-ifi = Arut-i^i = Arrit-1^ 2 = 0 .
6 . The inventory of the firm immediately before the quote change. As­
sume the inventory is zero in the beginning of the sample period. The 
inventory level is defined as the accumulated sell volumes minus buy 
vo lum es.T w o variables are included. It is the standardised inventory, 
the inventory subtracted from the average end-of-the-day inventory of 
the market maker and then divided by the standard deviation (see 
Hansch et al. 1998.) If there is no trade at all, then It =  0. The sec­
ond variable is A/*, the change of inventory between the current quote 
change and the preceding quote by market maker i.
The unadjusted change in inventory is the sum of sell volumes minus 
the sum of buy volumes between the current quote change and the 
preceding quote, so including A lt  and the variable group two together 
in the regression may cause colinearity. However, while A lt is the sum 
of volumes between two quotes of market maker i, the volumes in the 
second group of variable only include those between the current change 
and the preceding quote, which may not be made by the same market 
maker. The correlation coefficients between A lt  and each variable in 
group two are small, and the correlation coefficient between A lt and 
— ^2,6 ) is —0.31.
According to inventory hypothesis, > 0  and It,
A lt < 0. According to information hypothesis, if trades contain information, 
then Xi^ b,*, Vi^ b,*, < 6 ,* > 0  and It, A lt < 0 .
10 Note that buy and sell are defined from the customers’ point of view.
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2.6.2 Evidence
The result of the regression of the full sample is presented in Table 2.18. 
Two regression models are used. The first one employs all of the six groups 
of independent variables, and the second one omits Group 2 variables to avoid 
the possible cohnearity. The coefficient values and t-statistics are shown. The 
statistics are adjusted for heteroscedasticity by White’s (1980) approach. 
The results from the two models are very similar. All of the coefficients 
of are positive and of are negative, which means the quotes are 
hkely to go up after executing buy trades and are likely to go down after 
seU trades. The absolute value of is decreasing as the time difference 
increase, which means the quote changes are more likely to associated with 
the nearest trades. However, the second group of variables, does not 
exhibit similar properties. is not always positive, and Vi^ s,* is not always 
negative. The t-statistics are not significant except for The estimates of 
Group 3 and Group 4 variables exhibit a similar pattern to those in group one. 
All of the coefficients of and are positive and all of and t?9^  *are 
negative. The t-values of Group 3 variables are all significant at 0.0001 level, 
so are most of the t-values of Group 4 variables. Furthermore, recall that the 
sample consist of more sells than buys. Given the fact that the coefficients 
of buy trades and buy volumes are not much bigger than those of sell, it 
follows that the quotes were moved downwards in the sample period. This 
is exactly what happens with most of the stocks. There are more downward 
changes of the stocks with more than fifteen market makers, where most of 
the trades occur. The most important variables, however, are the preceding 
change in the mid-quote. The coefficients of Amt_i,o, Amt_i,i, and Amt_i ,2  
are all positive and the t-values are much bigger than zero. The coefficient 
value of Amt_i,o is greater than that of Amt_i,i, which is greater than that of 
Amt_i^2 * The decreasing estimates imply the more closely the current quote 
change to the preceding change is, the more likely the former resembles the 
latter. In fact, the preceding change explains more than 40% of the variation 
of the quote change. After introducing group five variables, the rest of the 
variables only improve the marginally. In contrast, the inventory variables
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do not have much effect on the quote change. The coefficient estimates are 
very close to zero, and the t-statistics are not significant at all. The second 
regression still does not show the inventory variables explain the quote change 
very well, either. The bottom of the table shows the and the number of 
observations (N) used in the models.
It is interesting to examine whether the results from the regression of 
the full sample hold for the subsets of the sample. Table 2.19 reports the 
regression results of the quote changes during the day when there are two, ten 
and nineteen market makers present. Group two variables are not included 
in the regressions. The results are very similar to those reported in Table
2.18. All of the coefficients associated with buy trades and buy volumes 
are positive with only two exceptions. All of the coefficients associated with 
sell trades and sell volumes are negative without any exceptions. The t- 
statistics are not as significant as those in Table 2.18, but most of them are 
still significantly different from zero. The preceding quote changes,
are still the most influential variables of the models. The magnitudes of the 
coefficients of are not very different from the counterpart in Table
2.18. The inventory variables, however, show some difference. In the two- 
market-maker sample, the coefficients of inventory variables are significantly 
smaller than zero, which indicates the inventory play a role in determining 
the change of quotes. For the other two samples, most of the coefficients of 
It and A lt  are negative, but they are not significantly different from zero.^^
A great difference of the three samples is that market makers weigh the 
trade information differently. The magnitudes of the coefficients of group 
one variables (iCi,*,*) of the two-market-maker sample are often bigger than
No distinction has been made between customer trades and inter-dealer trades in this 
chapter. However, Section 3.6 will show that IDB trades and IMM trades affect the quote 
change differently from customer trades. In general, IDB trades do not move the quotes 
and IMM trades do considerably. The parameters estimated in the regression may depend 
on the proportion of IDB and IMM trades in the sample. Since the number of inter-dealer 
trades is small, the aggregation of customer trades and inter-dealer trades may not even 
affect the result of the nineteen-market-maker case, let alone the other stocks. See further 
discussions in Chapter 3.
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those of the other two samples. For example, the coefficients of equals 
0.8312 in the two-market-maker sample, which is greater than 0.4077 in the 
ten-market-maker sample and 0.6571 in the nineteen-market-maker sample. 
On the other hand, the coefficients of Xi^ s,o equals —0.9728 in the two-market- 
maker sample, which is smaller than —0.3618 in the ten-market-maker sample 
and —0.4136 in the nineteen-market-maker sample. In contrast, the magni­
tudes of the coefficients of Group 3 and Group 4 variables * and *) of 
the nineteen-market-maker sample are often bigger than those of the other 
two samples. One of the reasons is probably that the more market makers 
in the market, the less market shares a market maker has, and the more the 
market makers value the trade information of the others.
Table 2.20 presents the regression results on the subsamples of three mar­
ket making firms. Again, all of the coefficients associated with buy trades 
and buy volumes are positive, and all of the coefficients associated with sell 
trades and sell volumes are negative with four exceptions. Arrit-i,* still ex­
plain most of the quote change and all of the coefficients are significantly 
different from zero. Inventory variables are significant in the Firm A sample, 
but not in Firm B sample. A lt  is also significant in the Firm C sample. 
The significance of the inventory variables corresponds to the significance of 
those variables in the two-market-maker sample, as both Firm A and Firm 
C quote a large number of small stocks. The most notable difference among 
the regression results of the three firms is that Firm B values the information 
of the trades not executed by itself more than the other two firms do. The 
coefficients of * and * of Firm B are often bigger than those of Firm A 
or Firm C, and the coefficients of of Firm B are often not significantly 
different from zero.
Table 2.21 reports the regressions of the quote change according to the 
quote status after the change. The four-way classification is used: quotes 
are either on both sides of the yellow strip (on-both), only on the best ask 
(on-ask), only on the best bid (on-bid) or neither on best ask nor best bid 
(straddle). The coefficients associated with buy trades and buy volumes 
are all positive with two exceptions, and the coefficients associated with sell
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trades and sell volumes are negative with three exceptions. are still
positive and significantly greater than zero, but the coefficient values of on- 
ask and on-bid samples are very different from those of on-both and straddle 
samples. The coefficients of of on-both and straddle category are
closer to those reported in the full sample, while those of Arrit-ifi and Arrit-i,i 
of the on-bid and on-ask regressions fall by near 0.2 to between 0.4 and 0.5, 
and those of A m t- 1^ 2 fall to between 0.21 and 0.24. Therefore, when market 
makers change to quote only on one side of the yellow strip, the preceding 
change is not as important as when market makers change to quote both 
sides or to straddle the strip. Inventory variables are significant in the on- 
both sample, which may also reflect the results in Table 2.19 and Table 2.20 
that it is more common for the market makers to quote both sides in the 
small stocks. As Arrit-i^* cannot explain the quote change in on-ask and on- 
bid sample very much, the has dropped to around 0.21. On the contrary,
is between 0.55 and 0.59 in the on-both and straddle samples.
Table 2.18, 2.19, 2.20 and 2.21 further provide diagnostic statistics of col­
inearity and autocorrelations. The Condition Indices are tiny, which indicate 
there is no evidence of colinearity. The Durbin-Watson statistics reveal that 
the autocorrelations of the residuals of the regressions are small. Therefore, 
the regression models are well-specified.
Finally, a series of Wald tests are performed to examine whether the 
quote change is more likely to be affected by the trades by the market maker 
who changes the quote (group one variables or by the trades without
the involvement of the market maker (Group 3 variables *). Because the 
variables are standardised by the total number of trades of the stock, their 
coefficients can be compared directly. Table 2.22 summarises the results 
of compared the absolute values of and *. An “S” indicates the 
absolute value of the coefficient of is bigger than that of a;?* *, and an 
“O” indicates the opposite is true. When all of the observations are used, the 
magnitude of the coefficient of tends to be smaller than its counterpart of 
a;?* *. When the observations are grouped according to the number of market 
makers of the stock, the moves the quote more for the two-market-maker
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group, and * moves more for most of the ten- and nineteen-market-maker 
group. When the observations are grouped according to the market makers 
who change the quote, the results of Firm A are mixed, the scale of the 
coefficient of a;?* * is bigger for Firm B with only one exception, and that of 
is bigger for Firm C. These results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that market makers pay attention to the trade information of the market as 
a whole. When there are only two market makers, the average market share 
is big, and they value the information of trades by themselves more than by 
the rivals. When the number of market makers increases, the market share 
of each one is getting smaller, and they value the trade information from the 
market more than the trade by themselves. The last panel shows the results 
of the regression models of which the observations are grouped by the quote 
status. The results are intriguing. * are more important for “on-both” 
and “straddle” changes, but Xi^ s,* is more important for “on-ask” change and 
Xi^ b,* is more important “on-bid” changes.
2.6.3 Interpretations
It appears there are mainly two différent types of quote change. The first 
type is to straddle the yellow strip or to quote both sides of the strip. The 
second type is to quote the best bid or the best ask only. Each consists of 
about half of the quote changes. The decision is essentially whether or not 
to quote only one side of the yellow strip. Section 2.3 shows that market 
makers are more likely to receive unbalanced order fiows while on one side of 
the yellow strip. Although quoting one side attracts more orders (Table 2.3), 
market makers may prefer to straddle the yellow strip to receive relatively 
balanced orders. To quote both sides is another way to obtain more balanced 
order fiows. Recall that a market maker quotes both sides often means that 
everybody else quotes the same bid and ask prices. It follows that before a 
market maker quotes both sides of the yellow strip, the rest of the market 
makers have already quoted the same bid and ask prices. The last market 
maker who joins the rest essentially changes the quote from being alone 
on best bid or best ask. Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 show that being on one
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side of the yellow strip alone attracts extremely imbalanced order flows, and 
that being on the yellow strip with everybody else receives balanced orders. 
Consequently, the decision of a market maker to quote both sides implies 
that he prefers to receive more balanced orders.
The regression results reveal the preceding quote change plays an im­
portant role in determining the current quote change, and it is much more 
important when market makers decide to straddle or to quote both sides of 
the yellow strip. When market makers observe they have been or they are 
about to be on one side of the yellow strip, they choose to straddle the strip 
or to quote the same prices as everybody else. The decision to avoid being 
on one side of the yellow strip may partly explain why inventory variables 
are often not signiflcant in most of the regression models. A lot of the mar­
ket makers do not choose to expose themselves to unbalanced order flows 
in the flrst place, so they do not put themselves into an awkward position 
with huge unbalanced inventory. Consequently, market makers do not have 
to change the quote to balance the inventory. Inventory management is diffi­
cult when only two firms make the market. The stocks are less hquid, which 
implies the inventory imbalance may last for a long time. Trade pubhcation 
ensures both market makers know exactly each other’s inventory, so the mar­
ket maker with unbalanced inventory has no intention to conduct inter-dealer 
trading. Consequently, changing the quotes in response to the change in the 
inventory level is a reasonable option in the two-market-maker case. The 
duopoly hterature may shed some hghts on this result (Sutton 1991; Hay 
and Morris 1991; Darrough 1993; Kyle and Wang 1997).
The insignificance of the inventory variables seems to be contradicted to 
the result from Hansch et al. (1998). However, they do not consider the 
information effect, and it is not clear whether the inventory effect in their 
study would exist had other effects been controlled. Moreover, they show 
that the inventory effect is strongest when the inventory levels of market 
makers are extremely unbalanced. The extreme inventory imbalance is by 
definition very uncommon, which indicates the inventory effect does not mat­
ter very much most of the time. It is therefore not surprising the regression
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analysis in the previous section does not find strong inventory effects. Fur­
thermore, although the almost-all positive coefficients of buy trades 
and the almost-all negative coefficients of sell trades Xi^ s,* are consistent with 
both inventory and information hypothesis, it can never be over-emphasised 
that the inventory effect and information effect of trades move the quote 
to the same direction. When an upward revision of quote coincides with a 
number of buy trades and the accompanied inventory reduction, it is always 
sensible to ask whether the change is motivated by inventory or information 
consideration. The regression results are in favour of information eflPects. 
Repeatedly more trade variables are significantly different from zero 
than volume variables are. If inventory were the determining factor to 
move the quotes, then each share traded would be of the same importance 
and volumes would be a better explanatory variable of quote changes. More 
importantly, market makers do not only care about the trades by themselves. 
The quote changes are related to the trades not executed by the market mak­
ers who are changing the quotes, and this information is valued more when 
there are a lot of firms making the market or when the market share of the 
firm is small. It means that market makers consider the trade information 
of the market as a whole and change the quotes accordingly. Therefore, it is 
possible that the significance of inventory variables in the regressions of some 
sub samples is partly attributed to the information effect of the trades. It 
is also possible that some of the inventory effects detected by Hansch, Naik, 
and Viswanathan (1998) are really information effects.
The most influential group of variables of the quote change is the pre­
ceding change. Quite a large number of quote changes take place soon after 
another market maker revises the quote. There are two ways to explain the 
impacts of preceding change along the line of information theory. First, the 
quote changes close to one another reflect the reactions of market makers to 
some public news in the market. Because the news is not transmitted to all 
of the market makers simultaneously, some of them are bound to react to the 
news quicker than the others. As there is consensus of their reactions, almost 
all of the market makers revise the quote to the same direction with similar
64
scale. The second explanation is that some of the market makers do not 
actively collect information. They learn from the quotes of the price leaders 
in the market (Black 1996; Board et al. 1997). When new information ar­
rives at the market, the price leaders revise the quotes, and the others follow 
suit. Without spending too many resources on collecting information, the 
price followers tend to avoid exposing themselves to the yellow strip, as they 
are very vulnerable to unbalanced order flows brought by informed investors. 
Therefore, the price followers are hkely to straddle the strip, which explains 
the big of the regression of straddhng the yehow strip in Table 2.21. On 
the other hand, the price leaders react to the news and lead the quote revision 
of the market. They are wilhng to quote the best bid or ask to avoid order 
flows of informed investors on one side, while attracting uninformed orders 
on the other side. Therefore, the preceding quote change has less influence 
on the current change to one side of the yehow strip, and the R-squares of 
the respective regressions are much smaller.
Do the quotes fufly reflect market information? Although the answer 
to the question may be beyond the scope of this chapter, a few points are 
worth mentioning. The quick quote changes by the price foUowers indeed 
“fufly reflect” the changes by price leaders, so the answer rests on whether 
the quotes by price leaders fufly reflect market information. The explanatory 
power of the preceding quote change is greatly reduced when market makers 
decide to quote only one side of the yellow strip. The information concern 
seems to be a good candidate to explain the change to be on only one side. 
No matter the quotes fufly reflect the information or not, the bottom line 
is, when market makers change the quotes, they take trade information into 
account.
2.7 Conclusions
The quote revisions made by market makers on the London Stock Exchange 
may be classified into two categories. The flrst one is to quote one side of 
the yellow strip in order to attract unbalanced order flows. The quotes are
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often made by price leaders in response to public information. The upward 
quote revisions are often associated with the arrival of buy orders, and the 
downward revisions are often with sell orders. Because volume variables do 
not perform better than trade-number variables in the regression models, and 
because trades made by another market makers affect the quote revisions as 
well, it seems market makers change the quotes according to information 
rather than inventory. Inventory affects the decision only when there are few 
firms making the market. The second category of quote change consists of 
the quote on both sides of the yellow strip or straddhng the strip. The quotes 
are often made by price followers in response to the quote change of price 
leaders. Since straddhng the strip attracts relatively balanced order flows, 
the price foUowers do not face inventory unbalance very often.
The benefit of straddhng the yehow strip is to receive balanced order 
flows; the drawback is the order flows tend to be less than standing on one 
side of the strip. The benefit and drawback of standing on one side of the 
strip is the other way round: receiving more order flows, and the orders are 
unbalanced. Evidence from Section 2.5 and Board et al. (1997) both suggest 
the majority of the market makers are price followers while a smaU number 
of market makers post the quote rather aggressively. One of the directions of 
future research is to examine under what circumstances will a market maker 
becomes price leader or price foUower. Moreover, the quoting behaviour of 
market makers is not fully studied in this chapter. For example, almost ah 
of the market makers maintain the same quote spread for a stock, a property 
which is repeatedly used in this chapter without questioning the reason. It 
would be interesting to know why market makers do not narrow the quote 
spread to stand on both sides of the yellow strip. Theoretical work may 
contribute insights to the questions. Information consideration apparently 
directs the decision of market makers to change the quotes, while the existing 
models of heterogeneous market makers (Ho and StoU 1983; Kandel and Marx 
1997) address the issues of inventory or liquidity. A theoretical model with 
emphasis on information may help explaining the behaviour of heterogeneous 
market makers in multiple dealership markets.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Trade data
number of number of sum of average size
stocks trades volumes in per trade
£millions in pounds
total 1,832 1,219,767 80,952 66,367
buy 1,822 505,905 40,259 79,578
sell 1,829 713,862 40,693 57,004
median stock 226 2 9,948
market A 1,132 336,000 10,749 31,990
maker B 21 271 53 193,899
C 933 81,931 708 8645
trades excluded:
basket trades 13,565 2,644 194,919
crosses 1,670 1,019 610,083
put-throughs 6,081 1,398 229,856
Table 2.2: Exploring the relationship between order flows and quote status
by two-way classification 
of a particular trade category is defined as the percentage of the number of 
buys in the category minus the percentage of the number of sells. Similarly, A ^ 
of a particular trade category is defined as the percentage of buy volumes in the 
category minus the percentage of sell volumes.
Number of trades 
buy % sell %
on best bid 193,222 39.4 297,229 60.6 -21.2 13,610 44.1 17,232 55.9 -11.7
off best bid 312,68342.9 416,633 57.1 -14.3 26,650 53.2 23,461 46.8 6.4
on best ask 226,53647.2 253,312 52.8 -5.6 15,550 55.9 12,246 44.1 11.9
off best ask 279,36937.8 460,550 62.2 -24.5 24,709 46.5 28,446 53.5 -7.0
Volumes in £  millions 
buy % sell % A^
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Table 2.3: Orders and quote duration in three-way classification 
Daily average duration is express in (hour):(minute). Zeros (0) in the percent­
age columns indicate the numbers in their corresponding columns, i.e., number of 
trade, volumes or duration, are smaller than 0.5 % of the category, so the percent­
ages are rounded to zero.
quote number of volumes average
status trades % (£1000) % duration %
Panel 1. The full sample
both sides 111,460 9 3,343,094 4 1:21 17
one side 747,379 61 51,952,371 64 4:41 60
straddling 360,928 30 25,656,229 32 1:49 23
Panel 2. By different number of market makers
2 both sides 37,955 54 488,613 54 4:35 56
one side 32,397 46 414,315 46 3:38 44
straddling 90 0 585 0 0:01 0
10 both sides 1,708 4 128,282 6 0:24 5
one side 25,346 67 1,531,194 69 4:50 62
straddling 10,994 29 546,702 25 2:31 33
19 both sides 659 0 39,536 0 0:02 1
one side 83,482 55 8,006,531 58 3:18 45
straddling 68,968 45 5,741,592 42 3:58 54
Panel 3. Selected market makers
A both sides 20,738 6 433,978 4 1:27 18
one side 208,262 62 6,970,784 65 4:59 63
straddling 107,000 32 3,343,834 31 1:26 18
B both sides 2 1 581 1 0:06 1
one side 178 66 33,674 64 2:56 39
straddling 91 34 18,292 35 4:30 60
C both sides 33,588 41 306,084 43 3:29 43
one side 46,174 56 385,698 54 4:26 54
straddling 2,169 3 16,506 2 0:14 3
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Table 2.4: Trades in the four-way classification
number of trades volumes in £1,000
buy % 
Panel 1. The full sample
sell % buy % sell % A^
on both 54,589 49 56,871 51 -2 1,645,789 49 1,697,305 51 -2
on ask 171,947 47 196,441 53 -7 13,904,703 57 10,548,962 43 14
on bid 138,633 37 240,358 63 -27 11,963,862 44 15,534,844 57 -13
straddle 140,736 39 220,192 61 -22 12,744,679 50 12,911,550 50 -1
Panel 2. By different number of market makers
2 on both 21,177 56 16,778 44 12 240,455 49 248,158 51 -2
on ask 10,595 66 5,510 34 32 102,408 52 94,012 48 4
on bid 7,536 46 8,756 54 -7 106,130 49 111,764 51 -3
straddle 48 53 42 47 7 179 31 406 69 -38
10 on both 734 43 974 57 -14 61,330 48 66,952 52 -4
on ask 6,024 48 6,610 52 -5 403,192 56 322,029 44 11
on bid 4,689 37 8,023 63 -26 377,192 47 428,781 53 -6
straddle 4,528 41 6,466 59 -18 251,851 46 294,851 54 -8
19 on both 225 34 434 66 -32 19,470 49 20,066 51 -2
on ask 16,177 38 26,502 62 -24 2,395,437 62 1,491,880 38 23
on bid 12,817 31 27,986 69 -37 1,570,713 38 2,548,501 62 -24
straddle 25,533 37 43,435 63 -26 2,817,411 49 2,924,182 51 -2
Panel 3. Selected market makers
A on both 9,126 44 11,612 56 -12 208,105 48 225,873 52 -4
on ask 42,414 40 64,845 61 -21 1,846,666 55 1,512,055 45 10
on bid 36,845 37 64,158 64 -27 1,574,049 44 2,038,014 56 -13
straddle 39,385 37 67,615 63 -26 1,778,964 53 1,564,870 47 6
B on both 2 100 0 100 581 100 0 100
on ask 38 75 13 26 49 5,859 69 2,642 31 38
on bid 36 28 91 72 -43 6,897 27 18,276 73 -45
straddle 38 42 53 58 -17 6,436 35 11,856 65 -30
C on both 18,599 55 14,989 45 11 149,995 49 156,089 51 -2
on ask 12,888 59 9,051 41 18 86,472 49 88,434 51 -1
on bid 12,479 52 11,756 49 3 102,956 49 107,832 51 -2
straddle 1,130 52 1,039 48 4 7,724 47 8,782 53 -6
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Table 2.5: Trade imbalance (A*^)after adjustment 
The definition of adjusted is in Section 2.3.5. T-statistics are computed 
under the null hypothesis that A ^ is zero of the fuU sample, of the number- 
of-market-maker groups, and of the market-maker groups. An asterisk (*) 
after the t-statistics indicates the value is at 0.05 significant level, and two 
asterisks (**) indicate it is at 0.01 level.
on-both on-ask on-bid straddle
mean t-value mean t-value mean t-value mean t-value
Panel 1. The full sample
-0.08 -0.11 22.04 45.14** -15.21 -34.13** 2.68 4.64**
Panel 2. By number of market makers
2 -1.31 -1.36 26.39 15.77** -21.14 -12.93** -24.26 -0.89
3 -2.81 -2.29* 18.76 12.28** -17.48 -12.56** -2.43 -0.60
4 0.00 0.00 19.22 12.40** -18.33 -12.52** -1.70 -0.59
5 -1.26 -0.58 21.22 12.92** -18.24 -11.41** -3.42 -1.27
6 -0.34 -0.11 17.55 9.40** -19.64 -11.64** -3.41 -1.39
7 2.22 0.64 22.43 10.41 ** -15.33 -7.73** -0.93 -0.39
8 -3.74 -1.12 19.91 10.61 ** -16.50 -9.77** -1.69 -0.88
9 0.33 0.10 19.83 12.62** -17.12 -12.80** -2.74 -1.73
10 -4.35 -1.01 18.03 8.11** -16.07 -8.49** -2.32 -1.17
11 -2.74 -0.59 23.10 6.98** -11.30 -3.57** 2.56 0.76
12 -4.81 -0.97 17.50 5.91 ** -10.66 -4.07** 2.42 0.90
13 10.27 2.19* 30.14 10.93** -0.92 -0.32 12.85 5.06**
14 -6.05 -1.06 24.47 7.13** -19.27 -6.60** 5.24 1.79
15 1.42 0.29 15.67 5.87** -13.06 -5.52** 4.96 2.08*
16 1.88 0.45 26.66 14.19** -11.88 -7.19** 8.62 5.65**
17 9.79 2.20* 19.02 9.30** -10.37 -5.63** 6.45 3.61 **
18 8.58 1.91 31.58 13.53** -6.05 -3.09** 11.54 6.07**
19 14.70 1.94 40.15 13.07** -3.24 -1.23 17.68 7.76**
Panel 3. Selected market makers
A -1.83 -1.28 10.27 9.16** -16.17 -15.10** -5.32 -3.74**
B 159.90 10.29 83.47 4.58** -20.29 -1.80* 18.51 1.13
C 1.09 1.00 10.60 6.83** -5.91 -4.16** 1.12 0.28
70
Table 2.6: Volume imbalance (A^) after adjustment 
The adjusted A^ is defined in a similar way to A ^ in Section 2.3.5. T- 
statistics are computed under the null hypothesis that A^ is zero of the full 
sample, of the number-of-maxket-maker groups, and of the market-maker 
groups. An asterisk (*) after the t-statistics indicates the value is at 0.05 
significant level, and two asterisks (**) indicate it is at 0.01 level.
on--both on-ask on-bid straddle
mean t-value mean t-value mean t-value mean t-value
Panel 1. The full sample
-6.84 -8.66** 15.13 26.13** -18.95 -34.42** -4.76 -6.88**
Panel 2. By number of market makers
2 -3.21 -2.47* 23.43 11.56** -16.46 -8.61 ** -24.11 -0.66
3 -6.58 -4.02** 15.56 8.51** -15.20 -8.92** -0.12 -0.02
4 -3.57 -1.62 14.32 7.51 ** -19.63 -10.57** -9.46 -2.77**
5 -9.05 -3.33** 14.24 6.61 ** -19.63 -9.37** -13.21 -4.19**
6 -6.38 -1.83 10.56 4.36** -19.92 -8.88** -12.21 -3.98**
7 -1.99 -0.46 14.13 5.47** -13.95 -5.53** -6.24 -2.02*
8 -10.97 -2.77** 10.07 4.39** -16.80 -7.52** -4.27 -1.68
9 -2.82 -0.73 16.07 8.74** -16.67 -9.10** -4.84 -2.30*
10 -20.51 -3.88** 14.11 5.45** -19.80 -7.28** -10.00 -3.60**
11 -12.43 -2.01 * 11.44 3.05** -19.52 -5.46** -2.51 -0.60
12 -18.53 -3.13** 4.94 1.34 -22.04 -6.55** -6.99 -2.12*
13 -5.29 -0.88 19.45 5.77** -14.75 -4.60** -0.35 -0.11
14 -16.00 -2.48* 16.80 4.54** -21.99 -6.56** -1.89 -0.58
15 -13.62 -2.30* 8.98 3.02** -22.85 -8.25** 0.55 0.20
16 -5.67 -1.18 22.11 10.61 ** -19.20 -9.81 ** 2.73 1.64
17 -2.61 -0.51 9.30 3.88** -23.29 -10.40** -3.51 -1.67
18 -16.83 -3.22** 15.35 6.13** -23.32 -9.86** -3.11 -1.41
19 -6.68 -0.73 24.09 7.94** -28.78 -9.41 ** -4.49 -1.56
Panel 3. Selected market makers
A -12.19 -7.11** 14.54 10.32** -20.79 -14.36** -11.93 -5.74**
B 101.02 267.77** 60.87 3.24** -42.22 -3.20** -13.83 -0.78
C -2.72 -1.88 5.55 2.98** -5.22 -3.02** -0.03 -0.00
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Table 2.7: Volume imbalance with different number of market makers on 
the best ask
When there are less than five market makers, either one market maker is alone
on the best ask (category (a)), or no less than half of the market maker are on
the best ask, so no trades fall into category (b), and the t-statistics in category 
(c) are the difference of between category (a) and (c). A asterisk (*) after 
the t-statistics indicates the value is at 0.05 significant level, two asterisks (**) 
indicate it is at 0.01 level, and a negative sign (-) indicates the sign of the mean 
diflFerence is different from what is expected.
(a) alone (b) with less than (c) with more than (d) not on ask;
on ask half of the market half of the market only on bid or
makers on ask makers on ask straddle
mean mean t-value 
(a)-(b)
mean t-value 
(b)-(c)
mean t-value 
(c)-(d)
Panel 1. The full sample
29.68 15.72 11.55** 0.39 14.91** -12.69 18.52**
Panel 2. By number of market makers
2 23.56 -3.84 11.48** -16.51 5.47**
3 18.96 3.36 5.75** -11.62 6.91**
4 30.36 1.63 9.15** -15.90 7.57**
5 27.90 12.73 3.28** 0.97 3.17** -16.88 6.75**
6 27.83 15.29 2.41* -1.80 4.05** -16.35 5.01**
7 26.31 14.45 2.13* 3.76 2.36* -10.15 4.06**
8 28.02 10.65 3.54** 0.01 2.69** -10.70 3.64**
9 39.18 21.31 4.42** 2.23 5.86** -10.71 4.99**
10 29.08 15.84 2.16* -6.29 4.59** -14.90 2.40*
11 12.40 18.31 -0.71- -5.58 3.88** -10.79 1.09
12 22.47 6.78 2.06* -10.05 2.83** -14.31 0.95
13 39.43 20.69 2.71 ** 2.57 3.26** -7.19 2.25*
14 27.25 25.27 0.26 -0.89 4.50** -11.64 2.37*
15 35.04 10.85 4.29** -4.07 3.14** -10.39 1.67
16 45.12 22.26 5.93** 6.95 4.31** -7.77 5.21**
17 34.08 9.40 5.20** -0.53 2.58** -12.89 4.00**
18 41.12 14.59 5.78** -2.22 4.18** -12.80 3.21**
19 47.37 21.36 4.41 ** 4.60 3.01** -16.31 4.35**
Panel 3. Selected market makers
A 25.11 7.42 5.72 ** 0.29 2.64** -15.94 8.73**
B 62.92 33.38 0.59 44.99 -0.28- -28.03 2.38*
C 5.89 11.48 -0.78- 0.06 1.66 -4.06 1.92
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Table 2.8: Volume imbalance with different number of market makers on 
the best bid
When there are less than five market makers, either one market maker is alone 
on the best ask (category (a)), or no less than half of the market maker are on 
the best ask, so no trades fall into category (b), and the t-statistics in category 
(c) are the difference of between category (a) and (c). A asterisk (*) after the 
t-statistics indicates the value is at 0.05 significant level, two asterisk (**) indicates 
it is at 0.01 level, and a positive sign (+) indicates the sign of the mean difference 
is different from what is expected.
(a) alone (b) with less than (c) with more than (d) not on bid;
on bid half of the market half of the market only onL ask or
makers on bid makers on bid straddle
mean mean t-value 
(a)-(b)
mean t-value 
(b)-(c)
mean t-value 
(c)-(d)
Panel 1. The full sample
-28.44 -22.75 -4.80** -11.29 -11.61** 6.31 -25.09**
Panel 2. By number of market makers
2 -16.26 -3.49 -5.54** 23.12 -11.02**
3 -19.85 -8.78 -4.21** 11.81 -9.37**
4 -23.94 -12.31 -3.45** 5.64 -7.72**
5 -28.59 -23.69 -1.06 -13.52 -2.79** 2.43 -6.03**
6 -24.18 -18.12 -1.17 -13.82 -1.06 -0.02 -4.77**
7 -23.89 -25.94 0.37 + -4,66 -5.09** 4.02 -2.58 **
8 -28.03 -22.96 -1.03 -11.37 -3.07** 2.98 -5.03**
9 -35.84 -18.42 -4.23** -9.19 -2.82** 5.61 -5.76**
10 -26.80 -21.49 -0.89 -19.75 -0.38 2.10 -6.25 **
11 -26.68 -26.36 -0.04 -15.68 -1.81 4.23 -4.25 **
12 -33.06 -23.55 -1.34 -19.72 -0.68 -1.20 -4.30 **
13 -27.85 -19.38 -1.26 -9.98 -1.80 8.95 -4.44 **
14 -35.08 -27.40 -1.04 -15.63 -2.14* 6.98 -5.12**
15 -45.67 -23.54 -4.11** -13.66 -2.15* 4.47 -4.88**
16 -42.60 -19.88 -5.69** -11.20 -2.58** 11.90 -8.44**
17 -41.01 -23.50 -3.79** -10.82 -3.38 ** 2.55 -4.32 **
18 -41.84 -28.99 -2.80 ** -16.99 -3.11** 5.67 -7.05 **
19 -46.03 -24.69 -3.70** -13.39 -2.05* 9.07 -4.87**
3. Selected market makers
A -29.81 -23.85 -1.89 -11.41 -4.71 ** 4.93 -8.79**
B -74.90 -41.44 -1.16 -3.53 -1.33 17.29 -0.77
C -2.24 -11.31 1.01 + -4.97 -0.72 4.29 -4.23**
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Table 2.9: Trades, volumes, and sizes 
[a, b) means the size of the trade is no smaller than a times MQS and smaller than
b time MQS. (a, 6) means the size is bigger than a and smaller than b.
number of trades volumes in ^millions
MQS in
buy % sell % buy % sell %
(0,0.05) 211,527 42 410,418 57 784 2 1,399 3
[0.05,0.1) 42,724 8 52,677 7 392 1 545 1
[0.1,0.2) 44,993 9 47,685 7 694 2 779 2
[0.2,0.5) 64,166 13 62,563 9 2,069 5 2,078 5
[0.5,1) 39,370 8 38,196 5 3,558 9 3,456 8
[1,2) 42,053 8 41,089 6 6,834 17 6,641 16
[2,3) 22,728 4 22,408 3 6,013 15 5,690 14
[3,6) 20,129 4 20,487 3 7,764 19 7,609 19
[6,75) 17,503 3 17,622 2 10,706 27 11,097 27
[75,00) 712 0 717 0 1,444 4 1,401 3
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Thble 2.10: Adjusted and by sizes of trades 
An asterisk (*) after the t-statistics indicates the value is at 0.05 significant level, and two asterisks (**) indicate it is at
0.01 level. The definitions of [a, b) and (a, b) are in Table 2.9.
on--both on-ask on-bid straddle
Panel 1.
mean t-value mean t-value mean t-value mean t-value
(0,0.05) -1.98 -1.57 6.45 7.45** -13.62 -17.13** -3.45 -4.04**
[0.05,0.1) 0.43 0.28 9.28 9.22** -8.92 -9.19** 1.41 1.32
[0.1,0.2) 0.49 0.35 14.64 15.32** -9.47 -10.41 ** 5.58 5.17**
[0.2,0.5) 3.22 2.75** 23.74 28.29** -11.67 -14.60** 8.51 8.61 **
[0.5,1) 1.05 0.77 36.88 38.46** -21.28 -23.35** 12.80 10.39**
[1,2) -0.39 -0.29 45.72 49.47** -28.06 -31.95** 13.99 11.21**
[2,3) -0.37 -0.22 38.20 33.02** -19.37 -17.36** 14.19 9.16**
[3,6) -2.46 -1.51 24.06 19.45** -5.26 -4.40** 14.73 9.00**
[6,75) -0.13 -0.07 3.49 2.54* 11.93 9.26** 6.61 3.42**
[75,00) 
Panel 2. A^
-0.50 -0.10 -11.48 -2.19* 1.27 0.27 31.10 2.56*
(0,0.05) -14.09 -9.77** -6.83 -6.98** -26.95 -29.09** -19.26 -20.02**
[0.05,0.1) -7.59 -4.46** -2.63 -2.40* -21.67 -20.78** -13.85 -12.46**
[0.1,0.2) -5.75 -3.81** 4.30 4.17** -20.94 -21.43** -8.92 -8.02**
[0.2,0.5) -2.50 -1.98* 14.01 15.86** -22.22 -26.43** -5.05 -5.06**
[0.5,1) -2.78 -1.94 27.74 28.59** -30.71 -32.84** -0.74 -0.61
[1,2) -4.42 -3.19** 36.12 39.86** -37.33 -42.50** 0.37 0.30
[2,3) -2.44 -1.49 29.71 26.47** -28.05 -26.02** 0.73 0.49
[3,6) -5.64 -3.53** 15.23 12.76** -13.81 -12.22** 0.90 0.58
[6,75) -4.04 -2.74** -5.67 -4.52** 4.65 4.00** -4.69 -2.59**
[75,00) -1.52 -0.37 -14.37 -3.38**
75
-2.59 -0.65 24.13 2.26*
Table 2.11: Effective spreads and order flows 
An asterisk (*) after the t-statistics indicates the value is at 0.05 significant
level, and two asterisks (**) indicate it is at 0.01 level. The definitions of
[a, b) and (a, b) are in Table 2.9. The blanks of the t-values in the bottom
row of Panel 2 indicates that there is only one group in the [75, oo) category,
and the t-statistics cannot be calculated.
correlation coefficients number volumes
mean t-value of trades ^millions
Panel 1. Grouped by day
total 0.04 10.25 ** 722,549 12,029
MQS in
(0,0.05) 0.16 35.24 ** 575,871 2,130
[0.05,0.1) 0.02 2.69 ** 47,688 596
[0.1,0.2) -0.02 -1.87 * 31,520 582
[0.2,0.5) -0.05 -4.38 * * 34,861 1,107
[0.5,1) -0.06 -3.38 ** 10,524 858
[1.2) -0.10 -4.74 ** 9,896 1,366
[2.3) -0.12 -4.19 ** 4,860 1,241
[3.6) -0.05 -1.68 * 4,133 1,950
[6,75) -0.07 -1.97 * 3,186 2,149
[75,00) 0.33 0.50 10 51
Panel 2. Grouped by hour
total 0.14 41.74 ** 427,373 2,991
MQS in
(0,0.05) 0.16 48.86 ** 405,850 1,610
[0.05,0.1) 0.02 0.90 6,592 89
[0.1,0.2) 0.01 0.28 4,441 81
[0.2,0.5) -0.05 -1.88 * 5,249 170
[0.5,1) -0.05 -1.09 1,393 120
[1.2) -0.04 -0.87 1,922 213
[2.3) -0.11 -1.83 * 911 204
[3.6) -0.20 -2.81 * * 629 247
[6.75) -0.04 -0.42 383 253
[75, oo) -1.00 3 2
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Table 2.12; Summary statistics of quotes sample 
The medians quote and yellow strip are the medians of all the spreads of all of the stocks in the market-maker category.
The quote spread is defined as the proportion of the mid-quote in percentage points. The touch spread is the proportion
of the mid-touch in percentage points. The quote size median is the median of the average of the ask and bid quote size
in pound sterhngs. The median of the number of quotes is the median of the number of quotes by a market maker per
stock per day. The dadly number of market makers are time-weighted average of those who axe respectively on best ask
number of 
market
number of 
stocks
Quote
spread
Inside
spread
Quote
size
number of 
quotes
mean daily number 
of market makers
makers median median median median on ask on bid on both straddle
2 611 5.41 4.08 2,400 1 0.43 0.43 1.12 0.01
3 432 4.08 2.94 4,045 1 0.88 0.90 1.11 0.10
4 254 3.35 2.11 8,450 1 1.34 1.36 0.96 0.34
5 161 2.55 1.53 13,150 1 1.65 1.70 0.92 0.72
6 114 2.47 1.32 15,125 1 2.03 2.10 0.62 1.25
7 73 2.43 1.31 21,000 1 2.16 2.30 0.59 1.95
8 74 2.21 1.16 25,125 1 2.40 2.70 0.54 2.35
9 77 1.44 0.79 56,125 2 2.79 2.89 0.39 2.91
10 32 1.83 1.10 67,625 2 2.97 2.93 0.53 3.55
11 20 1.90 0.97 91,750 3 3.02 2.99 1.04 3.94
12 23 1.85 0.82 100,875 3 3.05 2.96 0.60 5.36
13 23 1.57 0.64 132,750 3 3.07 3.33 0.78 5.80
14 21 1.22 0.69 157,500 4 3.55 3.72 0.58 6.11
15 36 1.43 0.59 186,250 5 3.51 3.89 0.41 7.17
16 46 1.29 0.53 204,250 6 3.43 3.78 0.34 8.42
17 47 0.98 0.54 206,250 6 3.66 3.84 0.37 9.10
18 32 0.79 0.41 382,750 8 3.95 4.17 0.36 9.49
19 14 0.93 0.40 378,000
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8 3.76 4.05 0.14 11.01
Table 2.13: Top ten popular quote and trade practices 
Ticks are the minimum differences of the prices among the quotes or trades records. The type of quote change is examined in three
dimensions. First, compared with the previous quote, the spread may be the same, wider or narrower. Second, compared with
the previous quote, the quote change may move the mid-quote upwards, downwards, or the mid-quote may be unchanged. Finally,
compared with the preceding quote change, “same change” means the change in both bid and ask prices are both identical to the
preceding change. “Same direction” means the direction of the change in mid-quote is the same as the preceding change, but the
magnitude of the change of either bid or ask is not the same. “Opposite” means the directions of the two changes are not the
same. “Opening” means the previous quote is an opening quote and hence no preceding change to compare with. “Size change”
means the current change is a change in quoted shares. The zero (0) in the percentage columns implies the proportion is less than
0.5% and hence the percentage is rounded to zero.
quote % quote % trade % absolute % quote change type %
spread tick tick quote spread mid-quote compared with
pence pence pence change
pence
change preceding change
5.0 33 1.00 67 1.00 61 1.00 56 same up same change 23
7.0 20 10.00 12 0.50 10 2.00 28 same down same change 22
3.0 15 5.00 11 10.00 9 3.00 7 same up same direction 17
10.0 12 25.00 3 5.00 9 0.50 3 same down same direction 16
4.0 11 0.50 2 2.50 3 5.00 3 same down opposite 9
2.0 3 50.00 2 0.25 2 4.00 1 same up opposite 8
1.5 1 100.00 1 25.00 2 0.25 0 same up opening 3
20.0 1 2.50 1 0.01 2 10.00 0 same down opening 2
15.0 1 0.25 1 100.00 1 7.00 0 same same size change 0
1.0 1 0.01 0 50.00 1 6.00 0 wider up opposite 0
98 98 100 99 100
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Table 2.14: Daily quote status statistics 
The daily average time of a market maker in different quote status is expressed in (hour):(minute). Zero minute (0:00)
means the average time is less than thirty seconds and rounded to zero. Similarly, zero quote frequency (0.0) means the
average frequency is less than 0.05 and rounded to zero. Blank means no observation has been found in the quote status.
number of daily average time daily average frequency
market on both sides on one side straddle on both sides on one side straddle sum
makers alone not alone alone not alone alone not alone alone not alone
2 0:02 4:35 3:32 0:12 0:02 0.0 0.9 0.8 0.1 0.0 1.7
3 0:00 3:03 1:57 2:56 0:16 0.0 0.7 0.5 0.9 0.1 2.1
4 0:00 1:56 1:19 4:05 0:40 0.0 0.5 0.4 1.1 0.2 2.3
5 0:00 1:28 0:59 4:22 1:09 0.0 0.4 0.4 1.4 0.4 2.6
6 0:00 0:49 0:50 4:38 1:39 0.0 0.3 0.4 1.5 0.6 2.8
7 0:00 0:39 0:44 4:17 2:12 0.0 0.3 0.4 1.5 0.7 2.9
8 0:00 0:31 0:35 4:26 2:19 0.0 0.3 0.4 1.8 0.9 3.3
9 0:20 0:30 4:29 2:33 0.3 0.4 2.3 1.2 4.3
10 0:24 0:29 4:05 2:45 0.3 0.5 2.9 1.7 5.4
11 0:43 0:30 3:41 2:45 0.6 0.6 3.8 2.1 7.1
12 0:23 0:27 3:21 3:25 0.4 0.6 3.4 2.3 6.6
13 0:27 0:25 3:19 3:25 0.6 0.8 4.8 3.1 9.3
14 0:18 0:21 3:35 3:19 0.6 0.8 5.5 3.5 10.3
15 0:00 0:12 0:21 3:21 3:37 0.0 0.5 0.9 6.4 4.4 12.2
16 0:00 0:09 0:20 3:02 3:57 0.0 0.5 1.2 8.0 5.9 15.6
17 0:09 0:19 2:57 4:01 0.4 1.1 7.6 5.7 14.9
18 0:08 0:17 3:03 3:55 0.5 1.3 10.4 7.8 20.3
19 0:03 0:16 2:44 4:14 0.3 1.5 9.6 7.8 19.1
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Table 2.15: Source of change in quote status 
Both the frequency of S and 0  changes are of daily average per firm. 0 /S  ratio is calculated by dividing O frequency by S frequency.
Zeros (0) mean the frequency is less than 0.05. Blanks mean that no such changes exist.
number of on both side on one side straddle Sum
makers alone not alone alone not alone
makers S 0 0/S S 0 0/S S O 0/S S 0 0/S S O 0/S S 0
2 0 0 1.61 0.4 0.4 1.00 0 0 1.00 0.4 0.4 0.61 0 0 0.61 0.8 0.8
3 0 0 3.70 0.2 0.4 2.01 0.2 0.3 1.42 0.3 0.6 2.20 0 0.1 1.76 0.7 1.4
4 0 0 1.50 0.1 0.4 2.97 0.2 0.3 1.62 0.4 0.8 2.21 0.1 0.2 1.94 0.7 1.6
5 0 0 3.50 0.1 0.3 3.93 0.2 0.3 1.65 0.4 0.6 2.33 0.1 0.3 2.07 0.8 1.8
6 0 0.1 0.3 5.15 0.1 0.2 1.69 0.4 1.1 2.39 0.2 0.4 2.13 0.8 2.0
7 0 0 4.17 0 0.2 5.76 0.1 0.2 1.68 0.5 1.1 2.36 0.2 0.5 2.30 0.8 2.0
8 0 0 0.2 6.89 0.1 0.2 1.53 0.5 1.3 2.45 0.3 0.6 2.09 1.0 2.3
9 0 0.3 7.89 0.2 0.2 1.29 0.7 1.6 2.23 0.4 0.8 2.02 1.3 2.9
10 0 0.3 9.34 0.2 0.3 1.25 0.9 2.0 2.31 0.6 1.1 1.75 1.7 3.7
11 0.1 0.6 10.19 0.3 0.4 1.34 1.2 2.6 2.25 0.8 1.2 1.44 2.3 4.7
12 0 0.3 11.08 0.3 0.3 1.21 0.9 2.4 2.57 0.9 1.4 1.56 2.1 4.5
13 0 0.5 11.10 0.3 0.4 1.30 1.4 3.4 2.35 1.4 1.7 1.23 3.2 6.1
14 0 0.5 13.55 0.3 0.4 1.23 1.6 3.8 2.38 1.6 1.9 1.17 3.6 6.7
15 0 0 0.4 13.31 0.4 0.5 1.14 1.7 4.7 2.75 2.1 2.3 1.07 4.3 7.9
16 0 0 0.4 13.96 0.6 0.6 1.03 2.1 5.9 2.80 2.9 3.0 1.05 5.6 10.0
17 0 0.4 14.64 0.5 0.6 1.03 1.9 5.7 2.95 2.9 2.9 1.00 5.4 9.5
18 0 0.5 16.98 0.7 0.8 1.03 2.6 7.8 2.99 4.0 3.8 0.96 7.4 12.9
19 0 0.3 17.89 0.7 0.7 0.97 2.3 7.3 3.10 3.8 4.0 1.07 6.9 12.3
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Table 2.16: 0 /S  ratios of subsequent quote changes 
Quote changes are classified according to the quote position and the source of
the change. The quote status may be ended by a quote change of the market
maker himself (S change) or somebody else (0  change). The change by the
withdrawal of the quote at the end of the day is not considered here. Blank
in the table implies either current of subsequent changes are not available for
the quote status.
number current change is by the market maker himself (S) or others (0)
of on both side on one side straddle
market alone not alone alone not alone
makers S 0 S 0 S 0 S 0 S 0
2 0.92 0.20 1.47 0.68 3.53 0.28 1.19 0.87 5.00 1.08
3 4.00 0.75 2.88 1.65 4.18 0.29 5.18 1.91 3.98 2.52
4 1.00 4.45 2.64 4.46 0.28 4.09 1.21 5.30 2.71
5 1.00 6.44 3.45 5.36 0.26 4.15 1.01 6.22 3.20
6 8.76 4.51 5.22 0.27 4.05 0.91 6.03 3.11
7 2.00 1.56 7.86 4.95 5.20 0.30 3.72 0.83 5.94 2.91
8 2.00 8.32 6.29 4.36 0.30 3.42 0.82 6.42 3.33
9 10.77 7.50 3.41 0.28 2.82 0.77 6.39 3.35
10 11.84 8.86 3.40 0.27 3.04 0.73 7.85 3.97
11 12.08 10.17 3.40 0.24 3.69 0.60 9.25 5.36
12 19.60 10.52 2.05 0.31 2.97 0.70 8.82 5.18
13 11.88 10.05 2.87 0.21 3.27 0.54 10.02 5.39
14 20.45 12.84 2.93 0.19 3.26 0.50 10.96 5.81
15 1.00 12.22 14.09 2.10 0.22 2.66 0.54 11.83 6.58
16 0.50 12.62 13.31 1.90 0.23 2.66 0.54 10.13 5.78
17 15.30 13.48 1.82 0.24 2.55 0.54 10.28 6.02
18 14.15 17.27 2.03 0.22 2.55 0.51 12.44 6.30
19 11.10 17.66 1.81 0.24 2.22 0.60 10.03 5.24
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Table 2.17: Summary of t-statistics of subsequent quote changes 
Quote changes are classified into seven categories according to whether the
quotes are on the yellow strip inunediately before the changes. The mean of
the change of mid-quote is calculated for each category of each stock. If the
number of changes in the category is five or more, then the t-test is performed.
All the available t-statistics are grouped into six categories according to their
values. A Zero (0) in the percentage columns means the proportion of the
t-tests in the group is less than 0.5% and hence rounded to zero. A blank
means the t-statistics is unavailable.
quote number of stocks of which the t-statistics are in
status (—oo,—3) [—3 ,—2) [—2,0) (0,2] (2,3] (3, oo) Sum
% % % % % %
on both
alone 1 20 2 40 2 40 5
not alone 78 7 53 5 354 30 441 38 95 8 154 13 1175
straddle 25 4 27 4 180 27 243 36 78 12 123 18 676
on ask
alone 1 0  1 0  6 0  47 4 50 4 1129 91 1234
not alone 3 0 8 1 82 9 64 7 806 84 963
on bid
alone 958 84 83 7 84 7 18 2 2 0 1145
not alone 679 71 78 8 160 17 34 4 2 0 2 0 955
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Table 2.18: Causes of quote changes -  full sample 
One asterisk (*) means the t-value is different from zero at 0.05 significance
level, two asterisks (**) mean the t-value is at 0.01 significance level, and
three asterisks (***) mean at 0.0001 significance level.
group 1: 
self trades
intercept
i^,b,0
^i,b,2  
i^,s,0
Xi,a,2 
Vi,b,0 
Vi,b,l 
Vi,b,2
'^i,s,0
Vi,a,2
group 3: x\
other trades
group 2: 
self volumes
group 4: 
other volumes
,o
'i,b,0
'1,6,1
^i,b,2
i,b,0
o
i,b,l
'^i,b,2
^*>,0
< s , l
'^i,a,2
group 5: Amt_i,o
previous change Amt_i,i 
Am t_i,2  
group 6: It
inventory A lt
R2
number of observations (N) 
Condition Index (Cl) 
Durbin-Watson (DW)
all variables 
coefficient t-value
0.0044 3.70**
0.7115 24.72***
0.4780 15.18***
0.0707 6.99***
-0.6365 -31.26*** 
-0.3296 -14.52*** 
-0.1812 -23.01*** 
0.0169 1.89
-0.0113 -1.02
0.0443 8.85***
-0.0055 -0.73
0.0034 0.67
-0.0024 -0.52
0.9908 14.68***
0.7929 11.86***
0.1304 10.80***
-0.9834 -13.51*** 
-0.9263 -16.04*** 
-0.0203 -10.62*** 
0.1214 3.23**
0.1826 4.61***
0.1692 23.10***
-0.0874 -4.11***
-0.0295 -2.14*
-0.1030 -20.30*** 
0.7497 282.72*** 
0.7125 162.22*** 
0.4725 194.06*** 
0.0001 0.80
-0.0006 -0.62 
0.4841 
642,932
3.26
2.27
group two omitted 
coefficient t-value 
0.0045 3.77**
0.7358 29.11***
0.4461 12.11***
0.1134 12.74***
-0.6453 -37.97*** 
-0.3194 -15.32***
-0.1741 -24.60***
0.9881
0.7926
0.1196
-0.9816
-0.9294
- 0.0201
0.1220
0.1833
0.1726
-0.0882
-0.0298
- 0.1020
0.7498
0.7127
0.4726
0.0001
-0.0013
0.4840
642,932
2.86
2.27
14.63***
11.83***
9.90***
-13.49***
-16.08***
-10.51***
3.24**
4.62***
23.41***
-4.17***
-2.18*
- 20. 11* * *
282.73***
162.26***
193.87***
0.81
-1.03
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Table 2.19: Causes of quote changes -  by different number of market mak­
ers
One asterisk (*) means the t-value is different from zero at 0.05 significance 
level, two asterisks (**) mean the t-value is at 0.01 significance level, and 
three asterisks (***) mean at 0.0001 significance level.
coefficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
intercept 0.0542 4.45*** 0.0035 0.47 -0.0001 -0.03
i^,b,0 0.8312 7.60*** 0.4077 4.90*** 0.6571 6.06***
0.4820 2.53* 0.2275 2.65** 0.0968 0.65
i^,b,2 0.2462 3.81** 0.0569 1.57 0.0513 1.37
-0.9728 -18.75*** -0.3618 -4.12*** -0.4136 -4.30***
-0.9146 -13.53*** -0.0389 -0.48 -0.0626 -0.75
i^,a,2 -0.2674 -6.72*** -0.0939 -3.04** -0.1806 -5.79***
i^,b,0 0.2515 2.60** 3.6515 7.94*** 21.2119 14.51***
^i,b,l 0.1380 1.65 2.3799 4.70*** 18.3593 11.82***
i^,b,2 -0.0156 -0.40 0.1676 2.61** 0.1235 0.97
-0.3865 -3.05** -2.6705 -4.87*** -18.2349 -14.08***
-0.4567 -6.12*** -2.1967 -5.62*** -12.3292 -9.26***
-0.0160 -0.88 -0.0633 -4.27*** -0.0214 -2.60**
<6,0 0.1053 2.16* -0.1984 -2.55* 0.4072 1.42
<6,1 0.1345 3.61** 0.2992 2.71** 0.4826 1.76
<6,2 0.1487 7.42*** 0.2157 5.84*** 0.8810 13.31***
<8,0 -0.1164 -1.25 -0.1537 -0.61 -0.2759 -3.95***
<8,1 -0.0613 -5.34*** -0.3233 -2.04* -0.1847 -0.59
<8,2 -0.0708 -4.35*** -0.1045 -5.81*** -0.3896 -7.07***
Am*.-1,0 0.7227 52.81*** 0.7488 101.47*** 0.7193 186.84***
Amt_-1,1 0.5544 9.40*** 0.7709 39.08*** 0.6276 53.71***
Amt_-1,2 0.4543 31.99*** 0.5210 45.85*** 0.3497 38.28***
It -0.0350 -5.64*** 0.0003 0.05 -0.0000 -0.23
A lt
R2
N
Cl
DW
-0.0874
0.4358
19,310
3.00
1.78
-3.50** -0.0083
0.4887
19,094
3.47
2.28
84
-0.41 -0.0040
0.4789
59,733
4.46
2.31
-0.91
Table 2.20: Causes of quote changes -  by selected market makers 
One asterisk (*) means the t-value is different from zero at 0.05 significance
level, two asterisks (**) mean the t-value is at 0.01 significance level, and
three asterisks (***) mean at 0.0001 significance level.
Firm A Firm B Firm C
coefficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
intercept 0.0107 2.04* -0.0257 -2.62** 0.0463 4.92***
i^,b,0 0.6055 13.68*** 0.0306 0.14 0.7508 7.78***
0.2929 4.60*** 0.3717 0.91 0.5863 7.31***
i^,b,2 0.0615 2.20* 0.1369 1.44 0.0950 1.88
i^,s,0 -0.5038 -10.67*** 0.6989 1.16 -0.9664 -17.29***
-0.0676 -1.26 0.5674 1.07 -0.6455 -6.43***
i^,s,2 -0.1882 -7.70*** -0.3163 -2.09* -0.2331 -6.64***
^lb,0 0.7887 3.97*** 11.5657 3.18** 0.3435 2.26*
^i,b,l 0.7575 5.49*** 11.6720 3.10** 0.3361 2.73**
^lb,2 0.2108 5.55*** 0.1570 0.58 0.0354 0.84
*^>,0 -1.0947 -6.40*** -8.8357 -3.09** -0.6841 -3.76**
-0.9482 -5.19*** -10.7185 -2.92** -0.4927 -5.24***
i^,s,2 -0.0438 -3.80** 0.0035 0.27 -0.0409 -0.72
'^ i,b,0 0.2425 2.51* 0.3073 0.37 0.1354 1.22
'^ i,b,l 0.1013 1.69 0.4581 0.48 0.0922 1.14
'^ i,b,2 0.1215 6.44*** 0.8327 5.03*** 0.1301 7.97***
-0.0190 -0.39 -0.3187 -5.49*** 0.1129 1.22
-0.0175 -0.25 -0.7007 -0.74 -0.0649 -4.53***
z^>,2 -0.0864 -6.29*** -0.6060 -3.67** -0.0758 -4.27***
Amt_i,o 0.8571 77.03*** 0.7515 74.41*** 0.6609 38.19***
0.7778 37.50*** 0.7471 28.84*** 0.6786 28.95***
Amf_i^2 0.4989 60.12*** 0.5163 24.52*** 0.4059 29.89***
It -0.0177 -4.32*** 0.0003 0.84 -0.0093 -1.75
AT, -0.1109 -5.74*** -0.0002 -0.13 -0.0568 -3.26**
R2 0.4242 0.5960 0.4396
Condition Index 3.15 3.67 3.02
Durbin-Watson 2.13 2.17 1.97
N 51,659 8,056 20,155
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Table 2.21: Causes of quote change -  by quote status after the change 
One asterisk (*) means the t-value is different from zero at 0.05 significance level,
two asterisks (**) mean the t-value is at 0.01 significance level, and three asterisks
(***) mean at 0.0001 significance level.
on-both on- ask on-bid straddle
coefficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
intercept 0.0404 6.67*** -0.5875 -173.02*** 0.6117 191.86*** -0.0100 -6.42***
Xi,b,0 0.6910 13.22*** 0.6498 17.87*** 0.5269 17.37*** 0.6819 9.76***
0.5136 7.17*** 0.2692 4.60*** 0.4034 14.93*** 0.4472 12.16***
Xi,b,2 0.1709 7.31*** 0.0889 6.72*** 0.1490 9.74*** 0.0753 6.89***
-0.7755 -16.73*** -0.5408 -27.92*** -0.4572 -15.88*** -0.5742 -17.67***
-0.5928 -9.03*** -0.4765 -18.07*** -0.1747 -6.98*** -0.3077 -8.05***
^i,s,2 -0.2960 -11.79*** -0.3008 -26.59*** -0.0707 -6.65*** -0.1394 -13.73***
^i,b,0 0.1613 1.62 2.3598 9.06*** 0.1258 1.66 1.8079 9.38***
0.2005 2.83** 2.1220 11.68*** 0.0366 0.39 1.4463 7.33***
<6,2 0.0374 1.14 -0.1491 -6.45*** 0.1226 7.94*** 0.0736 3.44**
< .,0 -0.3269 -2.96** -0.1988 -2.68** -1.2452 -6.34*** -1.1543 -5.59***
-0.4037 -6.88*** -0.1246 -1.66 -1.5988 -10.06*** -1.3264 -8.70***
-0.0399 -3.51** -0.0523 -14.73*** 0.0392 9.50*** -0.0104 -5.10***
<6,0 0.0082 0.10 0.1377 1.08 0.1310 3.03** -0.0398 -0.55
0.0848 1.65 0.1309 1.67 0.2025 3.63** 0.1442 1.48
0.1101 4.82*** 0.2011 12.22*** 0.0820 11.15*** 0.2125 13.79***
< .,0 -0.0335 -0.43 -0.0608 -3.04** 0.0345 0.57 -0.0756 -1.36
<»,l 0.0057 0.36 -0.0308 -2.06* -0.0475 -0.81 -0.0095 -0.27
-0.0799 -6.45*** -0.0687 -10.91*** -0.0614 -7.32*** -0.0945 -11.85***
0.7700 122.13*** 0.4958 82.35*** 0.4598 100.06*** 0.6864 189.56***
0.6362 11.89*** 0.4064 53.35*** 0.4155 52.57*** 0.6969 143.90***
Amt_i,2 0.5302 48.97*** 0.2155 54.70*** 0.2374 62.34*** 0.5300 151.06***
It -0.0110 -2.62** -0.0007 -1.35 -0.0002 -0.79 0.0001 1.01
AA -0.0293 -2.17* -0.0153 -3.45** -0.0007 -0.58 0.0011 1.85
R2 0.5559 0.2127 0.2067 0.5912
N 21,952 160,084 176,336 284,560
Cl 3.00 2.91 3.02 2.99
DW 1.90 2.03 1.99 2.05
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Table 2.22: Summary of Wald statistics for the trade variables 
This table summarises the results of Wald tests of the models in Table 2.18, 2.19,
2.20 and 2.21. The null hypothesis of any Wald test is the absolute value of the
coefficient of standardised trades executed by market maker i (a:*,*,*) equals that
of standardised trades without the involvement of market maker i (a:®* *). “O” in
the “which is bigger” column indicates the coefficient of T?* * is bigger, and “S”
indicates the coefficient of is bigger. One asterisk (*) means the t-value is
different from zero at 0.05 significance level, two asterisks (**) mean the t-value is
at 0.01 significance level, and three asterisks (***) mean 0.0001 significance level.
compared which Wald which is Wald which is Wald 
the scales of is bigger statistics bigger statistics bigger statistics 
Panel 1. Regressions of the whole sample (Table 2.18)
all variable without group two
Xi,6,o VS X? 0 13.81** 0 11.71**
X i,b ,l  vs X?fc 1 0 17.69*** 0 19.72***
X i,b,2  VS Xjfc 2 0 11.37** 0 0.14
X i,a ,0  VS X ? ,  o 0 20.51*** 0 19.79***
VS x 9 ,  i 0 88.80*** 0 94.75***
X i,s ,2  VS X ?g 2 s 368.29*** 0 410.94***
Panel 2. Regressions by number of market makers (Table 2.19)
2 MMs 10 MMs 19 MMs
Xi,b,o vs x?6,o s 16.08** 0 47.07** 0 195.26***
Xi,b,i vs x?b,i s 2.83* 0 17.39*** 0 135.87***
X i,b ,2 vs X?6 ,2 s 8.21** 0 1.88 0 0.27
X t,5,0 vs x?^ o s 18.35*** 0 16.60*** 0 186.81***
vs s 21.04*** 0 27.87*** 0 84.33***
X i,s ,2 vs X?, 2 s 34.79*** 0 0.72 s 22.58***
(continued to the next page)
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(continued from the previous page) 
compared which Wald which is Wald which is Wald 
the scales of is bigger statistics bigger statistics bigger statistics 
Panel 3. Regressions by selected market makers (Table 2.20)
Firm A Firm B Firm C
Xi,b,0 vs Q 0 0.79 0 10.01** S 5.03*
vs 0 9.13** 0 8.92** S 2.86*
Xi,b,2 vs 2 0 7.89** 0 0.00 S 0.52
X i,s ,0  VS o S 10.72** 0 10.38** S 2.24
VS 0 21.44*** 0 9.49** S 1.21
Xi,s,2 VS Xl^^2 s 24.12*** s 4.36* S 6.93**
Panel 4. Regressions by quote status (Table 2.21)
on-both on-ask on-bid
Xi,b,Q vs 0 0 23.71*** 0 42.18*** S 22.28***
vs 1 0 9.77** 0 92.29*** S 13.70**
Hb,2 vs 0 9.11** s 65.48*** S 1.06
i^.5,0 vs xl^ Q 0 14.25*** s 19.16*** 0 15.75**
vs ref , 1 0 4.59* s 18.99*** 0 77.44***
a^ i,s,2 vs ref ,  2 0 76.79*** s 404.06*** s 83.51***
straddle
Xi,b,o vs rcf t,o 0 27.57
vs ref b 1 0 24.39**
a^ i.6 ,2  vs ref b,2 0 0.00**
^*,«,0 vs ref, 0 0 7.51**
rri,,,i vs rrf , i 0 39.40***
a:i,a, 2  vs ref , 2 s 145.21***
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Chapter 3
COST OF TRADING WITH 
MARKET MAKERS ON THE 
LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE
3.1 Introduction
Although the growing use of computer trading systems has assisted the trad­
ing in dealership markets, a large number of trades, especially those with 
non-trivial sizes, are still carried out by negotiation among traders. If the 
traders have been trading in the market for a long time, they may know their 
trading parties very well. During negotiation, the trading parties may gather 
more information about the security than merely the price and the size of 
the trade. This chapter focuses on the comparison of the cost of trading 
with market makers on the LSE. The data constructed from the settlement 
records consists of not only the prices and quantities of the trades, but also 
the identities of the trading parties and trading conditions. Although it is 
not possible to identify the end customers behind brokers, the data provides 
sufficient clues to understand how the market makers differentiate their cus­
tomers.
Dealership markets are often designed to encourage dealers to compete 
with one another to attract customers, yet in practice people often wonder 
how competitive those dealers are. For example, there are suggestions that 
NASDAQ dealers collude (Christie and Schultz 1994; Christie, Harris, and 
Schultz 1994). Dutta and Madhavan (1997) argue the entry costs to a dealer­
ship market include establishing reputations and forming long-term relation­
ship with brokers, which can be very expensive. In London, the difference 
in trading costs is alleged to be the result of price discrimination (Securities 
and Investments Board 1995a), which imphes market makers exercise mo­
nopolistic power against the investors. It is interesting to investigate how 
much evidence there is to support the allegation.
Moreover, an inter-dealer-broker (IDE) market runs parallel to SEAQ to 
provide liquidity for market makers. Board and Sutcliffe (1995) and Reiss 
and Werner (1996, 1997) have shown that market makers trade with one 
another in both markets frequently, but the cost of trading of the two markets 
differ substantially. As market makers trade the same stocks with each other 
in both markets, the London market provides a laboratory to observe the 
similarity and difference between the two markets. The comparison between 
the two markets may shed some light on the ongoing discussion of the trading 
mechanisms.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 gives the 
institutional background about the cost of trading on the LSE. Section 3.3 
presents some descriptive statistics for the data investigated in this chapter. 
Section 3.4 reviews the literature of the theoretical arguments and empirical 
findings in the literature about the cost diflPerence and the structural of deal­
ership and auction markets. Section 3.5 shows some of the cost difference 
can be explained by the theories reviewed in Section 3.4. Section 3.6 investi­
gates the information contents of different classes of trades, and Section 3.7 
concludes the findings.
3.2 Institutional background
Section 1.1 has given a description of the operation of the LSE. The market 
makers in the Exchange trade domestic equities mainly in two trading sys­
tems: the Stock Exchange Automated Quotation system (SEAQ) and the 
Inter Dealer Broker (IDE) market. All members of the Stock Exchange are 
able to trade with market makers directly in SEAQ; they may act as prin-
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cipaJs to trade on their own account, or they can act as agents on behalf 
of the clients. On the other hand, IDB market is one to which only market 
makers have exclusive access. A market maker may contact one of the four 
inter-dealer brokers (IDEs) to place hmit orders, and the IDB will put the 
best buy and sell hmit orders on their computer screens. If another market 
makers wish to take the orders, they may call the IDB and the trades are 
executed.
Although this chapter will investigate the cost structure in greater de­
tails, it is initially motivated by the disparity of the trading costs in SEAQ 
and IDB market, a widely accepted allegation made by market participants 
in the survey by Securities and Investments Board (1995a). The survey finds 
the existence of IDB market appears to generate some resentment of the 
broker-dealers. Neither IDEs nor market makers are allowed to reveal any 
information in the IDB market. The broker-dealers suspect the best hmit 
orders in IDB screens contain useful information, they believe the market 
makers use IDB market for price discovery, so the market makers have infor­
mation advantage against them. More importantly, the brokers observe that 
a large number of trades take place at the prices weU inside the touch, which 
are much better than the prices they can get from market makers. They 
beheve some of those trades are IDB trades, so the conclude the market 
makers have costs advantage by trading with each other in the IDB mar­
ket. Securities and Investments Board (1995b), however, supports the view 
of market makers that the exclusive access of the market makers to the IDB 
market is essential for the market makers to lay off their risk positions rapidly 
and anonymously, otherwise “the efficiency distribution of risk and hquidity 
would be seriously impeded (p.47).”
The empirical evidence of the cost difference between trading in SEAQ 
and in IDB is documented in Board and Sutchffe (1995). They classify 
trades into three categories: the trades among market makers in the IDB 
market (which they call IDB trades), the trades between market makers and 
customers in SEAQ (customer trades) and the trades between market makers 
in SEAQ (IMM trades). An interesting result emerges: of the 42 stocks they
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survey, IDB trades are the cheapest in every stock, and IMM trades are the 
most expensive in 35 stocks (p.77). The result is robust even after the trades 
are grouped by size or by buy and sell. Using a similar methodology, Reiss 
and Werner (1997) concentrate on the comparison between IDB and IMM 
trades, and again, IDB trades appear to be cheaper than IMM trades. Reiss 
and Werner (1996) further define apparent spreads and find IDB trades are 
cheapest while costs of IMM trades and customer trades are the same. To 
sum up, the brokers’ allegation that IDB trades cost less is confirmed, but 
the findings of Board and Sutcliffe and Reiss and Werner bring about more 
questions. The practitioners are fully aware of the difference in costs, some 
of them even offer plausible explanations, but the answers to those questions 
may not be as straightforward as they seem to be.
3.3 D ata description
The transaction records of thirty-nine stocks are selected firom the CD-ROM 
Transaction Data Service provided by the Quality of Market Group of the 
London Stock Exchange. The sample includes thirty-nine stocks, nineteen 
of which are FTSE-100 stocks, and twenty of which are randomly selected 
from the rest of FTSE-AU share stocks, see Appendix A.3.2 for details. The 
procedure of editing the data is in Appendix A.4. A trade record consists of 
the price and quantity of the trade, the time when the trade was executed, 
the identities of the trading parties, and the flag of the “dealer capacity” of 
the trading parties. According to the dealer capacity, trades are classified 
into five categories: brokers on behalf of their clients (class A), private chents 
of market makers (N), inter-dealer brokers (I), market makers (M) and non­
market-maker principals (P). Further description of the data is in Appendix 
A.2.
This chapter is concerned with the trades which involves market makers 
and which take place in mandatory quote period, and trade categories are 
defined according to the dealer capacities. In other words, class “A” trades 
are the trades between market makers and brokers, “I” trades are the trades
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between market makers and inter-dealer brokers (IDB trades), “M” trades 
are trades between market makers in SEAQ (IMM trades), and so on. The 
trades that involve market makers but take place outside mandatory quote 
period are classified as T trades. The trades without the involvement of 
market makers, such as agency cross, are classified as X trades. Figure 3.1 
illustrates the relationship between market participants and the trade classes, 
and Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics of the trades. Three quarters 
of the trades in the sample are between market makers and brokers on behalf 
of small investors (A trades), but they only contribute to 20% of the volume. 
The average trade size of A trades is tiny compared with the size of the other 
categories. N trades are trades between market makers and their private 
clients.^ Those trades contribute to more than 30% of the volume, but they 
only account for less than 8% of the trades. The number of “M” trades (IMM 
trades) and the trading volumes are doubled to make them comparable with 
IDB trades.^ The market makers use IDB market to trade with each other 
very often, but they also trade with one another in SEAQ. Although the 
volume and the number of I trades are greater than M trades, the size of M 
trades tends to be bigger. In fact, the average size of M trades is the biggest 
of all categories.
There are two different ways to measure the cost of trading with market 
makers, both of which have been used in Chapter 2. The first approach is to 
classify the trade according to the best bid and ask prices in the market, for 
example, the trade is executed at, inside or outside the touch. (Neal 1992; 
Wells 1992; Huang and Stoll 1996). A shghtly more sophisticated measure is 
further developed by Board and Sutcliffe (1995) and Reiss and Werner (1997) 
to calculate the gains to the traders by the distance between the price and
 ^ They axe labelled as “internalised trades” in Hansch et al. (1999).
 ^An M trade involves two market makers, and an I trades involve a market maker and 
an inter-dealer broker, Reiss and Werner (1997) halve I trades to make it comparable 
M trades, implicitly assuming a “full” I trade involving an inter-dealer broker, one buy 
market maker and one sell market maker. However, more than 20% of I trades in the 
sample involve several buyers and/or sellers, and halving the volumes of IDB trades makes 
the interpretation difficult. Doubhng M trades is another way to make I trades and M 
trades comparable. See Appendix A.4.5 for further issues about the IDB data.
93
the best quote. Let p be the price of the trade, rrit be the mid-touch, and 
at and bt be respectively the best ask and bid quote when the trade occurs, 
then the gain from the trade is defined as
7 »"’ M[ (p — ht)/mt for a sell 
Market makers make two-way firm quotes during mandatory quote pe­
riod. If the customer buys the stock with a price below the best ask price, 
or the customer sells the stock above the best bid price, then the customer 
is said to gain from the trade.^
Measuring the gains or costs according to the touch prices is fine as long 
as the touch spread is constant. The problem arises when the touch spread 
varies, which can be illustrated in Figure 3.2. The example is taken from 
the trade records of Bank of Scotland on 25 April 1996. The best bid and 
ask prices are respectively 251 and 252 pence during most of the morning, 
and are 250 and 253 pence after 16:15. A trade at the price 252 pence would 
have been classified as at the touch if occurred in the morning, but would 
be classified as inside the touch if occurred in the late afternoon. This is 
exactly what happened: a market maker bought 25,000 shares directly from 
another market maker at 9:32 at 252 pence (an M trade), and he bought 
another 25,000 shares again at 16:27 from the third market maker via IDB 
market at 252.13 pence (an I trade). If the definition in (3.1) is used, the 
gain from the morning M trade is zero, and then the gain from the afternoon 
I trade is 0.35%. Certainly the market maker cannot claim to gain more 
by paying more for the IDB trade. If a certain class of trades occur when 
the touch is wider than the other classes, then the gains from this class of 
trades will be bigger than the other trades, other things equal. For example, 
Reiss and Werner (1997) observe IMM trades concentrate in the morning 
IDB trades concentrate in the afternoon. They show that IMM trades occur 
when the touch is narrow and IDB trades occur when the touch is wide. 
What happened with the stock of Bank of Scotland fits perfectly in their
 ^The use of the term “gain” follows Reiss and Werner (1997). Board and Sutcliffe 
(1995) call it “Reltouch”.
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analysis: the touch was narrow in the morning and an IMM trade took place 
at the touch, and when the touch was wide in the afternoon, an IDB trade 
took place inside the touch. The market maker “gained” more from IDB 
trades, but he in fact paid a higher price to buy the stocks in IDB market.
The second approach to measure the costs is to define the costs as the 
difference between the price and the mid-touch, or the difference divided by 
the mid-touch. Reproducing (1.1),
cost =  =  I  ^  '^tVrnt for a buy  ^ + bt)/2. (3.2)
y [rrit —p)/m t for a sell
The direction of the trade has to be identified in order to compute the 
costs. If the trade involves only one market maker, then the buy and sell can 
be simply identified as the direction of the trade of his counter party. The 
direction of IDB trade can be identified as the direction of the hitter (Board 
and Sutcliffe 1995; Reiss and Werner 1997). However, the direction of an M 
trade has to be decided by the mid-touch: the M trade is a buy if its price is 
above the mid-touch, and is a sell if its price is below the mid-touch. If the M 
trade occurs at the mid-touch, then the direction of the trade is irrelevant in 
computing the costs of the trade, as the costs would be zero regardless of the 
direction. It appears equation (3.2) measures the costs of the trade better 
than equation (3.1), so the former will be the measure the cost difference 
hereafter.
Table 3.2 summarises the average cost of trading under different trading 
categories. Broker trades (A trades) have the highest costs, and IDB trades 
(I trades) have the lowest. Private chents of the market makers pay less than 
the brokers, consistent with the finding in Hansch et al. (1999). M trades 
cost more than I trades, which is consistent with the finding in Board and 
Sutcliffe (1995) and Reiss and Werner (1997) despite a different measure is 
used. Board and Sutchffe find the costs of customer trades are between those 
of I trades and M trades, but a different picture emerges in this sample after 
N trades are separated from A trades: the latter are more expensive than M 
trades whereas the former are cheaper. The results hold in both FTSE-100 
and non-FTSE-100 stocks.
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The third panel is a further breakdown of the costs of the trades according 
to their normal market sizes. For the trades with the sizes less than six times 
NMS, the results are similar to the full sample; A trades are more expensive 
than M trades, which are more expensive than N trades, which are more 
expensive than P trades, and so on. The difference in costs between A trades 
and N trades becomes small when the sizes of the trades are between 6 and 
75 time NMS. The next panel shows the percentages of trades under difiFerent 
category of trades. 87.15% of the A trades and 35.24% of the N trades are 
of the size less than 0.1 times NMS, but very small number of inter-dealer 
trades fall into this category. The sizes of M trades tend to be larger than 
those of I trades. P trades tend to be bigger than N trades. However, the 
percentages of big N trades are bigger than the other trades.
Finally, the last panel shows the average half touch weighted by the num­
ber of trades. The touches of FTSE-100 stocks when the trades occur are 
about half of the non-FTSE-100 stocks. If all of the trades occurred at the 
touch, then the average cost would be simply the same as half of the average 
touch. As more of the trades occur inside the touch than outside, the average 
cost of all classes of the trades is smaller than half the average touch. The av­
erage touch when I trades occur is among the biggest, and the average touch 
when M trades occur is the smallest, which is consistent with the finding by 
Reiss and Werner (1997) that IDB trades occur when the touch is narrow, 
and IMM trades occur when the touch is wide.
3.4 Explanations for the cost difference
The empirical evidence from the previous section shows that costs of trades 
with market makers vary with the trading parties. On the other hand, there 
have been extensive discussions in the hterature regarding the cost of trading.
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3.4.1 Order processing, inventory and adverse 
selection costs
Traditionally, the spreads are believed to consist of three components: order 
processing costs, inventory bearing costs and adverse selection costs (O’Hara 
1995; Huang and Stoll 1997). The cost difference among the different classes 
of trades may result from the difference in at least one of the three compo­
nents. If some trades contain more information than the others, then the 
former should have bigger spread than the latter. Numerous researchers sub­
scribe to this view (Copeland and Galai 1983; Glosten and Milgrom 1985; 
Easley and O’Hara 1987; Glosten 1989). Applying the theory to the LSE, 
if the order-processing costs and the inventory bearing costs are the same 
among all classes of trades, then the difference of costs would be attributed 
to the information contents of costs: broker trades contain more information 
than chent trades, IMM trades contain more information than IDB trades, 
and so on.** Easley and O’Hara (1987) argue the adverse selection costs in­
crease with the size of the trade, as the informed trader wishes to take the 
most advantage of the information. In contrast, Naik et al. (1999) argue the 
market maker is a quasi-insider in the market before the trade is pubhshed, 
so the spread could decline with the information conveying in the trade in 
order to attract insider to reveal more information during the negotiation. 
The price schedule of the dealer therefore contains the size and the informa­
tion. In fact, the evidence from Table 3.2 shows the costs of the trades are 
not always increasing with size for the trades. It appears size alone cannot 
explain the difference in the costs of the trades — either the market makers 
regard different classes of trades contain different information, or the other 
components of the trades are different.
The inventory of the dealer affects the spreads in two ways. The inventory 
level before the trade affects the placement of the quote, and the size of the 
current trade affects the magnitude of the bid-ask spread. Moreover, the 
inventory level affects the spread indirectly through the marginal utility of the
 ^This is a completely different view of some market practitioners, who believe IDB 
trades contain information (Securities and Investments Board 1995a).
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wealth of the dealer (O’Hara and Oldfield 1986). The argument holds under 
both the assumption of a monopolistic speciafist (Amihud and Mendelson 
1980; Ho and Stoll 1981) and of multiple market makers (Ho and StoU 1983). 
The inventory effect may explain the cost diflFerence if, for example, cheap 
trades and expensive trades occur at different times or different directions 
when market makers have unbalanced inventory. Figure 3.3 illustrates that 
there are two market makers with diflPerent inventory levels: market maker 
A is short of inventory, so he raises the bid and ask price to attract more 
sell orders. Market maker B, on the other hand, has too many shares, so 
he lowers the quotes to attract more buy orders. Suppose market maker A 
attracts a sell order from the private chent (an N trade), and a buy order from 
a broker arrives at the same time (an A trade). As a result, it would appear 
that the N trade is cheaper than the A trade, measured by the distances 
between the prices and the mid-touch. The same apphes to when market 
maker B attracts an N buy and an A sell.
The order-processing cost of the spread is discussed in Demsetz (1968), 
Tinic (1972) among others. The costs include not only the costs to process 
the order, but they also include the gains from the monopohstic power of 
market makers. The “pure” order processing costs in a dealership market 
may contain a fixed component (de Jong et al. 1995), so the costs per share 
are decreasing in the size of the trade. It may explain why the costs of the 
small SEAQ trades may be bigger than the big ones. The monopolistic power 
of the dealers will be analysed in more details later.
3.4.2 Cartel
Like NASDAQ dealers, the market makers one the LSE are not immune from 
the accusation of collusion. The suggestion of the collusion in NASDAQ 
comes from the observations that NASDAQ dealers do not make odd-eight 
quotes as often as the even-eighth quotes (Christie and Schultz 1994; Christie, 
Harris, and Schultz 1994). Though the LSE does not have rules of minimum 
tick, a few practitioners (Securities and Investments Board 1995a) and Snell 
and Tonks (1998) support the claim that the market makers exploit the
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dealer. They suggest that market makers trade with one another low prices 
and collude to charge the customers higher prices. Huang and Stoll (1996) 
and Dutta and Madhavan (1997) also suggest inter-dealer trading helps mar­
ket makers offseting the inventory so easily that they have httle incentive to 
reduce the spread to attract small investors. Furthermore, market makers are 
able to receive preferenced order flow, which does not provide their incentive 
to reduce the spread, either. The collusion hypothesis appears to explain the 
low costs of IDB trades: the market makers ofier favourable prices to each 
other in IDB market, and then exploit their customers in SEAQ. However, 
IMM trades are as expensive as, if not more than, the customer trades. If 
market makers collude, why do they offer unfavourable prices to each other 
in SEAQ?
Dutta and Madhavan argue that under imphcitly collusion, the spread 
increases with the volume up to a critical point, and decreases with volume 
afterwards. The volume in their model is essentially the demand for trading, 
that is, the bigger the demand, the bigger the spread. On the other hand, too 
large demand for trading provides the incentive of market makers to cut the 
price to induce more business, and the collusion collapses. The relationship 
between volume and spread may indicate whether market makers collude.
3.4.3 Market mechanism
The above discussion focuses on the difference between market makers and 
the other market participants. The arguments are based on the behef that 
market makers are a special class of market participants, and the difference 
in costs between IDB trade and the rest of the trades reflects the difference 
in the characteristics between market makers and the rest of the traders. 
However, the difference in transaction costs may at least partly result from 
the difference in the two trading systems. IDB market differs from SEAQ in 
many aspects. IDB is an order-driven system. The limit orders of market 
makers are displayed on the IDB screen, and trades take place via an inter­
broker dealer. On the contrary, SEAQ is a quote-driven system. Except for 
the small trades, buyers and sellers communicate with each other through
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telephone calls, and hence the market makers know the identities of the 
traders. The comparison of two trading systems is considered by Madhavan 
(1992). The market makers are assumed to offer a price schedule to the 
investors. Equihbrium exists if the information asymmetry is not very severe. 
Madhavan finds continuous auction is more robust to information asymmetry 
than a dealership system, but the prices in the auction system are not efficient 
and more volatile.
Vogler (1993) considers the scenario in which a market maker acts as a 
quasi-insider in the market. The news of the trade with customers comes to 
the market with some delays, so the market maker can exploit the temporary 
information advantage by trading with the other market makers. As a result 
inter-dealer trading has information contents. If there is no private informa­
tion, Vogler (1997) finds the spread of the inter-dealer trade is smaller than 
the customer trade, mainly because the spread is increasing with the risk 
(the size) of the trade and the size of inter-dealer trading is smaller than the 
customer trade. The difference in spread is to compensate the additional risk 
of the dealer who trades with the fiquidity trader, since in the end the dealer 
cannot diversify the risk asset away completely. The risk-sharing scenario 
may explain the small costs of IDB trades, but why IMM trades are so ex­
pensive is difficult to be fit in the story. Pagano and Roell (1992) argue that 
a dealer market is less transparent than a batch auction market, so the mar­
ket makers are forced to set spreads wider to guard against the information 
advantage. On the other hand, they suggest that an electronic market does 
not provides a mean for communication, whereas the market makers may be 
able to recognise the insiders as well as liquidity traders, so the spread may 
be smaller.
Board and Sutchffe (1995) give a brief explanation about the existence 
of IMM trade and the reason for the difference in costs (p.74). They suggest 
that the IDB market does not provide enough immediacy, so it occurs that 
market makers need to pay a premium to buy immediacy in SEAQ firom time 
to time. Reiss and Werner (1997) found IDB and IMM trades are likely to 
be substitutes of each other. They plot the IDB and IMM trading and find
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IMM trades peak in the morning and IDB trades peak in the afternoon. They 
argue that there are relatively few IDB posting in the morning, so the market 
makers have to resort to IMM trades. Second, they report IMM trades are 
more common at narrow touches than IDB trades. They said the market 
makers may be more likely to use IMM trades when the touch is narrow. If 
spreads are narrow enough when IMM trades occur, then there is very httle 
room for the market maker to manoeuvre.
Finally, numerous researches have been conducted on the comparison 
of the execution costs in dealer markets and auction markets. Lee (1993), 
Affleck-Graves et al. (1994), and Huang and StoU (1996) compare the costs of 
NYSE and NASDAQ, Neal (1992) compares the costs of AMEX and OBOE, 
and de Jong et al. (1995) compare the cost of trading French shares in 
London and Paris market. Most of the work show that the cost of trading in 
auction markets are equal to or lower than dealership markets.
3.5 D eterm inants o f the spreads: a  
regression analysis
Section 3.3 shows cost of trading with market makers vary substantially with 
the customers. Section 3.4 reviews the hterature which offers explanations for 
the difference in costs, and this section is to examine to what extent the cost 
difference can be explained by the existing theories. The dependent variable 
of the regression models is the effective spread defined in equation (3.2). 
There are two groups of independent variables. The first group consists of 
dummy variables of the class of trade. Let d/, djvf j djv and dp be respectively 
dummy variables of the I, M, N and P trades: 1 indicates the trade belongs 
to the class, and 0 otherwise. The second group consists of the “literature” 
variables, which are suggested in the literature to explain cost of trading:
1. The variables that measure the competition of the market: MM, the 
number of market makers of the stock at the day when the trade takes 
place. FTSE, the dummy variable of FTSE-100 stocks: 1 indicates the
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stock is in the group of FTSE-100, and 0 otherwise. The third variable 
is spt, the size of half touch divided by the mid-touch. Both FTSE and 
MM are expected to be negatively related to the costs of trade, and spt 
is positively related to the costs.
2. sdt, the standard deviation of the prices of the trades from the begin­
ning of the day till one minute before the trade. It is computed first by 
taking the average of the standard deviation of buy prices and that of 
the sell prices, then the average is standardised by the average standard 
deviation at the time of the day. If there are only buy or sell trades, 
then use the standard deviation which is available without average. If 
there is no or only one previous trade in both buy and sell sides, sdt 
cannot be computed and the observation is removed from the analysis.
If traders are risk-averse, then the spread is increasing in the risk of 
the underlying securities (Stoll 1978b; Ho and Stoll 1981; Ho and Stoll 
1983; Easley and O’Hara 1987).
3. The variables associated with the inventory effect. Following Madhavan 
and Smidt (1991), the pricing function of the market maker may be 
written as follows:
' Pt -  oi{It -  Id) 4- s ( . ..) for a buy 
p = < , (3.3)
— Id) — s ( . ..) for a sell 
where p  ^is the “true” price of the underlying security. It is the inventory 
level at time t. Id is the ideal inventory level, and s is half of the bid- 
ask spread, a function of many variables. Combine equation (3.2) and
(3.3),
' (p -m t) /m t  = :^[pt -  mt -  a(It -  Id) + s{ ...)] for a buy
cost =  <
, ( m t - p ) /m t  =  -  rrit) + a(It -  Id) + s ( . ..)] for a sell
(3.4)
Furthermore, let db be 1 when the trade is a buy, and -1 when the trade 
is a sell, then (3.4) can be written as
s =  — [db{pt — rrit — Oi{It — Id)) +  s {...)]
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Let Iq be the inventory level at the beginning of the sample period, Vt 
be the net number of shares bought by the market makers between the 
beginning of the period and time then /* =  /q +  v*. Assume the ideal 
inventory level is the average of daily closing inventory level
125
/ i  =  E(^o + t'.,a)/125,
5 = 1
where Vs^ e is the accumulated trading volumes at the end of date s, and 
there are 125 trading days in the sample. Hence
125
It Id ~
5 = 1
and
125
s = Podb +  (3idb(vt -  5 ]  ^ 5,e/125) +  s{...).
5 = 1
That is, the inventory effect is captured by db, and the multiplication of 
db and Vt. The inventory theory predicts 0, and Pq can be either 
positive or negative.^
The regression will be run on the sample of 39 stocks with different 
market makers. Market makers may have different ideal inventory levels 
of different stocks, so the standardised inventory is used; see Hansch 
et al. (1998).
4. The non-hnear effect of time of the trade is modelled by cubic splines. 
Cubic sphnes are a set of cubic polynomials which are differentiable 
and continuous in the domain of independent variable. The technical 
details are described in Appendix B.l. Three knots points of the sphnes 
are 8:30, 12:30 and 16:30 respectively. To avoid the cohnearity, the 
value of time sphne at 8:30 is restricted to zero, and the two remaining 
variables are T1 and T2 respectively. The variable is to capture the 
intraday effect observed in some of the markets; see Section 4.2.4 for 
details.
® Some of the M trades are executed at the mid-touch. Their trade direction cannot be 
identified {db is unknown) and are removed from the analysis.
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5. The size of the trade measured by NMS multiples. To capture the po­
tential non-linear effect, the regression spline is used. The knot points 
are 0, 1, 6, 75, and 360 times NMS.® The spline of zero times NMS is 
restricted to zero to avoid colinearity, and the remaining variables are 
Ql, Q2, Q3, and Q4 respectively.
6. The trading volumes of the stock before the trade take place. According 
to Dutta and Madhavan (1997), if market makers collude implicitly, 
cost of trading increases with market volumes first and then decreases. 
As the accumulated volumes increase during the day, the variable is 
divided by the average accumulated volumes at the time of the day 
to measure the excess demand for trade. The volume effect is again 
modelled by cubic sphnes with knots point -1.464, 0, 4.407 and 10.278.^ 
The spline of the first knot is restricted to zero to avoid colinearity, and 
the remaining variables are VI, V2, and V3 respectively.
To compare the effect of class dummies with the effect of “literature” 
variables on execution costs, three regression models are tested. Model (1) 
uses all of the variables. Model (2) has only “literature variables” , and Model 
(3) uses trade-class dummies as independent variables. If the second group of 
variables explains the cost difference well, then Model (2) will perform better 
than Model (3), and the class dummies in Model (1) will be statistically 
insignificant.
The results of the regressions are shown in Table 3.3. Parameter esti­
mates, t-values of the variables, and the R-squares of the models are pre­
sented.® By comparison of their R-squares, Model (3) apparently performs 
much poorer than Model (2) and Model (1). Indeed, as ah of the class 
dummies of broker trades are zero. Model (3) merely reflects the average 
cost difference among different classes of trades: I trades are 17 basis points
® 360 times NMS is the maximum size observed in the sample. One, six and seventy-five 
times NMS correspond to the critical points of trade pubhcation rules; see Section 1.1.
 ^-1.464 and 10.278 are respectively the maximum and minimum volumes observed in 
the sample, and 4.407 is the average of them.
® T-values are adjusted for heteroscedasticity using White’s (1980) approach.
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cheaper than A trades, M trades are two basis points cheaper than A trades, 
and so on. The cost differences among the trades are not exactly same as 
those reported in Table 3.2 because some of the observations used in the 
previous table are excluded from the regression analysis.
A glance at the coefficients associated with the second group of variables 
in Model (2) and Model (1) reveals the behaviour of execution costs are partly 
consistent with most of the existing hterature. For example, the coefficients 
of both FTSE and MM are expected to be negative, but the coefficient of 
FTSE is positive in Model (1) and the coefficient of MM is positive in Model 
(2). Moreover, only the coefficient of FTSE in Model (1) is significant. The 
half touch, spt, is the most significant variable of the model. It reflects the 
fact that 71% of the trades in the sample occur at the best bid or best ask. 
The costs are increasing with sdt, which is consistent with the theory that 
risk-averse market makers demand more compensation when the market is 
volatile. The inventory theory does not impose any restriction on db, but 
db * Vd,t is expected to be negatively correlated to the cost, which is contra­
dicted with the result of both Model (1) and Model (2). The coefficients 
of time sphne, size sphne and volume sphne should not be considered sepa­
rately; they should be recovered from the knots and the coefficients. Figure 
3.4 plots the three estimated sphnes. The cost of trade is gradually increasing 
throughout the day, which are contradicted to the U-shape theory (Brock and 
Kleidon 1992).® The size sphne dechnes sharply in the beginning until 5 times 
NMS, then continues to dechne slowly to 60 time NMS, and then increases. 
The size effect is consistent with the finding by Hansch et al. (1999), in which 
they find the execution cost (the effective spread) is positively related to the 
sizes of big trades and negatively related to the sizes of small trades. The 
volume sphne increases between zero and eight times standardised volumes, 
and is flat elsewhere. It does not support the collusion hypothesis by Dutta 
and Madhavan (1997). However, both the time and volume effect are of httle 
economic significance. The difference between the maximum and minimum 
of time sphne is less than one, that is, the time of the trade does not change
® Chapter 4 will examine the existence of intraday effects in more details.
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the cost by more than one basis point. The range of volume sphne is slightly 
larger, but it is stiU less than 1.5 basis points. In contrast, the range of size 
spline is more than fifty basis points. Even if the majority of the trades are 
less than 60 time NMS, the range of the sphne with the size less than 60 
times NMS is stih bigger than ten basis points. Thus, the costs of trades are 
more sensitive to the sizes than volumes or times. The significance the co- 
efhcients of inventory-related variables, time, size and volume sphnes cannot 
be considered separately. The second panel of Table 3.3 presents the results 
of Wald tests of jointly significance of the sphnes. All of the sphnes are sta­
tistically significant, but of the size sphne is much bigger than those of 
the other two. Furthermore, the differences among the coefficients of class 
dummies in both Model (1) and Model (3) are ah significant.
The coefhcients of the same variable in Model (2) and Model (1) are often 
very similar. The introduction of class dummies in Model (1) has changed the 
signs of coefhcients of FTSE and MM, and the magnitudes of coefficients of 
size sphnes and volume sphnes are r e d u c e d .T h e  biggest difference between 
the coefficients in Model (3) and Model (1) (and Model (2)) is the intercept: 
the variables suggested in the hterature capture most of the effects of the 
intercept in Model (3). The absolute values of the coefficients of dj and 
are smaller in Model (1) than in Model (3), which means the difference of cost 
of trading among these classes of trades are not as big as it appears to be, 
after a great deal of effects discussed in the existing hterature have been taken 
into account, dp does not change very much. However, the dummy variable 
of M trades, du, changes from signihcantly smaller than zero in Model (3) to 
significantly bigger than zero in Model (1). It may imply that M trades are in 
fact the most expensive class of trades. Finahy, the Condition Index (Cl) 
of Model (1) and Model (2) are high, which is mainly due to the fact that 
MM and spt are highly correlated. However, this does not affect the abihty
The splines of Model (2) are very similar to those of Model (1) except the ranges of 
volume and size sphnes have increased to two and seventy basis points respectively.
However, those M trades which occurred at the mid-touch are not included in the
analysis as the directions of trades cannot be identified. The exclusion of those trades 
may over-estimate the costs of M trades.
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of the model to explain the costs. The Durbin-Watson statistics (DW) of the 
two models do not reveal the residuals of the two models are autocorrelated. 
In contrast, there is no sign of cohnearity in Model (3), while its residuals 
are highly autocorrelated.
Although Model (2) performs better than Model (3), it does not mean 
the class dummies are unimportant in determining the costs of trades. In 
the last panel of Table 3.3, F statistics are used to test if the coefficients 
of the class dummies are jointly significant in Model (1). The F-statistics 
of the class dummies is 41,889.11, which confirms the class dummies stih 
play an important role in determining the costs in Model (1). The variables 
proposed in the literature do explain the cost of trading very weU, but they 
stih cannot explain why there is difference among the costs of the different 
classes of trades.
3.6 TVades and quote changes
The previous section shows that a large part of the execution costs can be 
explained by the theories in the existing hterature. On the other hand, the 
significance of trade dummies in Model (1) implies that market makers appear 
to treat different class of trades differently. An explanation of the significance 
of the dummies is that different classes of trades have different informational 
contents, which are captured in the class dummies in the regression models. 
If market makers beheve that certain trades contain information, they may 
revise their behefs about the fundamental value of the stock. The changes 
in behefs may lead them to adjust the quotes. The aim of this section is to 
investigate if particular classes of trades affect the change in quotes.
Quotes of each market maker are provided in the CD-ROM Transaction 
Data Service. During the mandatory quote period in the first half of 1996, 
twenty-two market makers make 315,364 quote changes of the thirty-nine 
stocks in the sample. Chapter 2 has shown that market makers often change 
the quote just because another market makers have done so. Therefore, the 
quote changes are removed from the sample if there is another quote change
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preceding the current change by 30 seconds in the same direction, and only 
141,225 quote changes are included in the analysis.
Define the dependent variable m* the last mid-quote between t minute 
zero second and t minute 59 second by the market maker, then the change 
in quote during minute t is defined as
Amt =  (m* -  (3.5)
Note that here rrit is re-defined as the mid-quote of a market maker, not the 
mid-touch as in the previous sections of the chapter.
Two regression models are used. The first model includes independent 
variables such as number of buy and sell trades and volumes of different 
classes of trades, and the model can be written as
t
A u i f  ~  CXq -f- ^  ]  'y   ^ (o ^ cl,6x ,n ^ cl,6 ,n  0^cl,6v,n'^cl,6,n 4" 0 ^ c l,sx ,n ^ c l,s ,n  4“ Q^cl,su,n‘^ c l,s ,n )
c l  n = t —3 
t+ 3
4" y  ^ y  ^ (o^c2,6x,n^c2,6,n 4“ 0^c2,bv,n'^c2,b,n 4“ 0!c2 ,sx ,n ^ c2 ,s,n  4“ 0^c2,st;,n^c2,a,n) 
c2 n = t —3 
t
4“ y  ] y ] (^ c3 ,b x ,n ^ c3 ,b ,n  4“ Oic3,bv,n'^c3,b,n 4“ 0^ c3,sx,n^ c3,s,n 4“ 0!c3,sv,n'*^ c3,5,n)*(fi*fi) 
c3 n = t —3
The regression will detect which classes of trades have more influence on 
the quote c h a n g e . T h e  subscript cl indicates the trade class A, N, I, M 
and P when the initiator of the trade is the customer. C2 indicates the trade 
class 1(h) and M(h) when the initiator of an I trade or an M trade is the 
market maker who changes the quote. C3 indicates the trade class S(o) and 
I(o), of which the trade either takes place in SEAQ or in IDB market and of 
which the trade does not involve the market maker who changes the quote.
X is the number of the trades at time n, and v is the trading volumes (in 
NMS multiples) at time n}^ The subscript b indicates the x {v) is of buys 
and s indicates x  (v) is of sells. If trades are initiated by customers (class
Alternatively, one may regress the realised spread, defined as the diflFerence between 
the current price and the mid-touch at the end of the day, on the different classes of trades;
see Easley et al. (1997).
Both trades and volumes are not standardised. The regression model depends on a 
certain degree of homogeneity among stocks and market makers.
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cl), a quote change during minute t  may result from the trading before t, 
so lag trades at time t, t — 1, t — 2 and t — 3 are included in the model. 
If the inter-dealer trade is initiated by the market maker who changes the 
quote (class c2), then not only the trades preceding the change may affect the 
change, but the market maker may also change the quote before initiating 
trades. Hence trades at t - \ -1, t 2 and t +  3 are included as independent 
variables. If market makers do not involve in the trade (class c3), only the 
lag trades may affect the change of the quote. As market makers do not 
observe the direction of SEAQ trades which they do not involve, they may 
not observe the directions of S(o) trades, and the directions are identified 
by the mid-touch. On the other hand, market makers have access to IDB 
screen, so they can identify the direction of I(o) trades.
If a customer initiates a buy trade (class cl), then the market maker may 
move up the quote after the trade according to either inventory theory or 
adverse selection theory, so the coefficients ad,bx,n and aci,bv,n are expected 
to be positive. A sell trade will cause the market maker to move down the 
quote, so «ci.ax.n and aci,sv,n are expected to be negative. If a buy trade 
is initiated by the market maker who changes the quote (class c2), then 
he is likely to move up the quote if there is information effect. Similarly, 
the information effect will cause him to move down the quote as well as 
initiating a sell trade. The inventory effect, however, moves the quote to 
the different direction. Once the market maker initiates a buy trade, his 
inventory level rises, and the market maker will move down the quote to 
reduce the inventory. If the market maker initiates a sell trade, the inventory 
level falls, and the market maker will move up the quote to increase the 
inventory. If the inventory effect is greater than the information effect, then 
«c2 ,6x,n and ac2,bv,n are expected to be negative and ac2,sx,n and ac2,sv,n are 
to be positive. If the information effect is greater than the inventory effect, 
the outcomes are expected to be the opposite. Finally, the trades which do 
not involve the market maker (class c3) have no effects on his inventory. If 
there is information effect of the trades by others, then Oic3 ,bx,n and ac3 ,bv,n 
are expected to be positive and 0 !c3 ,sx,n and ac3 ,sv,n to be negative. The
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relationship between trades and quote changes are illustrated in Figure 3.5.
The result of the regression is in Table 3.4. Both the coefficients and their 
t-statistics are repor t ed .Reca l l  the coefficients of aci,6x,n and «ci.tw.n are 
expected to be positive and ad,sx,n and Oci.sv.n to be negative under inventory 
models and adverse selection models. Most of the coefficients associated with 
the numbers of A, N, P and M trades behave as expected. The coefficients of 
number of trades tend to be more significant than the coefficients of volume of 
trades except for class A trades. Quite a few coefficients of volume variables 
are not consistent with information or inventory models. Trades at time 
t — 2 and t — 3 are related to the change in quote at t more closely than 
the trades at time t or t — 1. It implies that market makers do not respond 
to trades instantly; they need time to digest the impacts brought by the 
trades. The sizes of the coefficients associated with buys and those of 
the corresponding sells apparently do not exhibit any patterns: the absolute 
value of otc\M,n{^ci,bv,n) may be bigger or smaller than that of aci,sx,n{^ci,sv,n)- 
The most significant coefficients are those related to the number of M trades. 
In contrast, the coefficients associated with I trades are surprising. The 
coefficients of volume variables, ai^ iyu,n and aj^sv,n, are not significant and 
with different signs. However, most of the a/,6x,n are significantly positive 
and all of the ai^sx,n are significantly negative. It implies market makers move 
down (up) the quotes after another market makers buy (sell) from them in 
IDB market, which are inconsistent with the theories. As a result, most of 
the signs of the coefficients of the number of trades are different from those 
of the volumes of trades. It appears market makers treat the trades in IDB 
market very differently from the rest of the trades when considering changing 
quotes.
If a market maker hits the fimit order in IDB market (trade class I (h)), 
then he is likely to move up the quote after a buy or to move down the quote 
after a sell. The result is consistent with the information theory, or at least 
the information effect is bigger than the inventory effect. The signs of the
The statistics are adjusted for heteroscedasticity using White’s (1980) approach.
The results here is somewhat contradicted to those found in Section 2.6.2, in which 
the magnitudes of most of the trades coefficients at time t are greater than those at f — 1.
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coefficients of number of trades and those of their corresponding volumes are 
not always the same, but most of the coefficients of volumes are not signif­
icant. The results are similar when the market maker trades with another 
one in SEAQ (trade class M (h)). Most of the coefficients of volume are not 
significant. Three significant volume variables are of the sells, two of which 
support inventory theories. However, all signs of aM{h),bx,n are positive and 
all signs of aM{h),sx,n are significantly negative, which strongly indicate the 
information effect is greater than inventory effect. The coefficients of M (h) 
class are more significant than their counterparts of I (h) class in general. 
Moreover, while there is evidence that market makers initiate M trades before 
changing the quotes, the practice appears to be less conunon when market 
makers initiate I trades: the coefficients of lead trades are more significant 
in M trades than those in I trades. If the trade takes places in IDB market 
and does not involve the market maker himself (trade class I(o)), then the 
trade hardly affects the decision to change the quote. Most of the coefficients 
of this class of trades are very small and insignificant. In contrast, all the 
coefficients associated with the trade class S(o) are significant and consistent 
with the adverse selection theory. It may imply that market makers regard 
trades in the market contain information and adjust the quotes accordingly.
The second regression model groups the trades by their sizes:
t
A ? 7 lf  =  CHq +  y   ^ y   ^ (o !c l,x b ,n ^ c l,b ,n  4" Oicl,XTn,n^cl,Tn,n  4 “ ^ c l ,x s ,n ^ c l , s ,n )  
c l  n = t —3 
t+ 3
4“ y   ^ y   ^ (o!c2,xb,n^c2,b,n  4" CKc2,xm,n2^ c2,m,n 4" 0 !c2 ,x s ,n ^ c2 ,s ,n }  
c2 n = t —3 
t
4“ y   ^ y   ^ {(^c3,xb,n^c3,b,n  4“ O ic3,xm ,n^c^,m ,n  4" 0^ c3,xa,n^ c3,s,n) 
c3 n = t—3
4- Û!S(o),x6,t-59/62^S(o),6,t-59/62- (3-7)
The reason of examining this regression model is that different classes of 
trades have different sizes (See Table 3.1 and Table 3.2), and trade sizes are 
beheved to contain information (Easley and O’Hara 1987). M trades in the 
model (3.6) appear to affect the quote changes more than the other classes 
of trades, but M trades are also bigger than another trades. Thus, it is
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worthwhile to separate size effects and class effects. Trading volumes are not 
used in (3.7) because the results from the previous model reveal that volume 
variables are often not statistically significant, in (3.7) is no longer
the number of buy or sell trades. Instead, it is the number of buy trades 
minus the number of sell trades at time n}^ cl, c2, and c3 are the same 
classes of trades defined as before, while subscript 6, m  and s respectively 
indicate the trades are greater than or equal to six time NMS (big trades), 
between one and six times NMS (medium trades), and less than one times 
NMS (small trades). Because the pubhcation of big trades is delayed for one 
hour, the model includes a new variable 2 :5 (0 ),6 ,*-5 9 / 6 2 ? which is the difference 
between buy and seU trades taking place in SEAQ between 59 and 62 minutes 
before the quote chage.^^ According to the information theory, ah a  in model 
(3.7) are expected to be positive. According to inventory theory, are
expected to be positive and o:c2 ,*,n are expected to be negative.
The regression results are shown in Table 3.5. The coefficients of most of 
the variables are positive. The biggest exceptions are those associated with 
I trades initiated by counter parties (Class cl.) However, coefficients of 1(h) 
trades are positive, and those of I(o) trades are not significant. Some of the M 
and P trade variables are occasionally negative, especiahy for the big trades. 
One of the explanations is that some of the trade directions in the two classes 
may be incorrect. For the M trades, the directions are identified by the mid- 
touch. If the mid-touch does not always reflect the true value of the stock, 
then the directions of M trades may not always be correct. For the P trades, 
market makers occasionally look for another member firms for liquidity, and 
the trade direction in such a situation should be the direction of market
Although the sample used in this chapter is different from the previous one, the fact 
that sell trades are more than buy trades remains the same. However, the magnitudes 
of a*,6x,n and a ,^bv,n are not bigger than those of and a^ .bv,ny so the use of net
trades is justified. Like the sample in Chapter 2, downward changes of quote are more 
than upward changes among FTSEÎ-100 stocks.
Those big trades involving market makers themselves are known when the trades are 
executed, and market makers observe all the trades in the IDB market, so only the big 
trades in SEAQ of c3 class may not be known by the market maker who changes the quote 
immediately after the execution of the trade.
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makers, not of principals. If this conjecture is correct, then market makers 
reverse the quotes after P trades are consistent with inventory theories.
The effects of medium trades appear to be bigger than both small trades 
and big trades in most of the trade classes. The effects of big trades are 
the strongest of trade class A. Table 3.1 shows that big A trades are rare. 
It implies that market makers regard big A trades as unusual and change 
the quote accordingly. Similarly, the average size of M trades is the biggest, 
small M trades are unusual, and market makers respond to small M trades 
more than the other classes of small trades. Finally, « 5 (0 ),x6 ,t-5 9 / 6 2  is very 
small compared with the other « 5 (0 ),it,n- It may imply the delay for trade 
publication has httle impact on the quote change. Even though big trades are 
formally published one hour after the trades are executed, the market makers 
who do not executed the trades learn the information from somewhere else 
and change the quotes soon after the trades take place.
Finally, the Condition Index of either (3.6) or (3.7) does not show any 
sign of cohnearity. On the other hand, the low Durbin-Watson statistics 
indicate the residuals may be autocorrelated. This is consistent with the 
result of Chapter 2, which shows that the preceding change two minutes ago 
still explain the current change.
3 .7  D iscussions and conclusions
This chapter compares the costs of executing different categories of trades. 
The smah investors, who have to use brokers to trade with market makers, 
appear to pay more than the private chents of the market makers. Member 
firms of the Exchange who act as principals have favourable price, and they 
may act as hquidity providers of the market makers. The trades in IDB 
market are remarkably cheaper than the trades in SEAQ, while IMM trades 
are remarkably expensive. The regression analysis shows the theories in the 
existing hterature successfully explain part of the effective spreads, but they 
cannot explain all of the cost difference among different classes of trades. 
The regression analysis of quote changes reveals that market makers change
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quotes after customer trades, which imply those trades have certain inventory 
or information implication. The hitters in IMM trades tend to adjust the 
quotes before the trades, and their counter parties tend to adjust the quotes 
after the trades. The hitters in IDB trades do not adjust the quotes as 
enthusiastic as they do in IMM trades, and the posters of IDB trades change 
their quotes to the direction opposite to what is predicted by the literature.
My interpretation of the evidence is as follows. The weak evidence of the 
effect of inventory on the costs of trades in Section 3.5 suggests inventory 
consideration may not play an important role in determining the costs of 
trades. According to Section 3.6, the initiator of inter-dealer trading appears 
to consider the information effect more than the inventory effect. Moreover, 
most of the volume variables do not perform as good as the variables of 
number of trades in model (3.6). Although some of the results in the re­
gression models do not separate the inventory effect from the information 
effect completely, there is evidence supporting information effect, such as 
the strong relationship between S (o) trades and quote changes in Section 
3.6, whereas inventory effect is either small or over-shadowed by information 
effect. Therefore, most of the cost difference is likely to be attributed to in­
formation costs, order processing costs and the monopolistic power of market 
makers. The support for the implicit collusion of market makers does not 
exist. The volume sphne in Figure 3.4 does not exhibit an inverse “V” shape 
as predicted by Dutta and Madhavan (1997) for imphcit collusion. Further­
more, according to Model (3) in Section 3.5, M trades are the most expensive 
trades all possible considerations discussed in the literature have been taken 
into account. Therefore, market makers do not give one another favourable 
prices in SEAQ.
Based on the evidence that inventory consideration does not affect the 
effective spreads in a substantial way, the close relationship between quote 
change and trades is largely attributed the information brought by the trades. 
Market makers regard the customer trades, including trades with brokers and 
with chents, as valuable information, and they move the quotes accordingly. 
Market makers are also very sensitive to M trades. Table 3.4 suggests the
114
effects of M trades on the quote change are more pronounced than the other 
classes of trades. If market makers cannot wait for trading with customers 
and rush into M trades, it indeed signals something unusual to their counter 
parties. Moreover, the initiators of M trades adjust their quotes to the same 
direction of the trades even before the trades take place, which strongly 
indicates the information effect outweighs the inventory consideration.
The significance of M trades from regression models (3.6) and (3.7) is 
consistent with the information hypothesis that M trades have more infor­
mation contents than the rest of the trades. However, the regressions still 
cannot explain why A trades are more expensive than N trades, nor why N 
trades are more expensive than P trades. How to solve this enigma? Here 
is a possible explanation. According to Table 3.1, the sizes of the trades are 
small compared with the trades with other market participants. Compared 
with other market participants, investors who use the brokers are the least 
frequent traders in the market. The aggregate volumes of broker trades may 
be substantial, but the volumes of a typical investor are small. As a result, 
a small investor may not be able to make the broker negotiate very hard 
to get a good deal from the market maker. Evidence from Chapter 2 even 
suggests that most of the small trades are preferenced. Brokers are loyal 
to their clients to the extent in which they can obtain the price as good as 
the best bid or ask quote in the market, but their wilhngness to help the 
clients beyond “best execution” is somewhat limited. In contrast, a private 
chent of market makers negotiates the trades with them herself, she is a fire- 
quent participant in the market, so she can get better prices from the market 
makers.
Is it a practice of price discrimination? Price discrimination is the prac­
tice of which the supplier of the market charges the price differently according 
to the demand of the consumers. However, the cost difference between the 
brokers and the private chents of market makers mainly reflect the different 
bargaining power of the consumers, not their demands. On the other hand, 
the huge costs of M trades may suggest the practice of price discrimination. 
As Board and Sutcliffe (1995) and Reiss and Werner (1996, 1997) have ar­
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gued, market makers use M trades only as the last resort. Market makers 
commit more capital to the market than any other market participants do. If 
a market maker needs to buy or sell stocks with other market makers for any 
reasons, it may imply that he cannot depend on brokers or private chents 
to satisfy his need to trade. Given the low costs of IDB trades, the initiator 
of M trades clearly reveals his urgent demand for shares. With IDB trading 
unavailable, the counter party of an M trade reahses it is very difficult for 
the initiator to get a deal if it is necessary to execute the trade immediately. 
The counter party can therefore charge the initiator a high cost.
A few explanations may account for the low costs of P trades. P trades 
are trades of market makers with member ffims of the Exchange, who are 
also frequent participants of the market, and their bargaining power may be 
as strong as private chents of market makers. Second, occasionaUy market 
makers rather than principals may initiate P trades. 11% of P trades occur 
below the mid-quotes, which is a proportion bigger than any classes of trades. 
It suggests that sometimes market makers may resort to non-market-maker 
members for hquidity. Third, since member firms can act as principal and 
agent, market makers are willing to reduce the costs of P trades in order to 
attract more A trades. It is interesting to examine the relationship between 
the costs of P trades and the level of order preferencing in future studies.
IDB market appears to succeed in providing market makers a platform 
to trade with one another at low costs. The success, however, partly rest on 
the inabihty of IDB market to provide hquidity timely. Reiss and Werner 
(1997) have mentioned the market makers observed the IDB best orders are 
not always available on the screens. Table 3.1 shows the total number of IDB 
trades is 54,318. Dividing it by 39 stocks and 125 trading days, the average 
number of users of IDB trades for each stock every day is about 11, including 
both posters and hitters. In other words, the four IDBs altogether broke less 
than six deals per stock per day, which does not seem to be a remarkable 
achievement. Market makers place hmit orders to IDBs without knowing 
when the trades wiU be executed. Therefore, they place hmit orders only 
when they can afford waiting for unwinding their inventories. The posting in
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IDB market clearly signals the trades only have inventory implication; there 
is no information content of IDB trades. Market makers generally subscribe 
to the view. Table 3.4 show that market makers may adjust their quotes 
when somebody else trades in SEAQ. In contrast, the market makers hardly 
take any notice to the trades in IDB markets. The hitters of I trades do move 
their quotes, but the relationship between quote change and I trades is not as 
strong as M trades, which is consistent with the conjecture that information 
content of I trades are not as big as M trades. On the other hand, the IDB 
posters are aware the IDB hitter may possess information, and in response 
they do not post big orders to IDB market. Table 3.1 shows the average 
size of IDB trades is less than 60% of the IMM trades. The effect of adverse 
selection makes IDB market less hquid than SEAQ, and it makes the costs 
of I trades smaller.
The investigation so far has generated some pohcy imphcations:
1. Is there any device to improve the costs of broker trades in SEAQ? 
The cost difference between A trades and N trades is due to the strong 
bargaining power of institutional investors. Unless the individuals are 
able to improve their bargaining power, cost difference remains between 
the two classes of trades.
2. Is there a need for a central limit order book? A central limit order 
book open to all investors is hkely to improve the costs of individual 
investors. The price of the market will be improved by the will of 
individual investors to place hmit orders, and the execution costs of 
small investors are likely to be improved. However, an order-driven 
system that is open to aU of the participants to the markets may be 
more hquid than the current IDB market. It wiU induce more informa­
tion trades to hit the hmit orders than what is currently observed in 
IDB markets. The information component of the effective spreads in 
the hmit order book must be bigger than the current IDB market.
SETS, the electronic order book for FTSE-100 stocks has been operated since October 
1997, but it does not accept small orders.
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3. How about the demands for big trades? The relatively small average 
size of IDB trades indicates big trades are not likely to take place in an 
order-driven market. If the adverse selection effect is more severe in the 
central hmit order book than in IDB market, one would expect the size 
of the order will be even less. The fourth panel of Table 3.2 indicates 
the market participants, especiahy institutional investors, have strong 
demands for trades with size of six times NMS or above. Big hmit 
orders are not many in IDB market, and they may not appear very 
often in an order-driven system. Moreover, the Exchange ahows the 
trades with six times NMS or above to be published one hour after the 
trades are executed. Before big trades are published, market makers 
are able to use inter-dealer trading or other means to offset the effect of 
the trades. If the big trades are required to enter the hmit order book, 
those trades may not take place in the first place. The customers wiU 
therefore spht the orders to enter the hmit order book. Because of the 
adverse selection effect, the sizes of those orders must be smaher than 
what are observed in IDB market. As a result, customers may have 
to wait much longer to finish the trades. Prom the market’s point of 
view, the splits in orders imphes the price formation process may be 
no sooner than is currently observed despite the delay for pubhcation. 
A central hmit book is not a satisfactory mechanism to facihtate big 
trades; another device is needed to assist the order-driven system.
To sum up, the quote-driven trading system in London has largely satis­
fied the needs for the frequent market participants to trade with one another, 
probably at the expense of infirequent investors. The infrequent investors pay 
more for the trading because they have less bargaining power against the big 
players in the market. The low costs of IDB market may not be the product 
of imphcit cohusion but of the infrequent trading, which makes trades in IDB 
market have httle information content. A change from a dealership market 
to an order-driven system is hkely to benefit the infrequent investors but not 
big players, it may not reduce the cost of trading to what is observed in IDB 
market, and it may also delay the price formation process.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of sample stocks 
The data includes the trades of thirty-nine stocks during the first six months
of 1996. Trades without the involvement of market makers are classified 
as “X” trades. TVades which involve market makers take place outside the 
mandatory quote period (MQP) are classified as “T” trades. The rest of 
trades are further classified into five categories: “A” trades are trades be­
tween market makers and brokers, “N” trades are trades between market 
makers and their private chents, “I” trades are trades between market mak­
ers and inter-dealer brokers, “M” trades are trades between market makers 
themselves, and “P” trades are trades between market makers and non- 
market-maker member firms. Volumes and the number of “M” trades are 
doubled to be comparable with “I” trades. Average trade sizes are computed 
by dividing the volumes by the numbers of trades.
trade categories: trade number of volumes in average
market maker class trades £1,000 trade
trade with size in £
brokers A 594,684 13,642,700 22,943
private chents N 60,045 20,325,343 338,473
inter-dealer brokers I 54,822 14,774,112 269,452
market makers M 30,656 14,178,948 462,404
principals P 7,643 1,657,000 216,755
outside MQP T 25,934 2,028,409 78,202
other trades X 6,969 1,375,887 197,405
total 780,753 67,982,399
of which
FTSE-100 stocks 680,526 59,164,894 86,933
non-FTSE-100 stocks 100,227 8,817,505 87,954
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Table 3.2: Cost of trading 
Cost of trading are computed according to equation (3.2). Average half touch
is one half of the difference between best bid and ask prices divided by the
mid-touch. The unit of costs and half touch is a hundredth percent. The
costs of I trades are costs of posters. The costs of IDB hitters are 11.18 basis
points for the FTSE-100 stocks, 23.55 for non-FTSE stocks, and 13.25 on
average. The difference is the commission fees of IDBs.
trade category
A N I M P
average costs 25.92 20.02 8.82 22.29 15.22
of which
FTSE-100 stocks 23.51 17.46 6.83 18.41 11.21
non-FTSE-100 stocks 44.59 32.82 18.82 38.94 28.42
breakdown of costs by NMS
0-0 .1 25.78 20.81 0.00 22.78 18.30
0.1-1 27.75 20.09 8.02 25.16 15.31
1 - 6 24.31 19.72 9.36 22.06 13.38
6 - 7 5 18.98 17.79 11.13 21.32 12.09
75 and above 22.91 24.46 3.75 39.37 26.67
Percentages of trades by NMS
0-0 .1 87.15 35.24 0.00 0.76 19.63
0 .1-1 10.22 32.77 47.72 8.85 47.51
1 - 6 2.08 20.64 46.81 82.25 28.81
6 - 7 5 0.55 11.16 5.46 8.09 3.98
75 and above 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.05 0.08
half average touch
FTSE-100 stocks 26.76 27.22 27.30 23.27 25.63
non-FTSE-100 stocks 56.71 55.73 57.33 46.82 58.55
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Table 3.3: Result of regression models of costs 
The dependent variable of the regression models is the cost of trading defined in (3,2).
Model (3) uses only trade-class dummies as independent variables. Model (2) uses variables
suggested in the hterature. Model (1) uses all the variables in (2) and (3). An asterisk (*)
indicates the t-statistic is significant at 0.05 level, two asterisks (**) indicate the statistic
is significant at 0.01 level, and three asterisks (***) indicate at 0.0001 level.
T2
Ql
Q2
Q3
Q4
VI
V2
V3
R2
Cl
DW
coefficient
3.5944 16.54*** 
-14.6484-119.27*** 
5.0318 34.00***
Independent Model (1) 
variables ~
Intercept 
di 
dM 
dn
dp
FTSE 
MM 
spt 
sdt 
db
dbVd,t 
T1
Model (2) 
t-value coeflftcient t-value 
3.6261 16.73***
-3.6123
-10.1137
0.2294
-0.0007
0.7128
0.2116
-0.7098
0.0001
0.7359
0.9261
-3.6993
-9.7694
-12.9615
39.2747
-0.0119
0.9013
1.3088
0.4942
26.05
1.84
-36.42***
-36.72***
2 .20*
-0.08
261.17***
11.12* * *
-39.28***
2.90**
11.61***
15.98***
-39.32***
-54.90***
-4.20***
0.66
-0.18
9.85***
2.58**
Model (3) 
coefficient t-value
25.86351159.70*** 
-17.0841 -178.27*** 
-2.5356 -17.09*** 
-5.9487 -56.29*** 
-10.6923 -38.10***
-0.1910 -1.81 
0.0065 0.65 
0.7082261.62*** 
0.2000 10.42*** 
-0.8702 -46.74*** 
0.0001 3.12**
0.7212 11.11*** 
0.6620 11.12*** 
-6.1189 -85.66*** 
-14.4084 -96.38*** 
-17.6725 -5.82***
56.2279
-0.0472
0.9538
1.8081
0.4674
25.65
1.83
1.00
-0.69
10.20* * *
3.49**
0.0414
1.52
1.02
Wald tests of 
Significance of size spline 
Significance of time spline 
Significance of volume spline 
dj < dp 
dp < djv 
d N  <  d M
Model (1) 
value 
3321.07*** 
277.02*** 
125.34*** 
247.24*** 
510.19*** 
171.61***
Tests of jointly significance of variables
Model (1)
Model (2)
Model (3)
F-values of classs dummies =  41889.11 
F-values of all other variables =  9308.00
Model (2)
X^  value 
13821.05*** 
168.14*** 
151.69***
Model (3) 
X^  value
469.79***
252.96***
361.91***
Sum of 
Square Errors 
120461778 
126850996 
228313582
Degrees of 
Freedom 
4 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1
Degrees of 
Freedom 
701969 
701973 
701984
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Table 3.4: Result of the analysis of quote changes -  trades and volumes
This table shows the result of regression model of equation (3.6):
ATTlf — Q!o +  ^  ^  ]  ( o ^ c l ,6 i ,n ^ c l ,6 ,n  " t  ^c \,h v ,n '^c \,b ,n  4" 0 !cl,aa:,7 i^c l,3 ,7 i "h ^c l,8 V ,n '^ c l,s ,n )
c l n = t —3 
f+ 3
4" ^  ^  ]  {o^c2,bx,n^c2,b,n  "t" Oic2,bv,n^c2,b,n "h OCc2,sx,n^c2,s,n  +  Olc2,8v,n'^c2,s,n)
c2 n = t —3 
t
^ ^ ] (^ c3 ,6 x ,n ^ c3 ,6 ,n  4" CKc3,bv,n'^c3,b,n 4" Oic3^gx^n^c3,8,n 4" Û!c3,flu,n^c3,s,n)-
c3 n = t —3
A r r it  is the quote change defined in (3.5). The independent variables are number of 
trades (x) and volumes (v) around the change in quotes. Subscript cl are of the trade 
classes initiated by customers, c2 are of the classes initiated by the market maker, and 
c3 indicates the trades without the involvement of the market maker who changes the 
quote. Subscript b (s) indicates buys (sells). The coefficients and their t-statistics are 
presented. An asterisk (*) indicates the t-statistic is significant at 0.05 level, two asterisks 
(**) indicate the statistic is significant at 0.01 level, and three asterisks (***) indicate at 
0.0001 level.
buy trades buy volumes sell 1trades sell volumes
0^ c,bx,n t-value 0!c,6r,n t-value ^c,sx,n t-value ^c,sv,n t-value
class cl
A t 0.0085 0.97 0.0210 4.51*** 0.0065 0.99 -0.0311-3.68**
t-1 0.0063 0.71 0.0147 3.30** 0.0098 1.04 -0.0137-3.55**
t-2 0.0281 3.17** 0.0262 3.59** -0.0382 -6.16*** -0.0521-4.95***
t-3 0.0345 3.42** 0.0480 3.90*** -0.0175 -2.76** -0.0235-3.16**
N t 0.0533 1.83 -0.0041-0.85 -0.1087 -4.62*** -0.0076-1.89
t-1 0.0792 3.81** 0.0052 1.70 -0.0696 -3.14** -0.0084-1.40
t-2 0.1369 5.67*** 0.0023 0.47 -0.1746 -8.38*** -0.0046-1.11
t-3 0.1407 5.86*** 0.0067 1.52 -0.1282 -6.09*** -0.0008-0.35
P t 0.0194 0.35 -0.0235-8.57*** 0.0668 0.63 0.0271 1.30
t-1 0.0744 1.35 0.0075 0.24 -0.2036 -4.52*** 0.0128 1.15
t-2 0.1995 5.08*** 0.0504 3.10** -0.2854 -6.10*** 0.0573 1.50
t-3 0.2115 4.01*** -0.0005-0.03 -0.1724 -2.83** 0.0234 0.32
I t 0.0991 0.84 -0.1771-1.60 0.2639 5.13*** -0.0402-1.36
t-1 -0.4948 -4.62*** 0.1437 1.39 0.2167 6.13*** 0.0070 0.28
t-2 -0.2046 -6.63*** -0.0791-2.54* 0.3035 13.54*** 0.0127 0.43
t-3 -0.3233 -9.04*** -0.0185-2.03* 0.2860 14.33*** -0.0201-1.51
M t 0.1197 1.93 -0.0632-3.30** -0.0943 -1.55 0.0264 2.11*
t-1 0.2630 5.85*** -0.0496-5.87*** -0.1898 -4.62*** 0.0365 2.40*
t-2 0.382322.56*** 0.0038 0.74 -0.3566-20.22*** 0.0298 3.91***
t-3 0.410927.51*** 0.0011 0.34 -0.3989-24.50*** 0.0217 2.98**
(continued to the next page)
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buy trades buy volumes sell trades sell volumes
^ c,bx ,n  t-value ^ c,bv,n t-value û!c,sx,n t-value Oic,sv,n t-value
class c2
I t+3 0.1697 3.42** -0.0007 -0.05 0.0367 0.74 -0.0318 -1.93
(h) t+2 0.0878 2.28* 0.0044 0.33 -0.1933 -4.76*** 0.0297 1.75
t+1 0.1893 3.40** 0.0075 0.39 -0.0497 -1.64 -0.0078 -3.45**
t 0.1562 4.26*** -0.0112 -0.92 -0.2358 -6.04*** 0.0211 1.39
t-1 0.1243 3.18** 0.0080 0.49 -0.0654 -1.46 0.0091 0.59
t-2 0.193910.20*** 0.0015 0.28 -0.2047 -7.64*** 0.0273 2.02*
t-3 0.196511.54*** 0.0081 3.79** -0.1913 -9.23*** 0.0063 1.02
M t+3 0.1019 2.10* 0.0194 1.09 -0.1080 -3.26** -0.0249 -2.49*
(h) t+2 0.2531 6.65*** -0.0186 -0.91 -0.0989 -2.77** -0.0429 -2.58**
t+1 0.1005 2.88** 0.0155 0.66 -0.1735 -3.56** -0.0122 -1.13
t 0.2527 7.27*** -0.0410 -2.22* -0.1191 -1.63 -0.1377 -1.63
t-1 0.2992 6.12*** 0.0175 0.99 -0.3456 -6.09*** 0.0734 1.60
t-2 0.266210.54*** -0.0294 -1.88 -0.3076 -10.65*** -0.0142 -0.90
t-3 0.257610.51*** -0.0088 -0.58 -0.2768 -15.06*** -0.0253 -2.93**
class c3
I t 0.0180 1.76 -0.0022 -0.32 0.0220 2.03* -0.0030 -0.41
(o) t-1 0.0177 1.83 0.0054 0.63 0.0202 1.94 0.0046 0.52
t-2 -0.0162 -1.87 0.0221 2.23* -0.0125 -1.29 0.0217 2.05*
t-3 0.0030 0.48 0.0108 2.33* 0.0090 1.43 0.0092 1.97*
S t 0.020611.68*** 0.0094 9.53*** -0.0086 -5.04*** -0.0136 -11.67***
(o) t-1 0.019911.84*** 0.0082 10.09*** -0.0176 -11.25*** -0.0118-13.62***
t-2 0.029416.84*** 0.0128 19.40*** -0.0202 -14.23*** -0.0158-19.69***
t-3 0.050923.63*** 0.0131 14.46*** -0.0369-23.51*** -0.0099 -5.60***
0.1298
Condition Index 6.02
Durbin Watson 0.44
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Table 3.5; Result of the analysis of quote changes -  by the size of trades
This table shows the result of regression model of equation (3.7):
AtTI^ — OlQ +  ^  ^  ]  i^ c l ,x b ,n ^ c l ,b ,n  4" ^ c l ,x m ,n ^ c l ,m ,n  "t" Q ^ cl,*a ,n ^ cl,s,n )
c l  n = t —3 
t+ 3
4" ^  ^  ]  {^c2 ,xb ,n^c2 ,b ,n  OCc2,xm,n^c2,m,n “t" O ic2,xs,n^c2,a,n)
c2 n = t —3 
t
"h ^   ^ ^  '] {0Cc3,xb,n^c3,b,n 4" O ic3,xm ,n^c3,m ,n  4" O ic3,xa,n^c3,a,n) 
c3 n = t —3 
4- 0 :5 (0 ),6x,t-59/623^S(o),6,t-5 9 /6 2 -
Am* is the quote change defined in (3,5). The independent variables are number of big 
(6), medium (m) and small (s) trades around the change in quotes. Subscript cl are 
of the trade classes initiated by customers, c2 are of the classes initiated by the market 
maker, and c3 indicates the trades which do not involve the market maker who changes 
the quote. An asterisk (*) indicates the t-statistic is significant at 0.05 level, two asterisks 
(**) indicate the statistic is significant at 0.01 level, and three asterisks (***) indicate at 
0.0001 level.
class cl
big
(^c,xb,n
trades 
t-value
medium trades 
(^c ,x m ,n  t-value
small trades 
O ic,xs,n  t-value
A t 0.2431 5.75*** 0.0402 0.97 0.0049 0.94
t-1 0.1478 2.64** 0.0870 2.69** 0.0008 0.10
t-2 0.3035 6.34*** 0.3258 13.16*** 0.0259 5.29***
t-3 0.4008 4.22*** 0.2826 8.17*** 0.0194 3.73**
N t 0.1077 2.33* 0.1215 3.56** 0.0431 2.00*
t-1 0.1966 4.67*** 0.1701 6.38*** 0.0031 0.19
t-2 0.1524 4.15*** 0.2725 12.37*** 0.0506 2.92**
t-3 0.1959 4.48*** 0.1670 7.40*** 0.0831 4.26***
P t -0.2074 -7.96*** -0.0142 -0.22 -0.0797 -1.14
t-1 -0.1653 -2.83** 0.1741 2.98** 0.0675 1.91
t-2 0.1883 2.45* 0.2254 4.03*** 0.2045 6.15***
t-3 0.2046 1.14 0.2304 4.69*** 0.1885 4.32***
I t -1.5451 -1.28 -0.1474 -5.32*** -0.1212 -2.25*
t-1 0.7809 0.89 -0.2832 -5.85*** -0.2450 -8.59***
t-2 -0.7952 -2.60** -0.3072 -7.31*** -0.2730 -15.88***
t-3 -0.3246 -2.45* -0.2702 -9.17*** -0.2990 -13.23***
M t -0.0916 -1.61 -0.0476 -1.53 0.1895 2.40*
t-1 -0.1622 -2.01* 0.0735 3.12** 0.1827 3.42**
t-2 0.2950 4.21*** 0.2636 25.92*** 0.3415 11.80***
t-3 0.3567 5.56*** 0.2780 29.30*** 0.4297 8.49*** 
(continued to the next page)
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(h)
M
(h)
(o)
S
(o)
big trades medium trades small trades
t-value t-value 0^ c„n t-value
class c2
t-|-3 0.3389 3.70** 0.0996 3.72** -0.0644 -1.08
t+2 0.1298 1.86 0.1072 5.94*** 0.1706 3.08**
t+1 0.2661 2.29* 0.1253 5.63*** 0.0102 0.17
t 0.0316 0.32 0.1559 8.51*** 0.2587 5.56***
t-1 0.1444 1.29 0.0757 3.61** 0.1851 3.89***
t-2 0.1101 1.47 0.1782 15.86*** 0.2166 5.42***
t-3 0.2424 3.87** 0.1942 17.26*** 0.1733 3.47**
t+ 3 0.1909 2.54* 0.1961 6.82*** 0.0234 0.65
t+2 0.1789 1.25 0.2065 6.96*** 0.1580 5.38***
t+1 0.4085 4.99*** 0.1326 3.11** 0.1110 2.80**
t 0.9221 1.55 0.2325 6.82*** 0.1813 7.12***
t-1 0.0286 0.10 0.3162 4.94*** 0.2777 8.06***
t-2 0.2488 2.25* 0.2693 8.41*** 0.2827 16.93***
t-3 0.5324 4.85*** 0.2122 10.99*** 0.2897 17.96***
class c3
t -0.0020 -0.03 -0.0013 -0.20 -0.0026 -0.34
t-1 0.0275 0.27 -0.0062 -0.85 0.0046 0.63
t-2 0.0135 0.11 -0.0043 -0.65 0.0016 0.33
t-3 0.0229 0.46 -0.0052 -1.13 -0.0023 -0.58
t 0.0957 13.94*** 0.1175 34.95*** 0.0084 6.62***
t-1 0.0962 13.87*** 0.1143 36.34*** 0.0122 9.87***
t-2 0.1188 20.22*** 0.1411 59.82*** 0.0099 9.57***
t-3
t-59/62
iition Index 
in  Watson
0.1106
0.0130
18.22***
3.15**
0.1639
1.86
0.45
0.1620 74.55*** 0.0199 14.74***
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Figure 3.1: Participants in the London Stock Exchange
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Figure 3.2: Measuring cost of trading
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Figure 3.3: How inventory may affect trading costs
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Figure 3.4: Effects of time, size and volume on the half effective spread
(a) time spline (b) size spline
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Figure 3.5: Quote change in response to inventory and information
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Chapter 4
MEASURING BID-ASK SPREADS 
IN MULTIPLE DEALERSHIP 
MARKETS
4.1 Introduction
The price of securities in financial markets consists of two main components: 
the fundamental price and the spread. Both components cannot be observed. 
The standard approach of estimating the spread is based on the autocovari­
ance structure of the differenced price data or on specific regression tech­
niques. It follows that the prices must be ordered sequentially over time: at 
each time period only one price is observed.
There are two notions of data sequentiahty: one refers to the market and 
the other refers to the available data set. It can be argued that securities 
traded at markets with a single market maker, such as the specialist on 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and securities traded at markets 
in which liquidity is provided by the pubhc Hmit order book, such as Paris 
Bourse and Tokyo Stock Exchange, have a price for each time period. Data 
collected from such markets usually maintain the property of sequentiality.
For multiple dealership markets, such as Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
and NASDAQ, several dealers negotiate and complete multiple trades simul­
taneously. Therefore, different prices of the same security float within the 
market at the same time. The property of price sequentiahty may stiff hold 
for data sets collected from such markets because of the method of the data
manipulation. For example, the average of traded prices within a period 
may be considered. Data sequentiahty remains in this approach but it may 
lead to a serious loss of information. DiflFerent prices are associated with 
different quantities that have a considerable effect on the spread. Moreover, 
such a practical solution is theoreticaUy not satisfactory and it is desirable 
to employ a model-based approach.
The transaction data used in this thesis is collected from the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE). Most of the securities traded on the LSE have multiple mar­
ket makers, and several trades of the same security occur simultaneously on 
a regular basis. It is not straightforward to identify the fundamental price 
in such markets due to the market itself and due to the lack of sequentiahty 
of the data. First, the London market is not transparent. Tirades are nego­
tiated between several dealers on the phone, and delays in the publication 
of new transactions take place regularly. Participants in the market do not 
necessarily observe most of the trading in the market. Therefore, even if the 
completions of some trades may be a few seconds apart, those trades are 
essentiaUy executed simultaneously. Second, data collected from the LSE is 
intrinsically non-sequential. There is no unique price within the time interval 
of one minute. The standard approach to estimate the spread using differ­
enced price is clearly not apphcable to the data. This has been the motivation 
to develop a new method to model bid-ask spreads for non-sequential trade 
markets.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 gives an 
overview of the contributions in the hterature on the empirical features of 
bid-ask spreads. The statistical model for bid-ask spreads is presented in 
Section 4.3. The section also includes discussions of the technical features of 
the model and some possible extensions. Section 4.4 presents an apphcation 
of the model by using the transaction data of three stocks traded on the 
LSE: Glaxo Wellcome, British Telecommunications and Shell Transport and 
Trading. It is shown that the proposed model is capable of identifying the 
fundamental price and the spread in a straightforward manner. Section 4.5 
compares the proposed model with alternative approaches, especially the use
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of mid-touch as the fundamental price. Section 4.6 concludes this chapter.
4.2 Bid-ask spreads
4.2.1 E stim ation using differenced prices
The fundamental price and the spread of a security are unobserved com­
ponents of the trade price. By making appropriate assumptions about the 
dynamic behaviour of the fundamental price and the spread, they can be es­
timated from the observed price. There are many ways to obtain the spread, 
but most of them require some sequential ordering of the data. Huang and 
Stoll (1997) give a detailed overview of two main approaches. The first ap­
proach is initiated by Roll (1984) and followed by, among others, Stoll (1989) 
and George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991). They estimate the spread by 
the autocovariance structure of the price and the quote differences. The 
second approach taken by Glosten and Harris (1988) and Madhavan and 
Smidt (1991) is based on regression techniques using trade indicators. This 
approach requires the use of differenced prices, quotes and trade-direct ion 
indicators, as dependent or independent variables.
Most data in the studies of bid-ask spread are ordered sequentially: daily 
data is ordered by day while intra-daily data is usually ordered by unique 
time stamps. Examples of studies based on daily data are those by RoU 
(1984) and by Affleck-Graves et al. (1994). Studies of foreign exchange 
markets often use quote records (BoUerslev and Domowitz 1993; BoUerslev 
and Melvin 1994; BoUerslev, Domowitz, and Wang 1997), which are ordered 
sequentially, so the standard approach may be adopted. Note that trade 
records are rarely available for these markets. Studies of futures or options 
markets analyse trades which are recorded sequentiaUy by the clerks in the 
exchange; see Chung (1991) and Locke and Venkatesh (1997). It should be 
stressed here that the observed data sequence may not necessarily be identical 
to the sequence of trading. For example, Hasbrouck et al. (1993) report that 
members of the NYSE are responsible to enter at least 90% of the trades to 
the Consolidated Tape System within 90 seconds of execution, so it is likely
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that the reporting sequence is not consistent with the trade sequence.
4.2.2 Non-sequential data
In a multiple dealership market, one may expect dealers to negotiate the 
trades simultaneously. Multiple trades of a liquid security may be executed 
nearly at the same time as a result. The price series is not sequential and 
estimation based on differenced data is not possible. One notable and impor­
tant example is the trade records retrieved from the LSE’s Transaction Data 
Service. Figure 4.1 shows a simplified data format of transaction records of 
British Telecom of 1 April 1996. There were six transactions at 11:09 and 
ten at 11:10 with different prices and quantities bought and sold by different 
market makers. If the approach by, for example, Huang and Stoll (1997) is 
used, one has to decide which trades at 11:09 and at 11:10 should be used: 
big trade or small trade? Buy or sell? By which market maker? At what 
prices? Any decision to manipulate the sixteen trades does not only lose but 
also distort the information.
To avoid losing serious amount of information, early investigations of the 
LSE trades rarely use the approaches of differencing data. Instead, the fun­
damental price is replaced by the mid-touch, the average of best bid and best 
ask, and the spread is defined as twice the difference between the transaction 
price and the mid-touch. This approach is carried out by, among others. 
Board and Sutchffe (1995) who study the impacts of the rules of trade pub­
lication, and Hansch et al. (1999) who study the costs of preferenced order 
flows. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 also use mid-touch in several occasions. Thus 
the spread is not measured from changes in prices. Drawbacks of using the 
mid-touch are that the time series properties of the fundamental prices have 
not been considered in full, and more importantly, whether the mid-touch is 
indeed a good approximation of the fundamental price remains in doubt; see 
Reiss and Werner (1996) and Hansch et ai. (1999) for the discussion about 
the use of the mid-touch. Moreover, the mid-touch may not be available 
outside the mandatory quote period, which is one of the main reasons why 
these outside trades are excluded in all the studies of the LSE market.
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This chapter presents a model preserving the time series properties while 
data sequentiahty is not required. The time series properties are modelled 
explicitly in order to obtain estimates of the underlying fundamental prices 
and spreads. Also, the model takes exphcitly account of a number of effects, 
which may cause the variation of the spread such as size of trade and time 
of trade. The structure of the model is general and it is easy to include more 
explanatory factors into the model. The remainder of this section discusses 
the empirical features affecting the spread which have been emphasised by 
other contributions in the hterature.
4.2.3 Trade size effect
The size of the trade is closely related to its order processing, inventory and 
information costs. Easley and O’Hara (1987) have argued that the spread 
increases with the size of the trade because large orders may indicate new 
information. On the other hand, the market maker deviates from the optimal 
portfoho by taking the order from the customer, so the spread is increasing 
in the size of the trade to compensate the loss; see Amihud and Mendelson 
(1980) and Ho and Stoh (1981, 1983). Furthermore, other authors have 
emphasised that spread size decreases with trade size because fixed costs are 
associated with each trade (Stoll 1978a; de Jong, Nijman, and Roëll 1995; 
Reiss and Werner 1996). Therefore, the size effect is expected to have a 
so-called U-shape: the spread is big for both small and big trades, and it is 
small for medium trades.
4.2.4 Intraday effect
The dominant feature of the bid-ask spread in many data sets is the intraday 
variation. Several contributions in the literature have studied the importance 
of intraday variation on the NYSE (Wood, Mclnish, and Ord 1985; Mclnish 
and Wood 1992; Brock and Kleidon 1992). It is argued that the spread 
is bigger in the early morning because traders have strong demands to re­
establish their optimal portfohos at the start of the trading period. Also,
134
market makers may fear that investors have private information at the start 
of the trading period. When the market is about to close, traders prepare for 
the non-trading period by adjusting their portfohos in an appropriate way.
Outside the NYSE, empirical evidence of the intraday pattern of spreads 
is mixed. Wang et al. (1994) use data obtained from the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange and they find that the spreads of the S&P 500 index futures have an 
intraday U-shape. Lee et al. (1993) find that effective spreads of stocks from 
NYSE and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) exhibit U-shape patterns. On 
the other hand, Werner and Kleidon (1996) study cross-listed stocks in the 
US and the UK and they conclude that the spread in the UK dechnes during 
the day. Chan, Chung, and Johnson (1995) observe that the spreads of the 
Chicago Board Option Exchange are smaller at the end of the trading period. 
Chan, Christie, and Schultz (1995) find the inside spreads of NASDAQ stocks 
remain relatively constant in the morning and dechne in the afternoon, and 
they suggest that differences of intraday patterns are due to institutional 
differences. Finally, van Ravenswaaij (1997) finds that only the first hour of 
trading on Paris Bourse has a considerable impact on the size of the spread.
4.2.5 Other effects
The level of competition of market makers is negatively related to the spreads; 
see Demsetz (1968). Competition level may be measured by the number of 
market makers of a security. The spread is positively related to the risk 
of returns to compensate market makers when market participants are risk- 
averse; see Stoll (1978b) for theoretical arguments and BoUerslev and Melvin 
(1994) for empirical evidence. StoU (1978b) further argues that factors such 
as the wealth of market makers and holding periods of securities also affect 
the spread. Easley and O’Hara (1992) argue that high volume of trades sig­
nals an information event so that market makers have to increase the spread 
to protect themselves from adverse selection. On the other hand, Dutta 
and Madhavan (1997) argue the positive relationship between volume and 
spread may result from the monopolistic power of market makers. FinaUy, 
the structure of an individual market may determine the spreads. Multi­
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pie dealership markets are not transparent and, therefore, market makers 
increase the spread to protect themselves from information advantage; see 
Pagano and Roëll (1992). In contrast, Naik et al, (1999) suggest the market 
makers in the dealership markets may narrow the spread to solicit informed 
trades.
4.2.6 Volatility
The variances for the disturbances may not be time invariant. It has been 
emphasised in the hterature that for many financial time series, the distur­
bances are heteroscedastic and that it can be modelled by autoregressive con­
ditional heteroscedastic (ARCH) structures or by stochastic volatihty (SV) 
specifications, see Anderson and BoUerslev (1997) for discussions. However, 
this chapter wiU concentrate on the intraday volatihty; the volatihty is not 
treated as a stochastic process but as a deterministic effect on variances of 
different time periods within the day.
Many contributions in the hterature have found a U-shape for the intraday 
volatihty of security returns (Wood, Mclnish, and Ord 1985; Park 1993; 
Chan, Christie, and Schultz 1995; Chan, Chung, and Johnson 1995; Werner 
and Kleidon 1996). French and RoU (1986) suggest that trading itself creates 
volatihty and Slezak (1994) argues that the information asymmetry during 
market closure contributes the uncertainty to the opening. Furthermore, the 
works of Admati and Pfieiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990) 
indicate that volatihty and volume are correlated. Empirical evidence of the 
positive relationship between volume and volatihty is provided by Jain and 
Job (1988). Ah these indications hint that the heavy trading at the beginning 
and at the closing of the trading period may be the source of the U-shape 
volatihty. FinaUy, Jones et al. (1994) point out that the volatihty-volume 
relationship is essentiaUy a volatility-transaction relationship: the number of 
transactions is correlated more closely to the volatihty than the volume is.
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4.3 S tatistical m odel for bid-ask spreads
The statistical model for prices of multiple dealership markets with multiple 
market makers presented below can be used generally for observations which 
are not necessarily sequentially ordered over time.
4.3.1 The main structure o f the m odel
Suppose that Nt transactions have occurred at time where iVt is a non­
negative integer. The trade prices of a security at time t are stacked into the 
vector pt and the associated trade quantities are stacked into the vector vt in 
the same order as pt. The elements of vectors pt and vt are denoted by pt^ i and 
Vt^i, respectively, for i =  1 , . . . ,  When observations are not available for 
some time point t = t , the observation r  is treated as missing and =  0 . 
The estimation method employed later handles missing observations in a 
straightforward manner.
The underlying fundamental price of an equity is denoted by the scalar 
Pt and it apphes to all trade prices within time period t. The model is thus 
given by
Vt,i =  -h s t .i , et ,i  ^  AT(0 ,0 -2 ) , i  =  l , . . . ,A T t
m t =  i , . . . , n .
The first equation states the trade prices consist of fundamental price the 
half-spread Sf,*, and the pricing error et,i. The second equation states the 
fundamental price Pt ^  the fundamental price in the previous period Pt_i 
adjusted for the information from the order flows, %, and for the informa­
tion from other sources, P f  The specification for st^i and % are discussed 
below. The normal distributed disturbances et,i  are mutually independent 
and uncorrelated with the normal distributed disturbances r/^ . The structure 
of the model is similar to the ones used by Glosten and Harris (1988) and 
Huang and Stoll (1997) but model (4.1) allows the number of trades to vary 
with time t. Also, the particular speciflcations for the spread and the ad­
verse selection effect are different; see below. Finally, unlike Huang and Stoll
(1997), the inventory effect is not considered for two reasons. First, market
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makers on the LSE heavily depend on the inter-dealer market to balance the 
inventory, see Hansch et al. (1998) and Reiss and Werner (1998). Second, 
the investigations in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 have not found that inventory 
consideration determines the placement of the quotes nor the size of effective 
spread.
The assumption of normahty for e*,* may not be very realistic partly be­
cause of the nature of the observations which have been subjected to rounding 
functions. Problems related to rounded data have been given some attention 
in the hterature; see Harris (1991, 1994), Hausman et al. (1992) and Chrodia 
and Subrahmanyam (1995). Furthermore, statistical techniques have been 
developed to deal with the rounding problem and they can be apphed to 
the model. Hasbrouck (1997) considers a discrete bid-ask price model and 
estimates the model using a non-hnear filtering technique. Manrique and 
Shephard (1997) extend this analysis by presenting a Bayesian treatment us­
ing Markov chain Monte Carlo methods. However, in view of the aim of this 
chapter and the large sample size, the rounding problem is not the crucial 
issue in the analysis.
4.3.2 The spread
The specification of the spread effect depends on a number of fixed (non­
stochastic) but unknown parameters. The half spread at time t of the %-th 
trade is denoted by St^ i and its specification is given by
= v = vt,i, (4.2)
where dt^ i is set equal to unity when the i-th trade at time t is a buyer-
initiated trade and it is set equal to minus unity when it is a seller-initiated
trade:
{ 1 , trade is buyer-initiated
—1 , trade is seller-initiated
When the data set contains information about the identities of the traders, 
as is the case in the sample, the direction of the trade can be easily identified. 
When such information is not available, the direction of the trade can also
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be identified by of (4.1):
j  . _ / 1. > ft-i
-  X - 1, iîp t,i < f i t - i  ■
The size of the z-th trade at time t is denoted by Vt^ i.
The model does not attempt to decompose the spread into three compo­
nents as Huang and Stoll (1997) do. Instead, it will uncover how the spread 
varies with the trade size and the time of the day. The part of (4.2) in the 
brackets represents a regression equation with the parameter vectors 7  and 
6. The explanatory variables Zt and Wy are constructed vectors which are 
based on the time-of-day t and the size Vt^ i, respectively. This representation 
allows the introduction of piece-wise regression effects which have different 
parameters for different intervals within the range of independent variables; 
see Johnston (1984, ChapterlO, Section 2). This specification can be fur­
ther generalised to regression cubic spline functions which join the discrete 
jumps of the parameter coefficients to a twice differentiable smooth function; 
see Poirier (1973, 1976). Figure 4.2 graphically displays a regression fine, a 
piece-wise regression fine and a cubic spline function for an artificial set of 
random points. The cubic spfine regression gives the best fit compared to the 
piece-wise regression with the same number of parameters. Some technical 
details of regression cubic splines are discussed in Appendix B.l.
Following the previous theoretical and empirical work on the bid-ask 
spread, the model specification for the spread captures the following two 
features:
1. The intraday effect is modelled by a regression cubic spline, in which 
the æ-scale is time. A hmited number of knots are equally distributed 
between 0:00 and 23:59 hours. The spline is restricted to sum to zero 
to avoid confounding with the total effect.
2. The size effect w[,6  is also modelled by a regression sphne but here the 
x-scale is size. The knots are placed between the possible minimum 
and maximum sizes of trades. When no institutional boundaries for 
trade sizes exist, the minimum and maximum can be determined from 
the data.
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An alternative approach for modelling non-linear effects is to transform the 
underlying variables into a vector of dummy variables and to estimate the cor­
responding coefficients either by generahsed least squares techniques (Lehman 
and Modest 1994; Werner and Kleidon 1996) or by general method of mo­
ments (Sheikh and Ronn 1994; Chan, Chung, and Johnson 1995). This 
approach is unsatisfactory because of the discontinuity of parameters for dif­
ferent intervals. It is also cumbersome when a lot of dummy variables are 
required as is usually the case.
4.3.3 Adverse selection effect
The adverse selection effect is the effect of signed volumes on the fundamental 
price Hi, and it is modelled by
S N t- j
qt = = where rj t^ =  J =  1 , . . . ,  5,
3 = 1  t = l
(4.3)
with /? =  (/?!,. . . ,  /?^)' as a fixed unknown vector of coefficients. The vector 
rt =  • • • j contains the sum of the trade volumes multiplied by trade
dmnmies d t / s .  Note that r* is the sum of the signed volumes of the market, 
not of any single market maker.
After trades are executed, market makers revise their behefe about the 
fundamental price according to the volumes of trades. If there are more unex­
pected buy volumes, then the security is probably undervalued and the price 
must be adjusted upwards. Similarly, if there are more unexpected sell vol­
umes, then the price will be adjusted downwards. However, the adjustment 
Qt  is not only a function of the volumes in the preceding period, but it also 
depends on the volumes even earher for two reasons. First, market makers 
revise the behefs of fundamental price by unexpected order flows (Hasbrouck 
1991). Order flows are likely to be serially correlated because of, for example, 
price stickiness or order fragmentation. As the expected order flow a function 
of lagged order flows, so is the unexpected flow, which may be written as
f' j , t  -  I  0 - 2 , 15 •  •  • )  =  ~  “  < ^ 2 0 - 2 ,t ------
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Second, the security market is rarely transparent. For example, the pubhca- 
tion of trades may delay, so the unexpected trades a few minutes back may 
still affect the current price. As a result, the adverse selection effect can be 
written as a function of past trades, that is,
Qt = ^ E Pj (4 4)
i=i fc=i 3=1
4.3.4 State space representation
Model (4.1) can be placed into state space form; see, among others, Harvey 
(1993) for a general discussion. The state space form consists of a transition 
and a measurement equation; they are respectively given by
at =  Ttat-i +  W t\^  +  Rtrjt, r j t^  ^  t =  1 , . . . ,  n, (4.5)
Pt,i =  +  Xt^iXx +  £t,i  ^ £t,i ^  X  (o, , 2 =  1, . . . ,  At,(4.6)
where at is the m x 1  state vector. The observation pt^ i for time t and subject 
i is modelled as a hnear function of the state vector a*, the explanatory vari­
able vector Xt^i and the disturbance et,i> The state vector follows a vector 
autoregressive process with transition matrix T<, explanatory matrix Wt and 
selection matrix Rt for the disturbance vector rjt. The disturbances are mu­
tually independent and uncorrelated with each other. The parameter vectors 
Xx and Xw associated with explanatory variables Xt^i and Wt, respectively, 
allow the inclusion of fixed effects in the model. The matrices T*, Rt and Qt 
and the vectors Zt i^ and Xt^i are referred to as system matrices and vectors 
which are assumed deterministic and known. However, a small number of 
elements within the system matrices and vectors may be unknown. Denote 
'ip the vector of these elements. The parameter vector ip can be estimated by 
maximum hkehhood methods. See de Jong (1991) and Koopman and Durbin
(1998) for more detailed discussions of the state space form.
It is straightforward to put model (4.1) into state space form. The state 
vector is the scalar so that Rt = 1 and Qt =  cr^  in (4.5). The adverse 
selection effect qt of (4.3) is modelled via the regression effect WtX^ so that 
Wt =  and A^ , =  (3. The observation equation has Zt i^ equals unity and the
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regression effect Xt^iXx is used to model the spread (4.2) so that Xt^i =  w' )^
and Xx = The variance is the constant cTg. The initial state
requires a diflFuse prior condition, that is
a i -  Ar{0,«7}, (4.7)
where the diffuse prior k represents a large scalar value, for example 1 0 ®. 
The large variance is required because the fundamental price is modelled 
as a nonstationary time series process; see Koopman (1997).
The standard Kalman filter recursions evaluate the mean of the state 
vector at+i conditional on the vectors observations p i , . . .  ,p*, that is dt+i =  
E  (at+i\pi,. . .  ,pt), where
Pt =
\  Pt,Nt )
together with the variance matrix Pt+\ =  var {at+i\pi,. . .  ,pt)] see Anderson 
and Moore (1979). Koopman and Durbin (1998) argue that considerable 
computing savings can be achieved by treating the vector series pi, ..., Pn as 
the univariate series pi,i, ..., Pi,iVi, Pz.i, • • Pn,Nr, and applying the Kalman 
filter to the univariate series. The exact treatment of diffuse priors within 
the initial state vector variance matrix for the Kalman filter is also simplified 
considerably using the univariate approach.
The Kalman filter evaluates one-step and multi-step predictions of the 
state vector and it evaluates one-step-ahead prediction errors including their 
variances. These predictions are interpreted as minimum mean squares hn­
ear estimators. The smoothed estimator of the state vector, that is àt =  
E  (cKtlpi,. . .  ,pn), and its variance matrix can be computed using a smooth­
ing algorithm which is associated with the Kalman filter. The likehhood 
function can be constructed using the prediction errors via the prediction er­
ror decomposition; see Harvey (1993). The Kalman filter and the associated 
smoothing algorithm are discussed further in Appendix B.2.
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4.4 Em pirical results for the London Stock  
Exchange
4.4.1 The LSE data set
This chapter considers the trade data of three securities: Glaxo Wellcome, 
British Telecom and Shell Transport and leading in 125 trading days between 
January and June 1996. The data used in this chapter does not include any 
IDE or IMM trades; every observation in the sample comes from a trade 
by a market maker and another non-market-maker participant. Therefore 
agency crosses are also excluded. Most of the trades are executed between 
the mandatory period, but 3.08% of all trades take place outside this time. 
Most of the prices in the sample are rounded: 91.22% of the trade prices are 
measured in pence so the vast majority of observations is discrete.
Standard procedures of data editing are apphed; see Appendix A.4 for 
details. Some descriptive statistics are given in Table 4.1. The settlement 
records are time-stamped in minutes. There are occasions at which many 
trades are executed, for example, 89 transactions of British Telecom are 
executed on 17 May 1996 at 8:46, after shape trades and potential shape 
trades have been grouped (Appendix A.4). Including aU of the data in the 
sample will increase the computational burden substantiaUy, so only the ten 
biggest trades are included in the final sample if there are more than ten 
trades within a minute. As a result the data set is reduced by 2.42%.
4.4.2 D etails o f the m odel
Each trade record contains time of the trade t, the security price pt^ i and the 
trade size Vt^ i. As a result, Nt and % of model (4.1) are known. The unit of 
Pt,i is in pence, the unit of Vt^ i is in 1 0 0  shares and the time t is in minutes. 
The trade records also contain the capacity fiags of the buyer and the seller. 
Since market makers are marked as “M”, the direction of the trade is the 
action of the counter party of the market maker: dt^ i =  1  if the seUcap is 
“M” , and dt,i =  —1 if buycap is “M”.
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The spread is modelled as two regression spline functions: one for the 
time-of-day effect and one for the size effect. The sphne functions require a 
set of knots. Although a larger number of knots gives a better fit, the optimal 
number is based on the right balance between fit and parsimony. The knots 
are therefore determined by Akaike information criterion (AIC)
AIC =  2 ( fc- logL),
where L  is the value of the likehhood function of the estimated model and k 
is the number of parameters which is defined as the sum of the sizes of the 
vectors at, Xx, X^ , and ÿ). The model with the lowest AIC value is selected 
as the appropriate model. The knots are
time sphne
Glaxo BT Shell
■ 0  ■ ■ 0  ■ ■ 0  ■
510 510 510
750 750 750
990 990 990
0  ■ 0  ■ 0  ■
size sphne 16000 22500 9000
32000 45000 18000
Three knots for size sphne are based on the maximum trade sizes observed 
in the data. Four knots for time sphne are based on the official trading hour: 
8:30 and 16:30 are respectively 510 and 990 minutes after the mid-night. In 
the same way as for the number of knots for splines, the maximum time lag 
S  can be determined by the AIC decision rule, and S  is set to be 3. The 
inclusion of more lags than 3 increases the computational burden and it does 
not increase the fit of the model.
4.4.3 Disturbances
The disturbances in the model (4.1) are normahy distributed. The variance 
of rjt can be expressed as a ratio of the variance of et which will be referrd to 
as the signal-to-noise ratio, that is
LÜ=
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This unknown parameter is fixed for all time points except for certain time 
periods, and the variances are multiphed by certain constants for these spe­
cial periods. Alternatively, different values for and can be apphed to 
different time periods, but this approach is not desirable as it increases the 
number of parameters to be estimated.
The signal-to-noise ratio w is estimated via numerical optimisation of 
the likehhood function. After estimating w, the Kalman filter is used to 
compute one-step ahead prediction residuals together with their variances. 
The standardised error Ut^ i is defined as
ut^ i =  (4.8)
where prediction error Vt^ i and its variance Ft^ i are computed as in equation 
(B.3) in the Appendix B.2. The absolute values of itt,i are grouped by the 
time of the trade in ten-minute intervals for which the means are calculated. 
Figure 4.3 presents the average of absolute standardised errors in the sample. 
The errors are much larger at the opening and at the closure of the trading 
period as it is suggested in Section 4.2.6. Therefore, adjust the variances of 
the model to take account of these empirical phenomena. Define the variance 
multipliers at and ht so that the variances of the disturbances in model (4.1) 
become time varying and they are given by
~  t =  1 , . . . , Tl, 2 =  1 , . . . ,  Nt- (4.9)
The variance multiphers for the model are as follows:
1 . The beginning and the end of trade period. Section 4.2.6 points out 
that the volatihty may be relatively large at the beginning and the end 
of the trading period, so the variance <7  ^ is doubled {at — 2 ) at the 
opening of the trading period between 8:31 a.m. and 8:50 a.m. and at 
the closure of the trading period between 4:00 p.m. and 4:28 p.m.
2 . Outside official trade period. Most exchange markets impose official 
trading sessions but sometimes it is allowed to trade outside these pe­
riods. For example, special arrangements exist for overseas chents who
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wish to trade outside the official period. The volatihty is even larger 
than the beginning or the end of the official trading period, so the vari­
ance cTg is multiplied by eight (a* =  8 ) when trades take place before 
8:30 am, and it is multiphed by six {at =  6 ) when trades take place 
after 4:29 pm.
3. Period of fundamental price correction. Price adjustments and large 
fluctuations in prices are expected when new information becomes avail­
able to traders. This requires relatively larger values for r]t and £t and 
therefore the corresponding variances should be increased in these peri­
ods. Indeed, some standardised one-step-ahead residuals are relatively 
large. When the absolute values of more than two consecutive residuals 
are greater than a certain number, say eight, a* and bt are given values 
larger than one. Although the adjustments are somewhat arbitrary, 
most of these adjustments coincide with news reports on, for example, 
earnings or mergers pubhshed by the Financial Times\ see Table 4.2. 
This imphes that the fundamental price must be given the flexibihty 
to adjust for changes during these hmited periods. Hence the variance 
adjustments are well justified.
4. Otherwise, a* =  1  and h t— 1 .
Satisfactory results are obtained with these settings. It should be noted that 
final results were not very sensitive to a different set of adjustments. By 
taking into account the variance adjustments, the model is re-estimated.
4.4.4 M odel specification: tim e, size and volum e 
effects
This section investigates whether the size and intraday effects explain the 
spread and whether the volume effect explains the fundamental price. The 
hkehhood ratio (LR) test and the AIC are used. AIC has been defined in the 
previous section, and the LR test statistic is given by
LR =  —2 * log(Lo/L) =  2 * (log L  — log Lq),
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where L  is the likelihood of the estimated model (4.1) and Lq is the hkehhood 
of the estimated restricted model. Three restrictions are considered: (i) no 
existence of size effect on the spread, that is w ’^ 8 =  0 , (ii) no existence 
of intraday effect on the spread, that is z'fi =  0 , and (iii) no existence of 
volume effect on the fundamental price, that is qt = 0. Under the restricted 
hypothesis and assuming normality for the disturbances, the hkehhood ratio 
test statistic is chi-square distributed with degrees of freedom equals the 
extra number of variables for the unrestricted model. It is already mentioned 
that the assumption of normahty is weak for the data set and therefore the 
LR statistic should be regarded as an indicative diagnostic rather than as a 
formal test.
The distribution of the initial state is diffuse implying that the initial 
state variance is arbitrarily large. The Kalman filter may behave unstable 
for the first few observations. The hkehhood function is evaluated via the 
Kalman filter and it is decided to exclude the first percent of observations 
from the summation operators of the log hkehhood function; see Appendix 
B.3. The LR statistics for the three restrictions are reported in Table 4.3. 
The restrictions of no size effect and no volume effect are clearly rejected. 
The restriction of no time-of-day effect for British Telecom (BT) securities 
cannot be rejected. Moreover, although the hypothesis of no intraday effect 
for Glaxo Wellcome (Glaxo) and Shell Transport and Trading (SheU) may be 
rejected in the conventional confidence level, the LR statistics of no intraday 
effect are much smaller than those under the other two hypotheses.
Table 4.3 also reports the AIC value for the estimated model (4.1) and the 
three AIC values for the estimated models with the three subsequent restric­
tions of no size, no time and no volume effects. The theory of AIC’s suggests 
to select the model with the lowest AIC value, that is, the estimated model 
(4.1) for Glaxo and Shell, and the estimated model without the intraday ef­
fect for BT. However, the AIC values for the estimated model without any 
restriction and the estimated model without the time-of-day effect are not 
very different from each other in the case of Glaxo and Shell. The exclusion 
of other effects causes larger AIC values.
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A graphical display of the time-of-day sphne 2 ' 7  for j  =  1 , . . . ,  1440, that 
is, 24 hours of 60 minutes, is presented in Figure 4.4. In the left column 
of graphs, the splines are displayed for j  =  1 , . . . ,  1440 and, in the right 
column, the splines are plotted against j  =  510,.. . ,990 which represents 
the trading period. From the left column of plots it may be argued that 
the Glaxo time spline has the familiar U-shape, the spread of BT is large 
during the trading hours, and the SheU sphne is of a U-shape with a smaU 
hump around noon. On the other hand, the shapes of time sphnes during the 
trading hours are very different for the three securities as can be observed 
from the right column of pictures in Figure 4.4. The spread of Glaxo is large 
around noon and smaU at ten o’clock and three o’clock, the spread of BT is 
almost flat everywhere with two smaU humps, and the time sphne of SheU 
has an inverse U-shape during the ofhcial trading period. The variation of 
the sphne is very small in ah cases. The difference between the maximal and 
minimal value of the sphnes is at most 1 . 8  pence and only 0 . 1  pence during 
trading hours. Like some of the work on dealership market mentioned in 
Section 4.2.4, the evidence does not support a U-shaped intraday pattern. 
Unlike those work which suggest a declining spread, no significant intraday 
pattern can be apphed to all three stocks investigated in this chapter. Indeed, 
Section 4.5 will argue that intraday pattern only exists in the touch spread.
In contrast, there is a strong size effect for the spread. Figure 4.5 plots 
the estimated size sphne functions w'^ 6 for possible values of the trade size. 
The left column shows the size sphnes of the three stocks studied in this 
chapter, and the other two colunms show the sphnes of another six stocks for 
comparison. The middle columns is of three middle-range FTSE-100 stocks 
in terms of market capitalisation, and the right column is of three bottom- 
range FTSE-100 stocks. The size sphnes are measured by the basis points of 
the average trade price, and they are restricted to be zero when the trade size 
approaches zero. The trade sizes are measured relative to the stocks’ NMS. 
Although there are some stocks with big trades, the plots only show the size 
up to 40 times NMS to accommodate the fact that the maximum trade size 
of SheU is only 36 times NMS. The size sphnes for the nine securities exhibit
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broadly the same pattern: the spread is decreasing and then increasing with 
the size. The phenomenon of an increase of the spread when the size gets 
large is consistent with the inventory and information models of spreads in 
the hterature. The initial fall of the spread may be attributed to the fixed 
component of the transaction costs. The sphnes reach their minimum at 
around 20 times NMS. However, the slopes of the splines are very different. 
It is consistent with the argument made in Chapter 3 that size alone may 
not account for all of the variations of the spreads. It is also likely that 
the NMS is not a good measure to standardise the trade size. The use of 
the modal quote size may be considered. On the other hand, it should be 
emphasised that there are very few big trades, and the upward-sloping part 
of the size sphne is less rehable. Moreover, the estimation is not immune 
from the criticism of Pranks and Schaefer (1995) that it may under-estimate 
the spread of big trades should they are protected.
4.4.5 M odel misspecification: estim ated disturbances
The average of the standardised one-step ahead predictions residuals within 
each minute are presented in Figure 4.6 and some summary statistics are 
shown in Table 4.4. The average residual is defined as
1 Nt 
S=1
where ut i^ is defined in equation (4.8). It can be concluded that the residuals 
are not normally distributed and exhibit weak autocorrelations. It is men­
tioned in Section 4.3.1 that the assumption of normahty is not very reahstic 
and therefore it is not surprising that the skewness and kurtosis in the table 
point to a departure from normality. However, it does not mean the model 
is mis-specified. Kalman filter performs general least square, and the estima­
tion is still the minimum mean square hnear estimator should the normahty 
do not hold (Harvey 1989). Even if the residuals are not normally distrib­
uted, the log-hkelihood ratios are stiU asymptotically chi-square distributed. 
Figure 4.7 presents the correlograms of the residuals for the three securities.
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The function is defined as
, \ _ TM _ ES=r+l^ “t-r/(r-r)
7(0) Er=iS?/r
The first coefficient of the correlogram is modest in all three cases and the 
coefficients are negligible after ten lags. The existence of serial correlation 
can partly be explained because the residuals under consideration are an 
average of a set of residuals within one minute. This type of pooling may 
introduce some serial correlation in large data sets.
The residuals do not exhibit any ARCH-type effects. The squared es­
timated disturbances rj^  possess no serial correlation. Moreover, an OLS 
regression of these squared residuals against the number of transactions Nt 
gives very weak fit (measured by R^) in all stocks. Therefore, the imposed 
multiplication factors for the variances and cr^  have successfully dealt with 
the possible volatility for the three securities.
4.4.6 Estim ated parameter coefficients
Table 4.5 presents the estimated parameters of model (4.1) without the time 
spline. Firstly, the signal-to-noise ratio u  is reported which is estimated by 
maximum likelihood. This requires numerical optimisation of the likelihood 
function which is computed by the Kalman filter; see Appendix B.3. The 
estimated ratio w is roughly the same for Glaxo and Shell and it takes the 
value of around 0.1. The ratio for BT is much smaller which indicates that the 
fundamental price evolves more smoothly than the price of the other equities. 
It may be concluded that new information other than from the order flows 
has less influence on the fundamental price for BT than for Glaxo and Shell. 
The Figures 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 present the observed trade price pt^ i and the 
smoothed fundamental price àt for the three equities and Figure 4.11 shows 
an example of the evolution of the fundamental price on a specific day for 
Shell.
Secondly, the estimated coefficients for the size effects are reported to­
gether with the corresponding t-statistics. The estimate for parameter vector 
6  is required to generate a graphical display of the size spline. Again, the
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size eflFects appear to be statistically significant since the t-statistics associ­
ated with the knot coefficients have values larger than 3.5. The estimated 
half spread can be obtained by using 6  vector to recover in (B.l). For 
example, when the size of the trade tends to zero, collaspes to 6 1 , so the 
half spreads of the very small trades of Glaxo, BT and Shell are 1.28 pence, 
0.68 pence and 0.97 pence respectively.
Finally, the estimated coefficients of the adverse selection effect ps are 
reported. They are highly significant and they all take positive values. Al­
though the structure of 9 and ÿ of (4.4) is not imposed, the estimates for 
/5s can still be interpreted as an indication of the depth of the market (Kyle 
1985). For example, the sum of P of Glaxo Wellcome is about 0.000096, 
which means, roughly speaking, that the fundamental price of the security 
will increase one penny if the volume of buys in the market exceeds that of 
sells by l / ( 0 i  + 0 2 ' ^  ~  1,041,667 shares.
4.5 Compared w ith  traditioned approaches
Section 4.2 argues that the use of autocovariance structure or data differenc­
ing to estimate the bid-ask spread requires the data to be ordered sequen­
tially. The trade data in Transaction Data Service is not sequential, and 
neither of the approaches is theoretically appealing or empirically feasible 
without distorting information. An alternative method is to use the mid­
touch as the fundamental price, and to define the effective spread as twice 
the difference of the trade price and the mid-touch, for example, (1 .1 ) in 
Chapter 2 . Since the mid-touch is unavailable or unreliable outside manda­
tory quote periods, the rest of the section will report the results based on 
the trades executed between 8:30 and 16:30. Denote m* the mid point of the 
best bid and ask quote at time t, then half of the effective spread of the trade 
i at time t is
4 , i  =  d t,i(P t,i -
The assumption that the spread is a non-linear function of the trade size 
is maintained, so the focus is to compare model (4.1) with the least-square
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regression models
^ii =  +£t,i, and (4.11)
4 , i  =  w ' J z ' t j  + £t,i,  (4.12)
where w'^S and z'^y are defined in (4.2) and £t,i in (4.1). The size sphnes of 
the two models are exactly the same as the counterpart in (4.2); that is, the 
constant terms are not restricted to zero, and the knot points are the same 
as described in Section 4.4.2. On the other hand, the time sphne in (4.12) is
no longer a periodic sphne, and its only restriction is that its value is set to
be zero when the time is 8:30 (510). Unlike those in the Kalman filter model, 
the knot points of the time sphne in (4.12) are 8:30 (510), 10:30 (630), 12:30 
(750), 14:30 (870) and 16:30 (900). The residuals of (4.11) and (4.12) are 
respectively defined as
êt,i =  s(i - w 'J  , and
êi,i = s[.i - K S  -4Î.
where 6  and 7  are the estimates of 6  and 7  respectively. The residual of 
model (4.1) is defined as
èt,i  =  Pt,i — P t ~  ^t,i,
where and are respectively the estimated fundamental price and spread 
from Kalman filter smoother without the time sphne in s.
Table 4.6 compares the residual obtained from (4.1) and from (4.11) of 
the three stocks. The sum of residuals of least-square regression is zero, and 
the sum of residuals from Kalman filter is close to zero. The variance of êt,* is
always smaller in (4.1) than in (4.11). êt,i in (4.1) is more skewed for BT and
for Sheh but not for Glaxo Wellcome. The kurtosis of èt,i in (4.11) is bigger 
for Glaxo and Shell but shghtly smaher for BT. Both models may produce 
serious mispricing: the error of (4.11) can be as big as -11.77 for Glaxo, and 
the error of (4.1) can be as big as 10.52 for Sheh. However, (4.11) produces 
bigger absolute on average in all three stocks. To sum up, the residuals 
of (4.1) appear to behave better than those of (4.11).
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Figure 4.12 plots the absolute values of èt^ i averaged by the size of the 
trades. The solid bars represent the means of | St^ i | from model (4.1), and the 
dash bars represent those from (4.11). It appears the absolute residuals of 
(4.11) are bigger in most of the trade sizes for all three stocks. The mispricing 
is a more serious problem with big trade sizes, but it should be noted that 
there are very few big trades. For example, only 332 trades exceed ten times 
NMS, which is 75000 for BT and 50000 for the other stocks. Furthermore, 
only 27 trades are bigger than the half of maximum trade sizes observed 
in the sample. Figure 4.13 plots the absolute values of êt,i averaged across 
the time of the day. Both the residuals of (4.11) and (4.12) are plotted as 
well as those of (4.1), but adding a time sphne in the least-square regression 
produces almost exactly the same residuals for Glaxo and BT, and even for 
Shell the difference is minor. It indicates that adding the intraday effect 
does not change the estimation of effective spreads dramatically. The mean 
absolute residuals from the three models are close to one another during the 
opening and closing hours, and those of (4.1) tend to be smaller between 9:00 
and 16:00. The gap between Kalman filter residuals and mid-touch residuals 
is the biggest for BT and the smaUest for Shell, which correspond to 0.06, 
0.08 and 0.03 pence differences of | èt,i | of Glaxo, BT and Shell respectively 
in the bottom row of Table 4.6. In other words, (4.1) performs best for BT, 
and it does only marginally better than (4.11) and (4.12) for Shell.
Figure 4.14 provides further information for the estimation of Shell. The 
results from Glaxo and BT are not different firom those from Shell and hence 
are omitted. The top-left panel plots the correlogram of the average residuals. 
The autocorrelation function of the average residuals of (4.11) is 
much bigger than that of (4.1) in the first few lags. The former gradually 
converges to the latter, but it is still shghtly bigger after 200 lags. The 
top-right panel plots the size sphne of model (4.1), represented by smaU 
triangles, the size sphnes of model (4.11), represented by smaU dots, and 
the average half effective spreads by the sohd hne. The two size sphnes 
are almost indistinguishable for the smaU trades, and the sphne from (4.1) is 
bigger than (4.11) for the big trades. The bottom-left panel plots the intraday
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effects. Small triangles represent the estimated time spline of the Kalman 
filter model, and small dots represent the sphne of (4.12). In addition, the 
five-minute average of the half effective spread (the dash line) and the half 
touch spread (the sohd line) are plotted. Ah of the values are standardised 
to have zero means. There is minor difference between the two sphnes during 
the day, and they are almost identical after 14:00. Both sphnes pass through 
the average effective spread. The sphnes range between -0.04 and 0.04 pence, 
and the average half spread between -0.12 and 0.08 pence. However, the half 
touch spread exhibits the greatest variation. It has the peak at the opening 
with 0.32 pence, it declines sharply within half an hour, it does not vary very 
much during most of the day, and it is the lowest at the closing. The big 
spread in the opening is consistent with the finding by Werner and Kleidon 
(1996), and the decline in the closing is consistent with the ones reported in 
Chan, Chung, and Johnson (1995) and Chan, Christie, and Schultz (1995). 
All of their results are based on the quote data.^ However, the big variation 
of quote spread does not contribute to elective spread nor Kalman filter 
spread. It appears that the costs charged by market makers are relatively 
invariant to the swings in the quote spread.
4.6 D iscussions and conclusions
The available level of detail in databases of intra-daily transaction data for 
multiple dealership markets brings mixed blessings to the study of market 
microstructure. On the one hand, transaction prices and volumes become 
available for small time intervals, which provide the opportunity for financial 
analysts to have a better understanding about the market behaviour. On the 
other hand, the data set is not necessarily ordered sequentially and therefore 
standard techniques for estimation of the spread may not be applicable.
This chapter has presented a simple model to analyse the data of three
 ^ Chan, Chung, and Johnson (1995) use Berkeley Options Data Base, which is a quotes 
and trade data set. Because the trading volumes are very low in the early morning (see 
their Figure 1 in page 337), the spreads obtained in the morning are presumable from 
quote data.
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heavily traded stocks on the London Stock Exchange. The model includes 
components which allow for the time series properties of the data and the 
existence of non-linear effects. The problem of non-sequentiahty is solved 
by putting the model into state space form and to estimate the model by 
maximising likehhood using the Kalman filter. The updating recursions of 
the Kalman filter do not require the dimension of the observational vector 
to be constant. The Kalman filter and associated algorithms can deal with 
missing observations in a straightforward manner. The underlying funda­
mental price of the security is extracted from the data, and at the same time 
the effect of volumes on the price and the explanatory factors of the spread 
are estimated. Strong evidence is found to support the fact that spread is 
a non-hnear function of the trade size. The evidence of intra-daily effects is 
less strong. Apart from the weak significance of test statistics, the estimated 
time sphnes for the securities have three different shapes and the variation 
of the three sphnes are smaU. Intraday effects are only pronounced in touch 
spreads. Hence, it is plausible that the time-of-day effect is not a determi­
nant factor of the spread on the London market. In conclusion, the analyses 
of the three securities have been successful. Model (4.1) can generate a wide 
range of statistics, which provide detailed information about the available 
transaction data. It also outperforms the traditional approach of using the 
mid-touch as the fundamental price. Empirical studies based on the model 
may contribute to a better understanding of the fundamentals of the bid-ask 
spread.
The basic model (4.1) can accommodate almost all features of the funda­
mental price and the spread. Variations of the model may be used to address 
other questions of the market microstructure. It may be interesting to modify 
the model specification and to improve the estimation techniques for further 
research. A three-way decomposition of bid-ask spread into order-processing, 
inventory and information costs will be in the agenda. Moreover, the strat­
egy of imposing different disturbance variances for specific time periods is 
not satisfactory and it can be altered. The introduction of an intra-daily 
variance function can be considered and its specification may rely on dununy
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variables or smooth functions such as the cubic sphne. Also, it is argued 
that the normahty assumption is not reahstic because the data is subjected 
to rounding functions. Furthermore, the erratic behaviour of financial time 
series may require error distributions with heavier tails. Thus a more in- 
depth analysis of the data requires more advanced estimation techniques. 
However, such improvements come with a price. The model specification in 
this chapter consists of one parameter which needs to be estimated by nu­
merical optimisation. More sophisticated models will inevitably lead to an 
increase of computational costs.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of sample stocks 
The constructed sample consists of the first ten largest trades with the same
time stamp. The directions of the trades are identified by the capacity flags.
The unit of volumes is 1,000 shares, the unit of the size of trade is one share,
and the price unit is one penny.
Company name Glaxo BT SheU
Industry Pharmaceutical Utihties Oil and Gas
Original sample
number of observations 61,111 124,694 48,660
total trading volumes 474,829 912,699 297,926
max number of trades in 1  minute 38 89 56
Constructed sample
number of trades buy 31,734 29,198 13,301
sell 28,476 91,797 34,273
total 60,210 120,995 47,584
price mean 852.00 360.09 873.84
max 970.00 386.50 820.00
min 765.00 326.00 949.00
std 50.99 14.34 33.41
size of trade mean 7,790 7,395 6,203
max 3,200,000 4,484,000 1,798,800
min 1 1 1
total trading volumes buy 241,965 447,720 132,179
sell 227,113 460,036 162,986
total 469,078 907,756 295,165
number of market makers 19 19 19
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Table 4.2; The timing and magnitude of changes in variances 
This table shows the time when at and bt, defined in equation (4.9), are
adjusted. The magnitude of the adjustments is also shown. Events are news
items of the companies reported in the Financial Times on the same day or
the next day of the adjustments.
stock date time at bt
Glaxo 31/01 08:03 1 0 0
06/03 09:13 40
10:48-10:55 6.67 800
26/03 10:05-10:20 2 2 0
16/05 14:10-14:50 4 1 0 0 0
15:46-15:56 2
BT 06/03 11:45 50
08/03 13:35-14:25 8
28/03 15:59-16:06 2.5 2 0 0
29/03 07:46-08:07 50 600
02/04 11:50-12:00 5
18/04 08:40-09:00 5
02/05 17:46- 2 0 1 0 0 0
03/05 -8:02 2 0
17/05 09:10 50
10/06 09:12-09:45 6
Shell 15/02 10:16 80
13:15-14:50 5
08/03 13:55-14:35 4 150
09/05 10:00-10:08 6.67 2 0 0
3TC drugs could be a weapon against HIV.
Disappointment on the fuU-year figures.
overseas telephone call market
they are not interested in bidding for Mercury
talks with Cable and Wireless came 
after market hours.
BT marked down sharply from the outset on 
news of the groups’ doomed merger.
Downgraded by Goldman Sachs and 
ABN Amro in New York opening 
The stock could not resist the 
pressure from Wall Street 
Recorded quarterly result of net inco 
Recommended by Goldman Sachs
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Table 4.3: LR statistics for size, time and volume effects 
The proposed model is equation (4.1) with size and time spline as in (4.2) and with adverse selection effect qt defined in
(4.3). The model without size effect is the same as the proposed model except that w '^ 6 of (4.2) is dropped and replaced
by a constant term for the spread. The model without time effect is the proposed model without z '^y of (4.2). The
model without volume effect is the proposed model with no Qt in (4.1). The log-likehhood is defined in Appendix B.3, the
likelihood ratio is defined as LR= —2*\og{Lo/L) = 2* (log T —log To), and df is the difference of the number of parameters
between the proposed model and the model under the null hypothesis. The critical value for X(3 ,o.9 9 ) is 11.341 and X(4 ,o.9 9 )
is 13.277. AIC is defined as AIC = 2  {k — logT), where k is the number of parameters, including the signal-to-noise ratio
w.
Glaxo BT SheU k df
logL LR AIC logL LR A IC logL LR A IC
Proposed model -9886.44 19796.9 19966.08 -39908.2 4054.70 -8085.4 1 2
No size effect -9988.57 204.26 19995.1 19789.59 352.98 -39561.2 3908.42 292.56 -7798.8 9 3
No time effect -9901.78 30.68 19819.6 19963.62 4.92 -39911.2 4036.69 36.02 -8057.4 8 4
No volume effect -9958.42 143.96 19934.8 19848.35 235.46 -39678.7 3956.49 196.42 -7895.0 9 3
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Table 4.4: Summary statistics for standardised residuals 
This Table presents the summary statistics of the average standardised resid­
uals Ut^ i which are defined in equation (4.10).
Glaxo BT Sheh
mean 0 0 0
variance 1 1 1
skewness 0.0975 0.1768 0.0870
kurtosis 6.0671 7.7270 6.0028
f( i ) 0.1897 0.2659 0.1640
Table 4.5: Parameter estimates 
This table presents the parameters of the final model, that is, 4.1 without
time sphne. The signal-to-noise ratio w is cr /^o-g, where <7  ^ and are re­
spectively the variance of and as defined in (4.1). The estimates are 
reported of the elements 6 1 , 6 2  and 6 3  of the size sphne vector 6  which is 
defined in (4.2). The estimates for P2 ^^ nd /?3 , the elements of vector /? of 
(4.3), are reported. The usual t-values are also reported.
Glaxo BT SheU
ÜJ 0.115312 0.064824 0.116857
< 0.783025 0.219060 0.340653
0.090291
t-value
0.014200
t-value
0.039808
t-value
61 1.2759 343.23 0.6938 549.65 0.9664 307.02
S2 0.7906 3.86 0.4692 10.70 0.6631 8.57
6 3 5.3886 4.42 4.6397 17.17 5.3573 1 2 . 0 2
Pi 6.7937e-05 8.98 9.1173e-06 6.98 7.6701e-05 8.82
P2 -1.9276e-06 -0 . 2 1 4.6373e-06 2.90 8.4424e-06 0.79
Pi 3.0355e-05 4.04 1.0937e-05 8.43 2.0801e-05 2.43
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Table 4.6: Mean residuals during mandatory quote periods 
This table compares the summary statistics of the residuals êt,i estimated
from model (4.1) and (4.11).
Glaxo BT Shell
èt^ i of model (4.1) (4.11) (4.1) (4.11) (4.1) (4.11)
mean -0.0187 0 -0.0006 0 -0.0006 0
variance 0.4288 0.5309 0.0815 0.1133 0.1871 0.2600
skewness 0.0868 -0.1979 0.5454 -0.1990 0.0205 0.0310
kurtosis 3.9779 5.8131 7.4636 7.1237 6.1197 9.3444
maximum 9.4369 7.7224 5.5140 5.2860 5.8374 10.5216
minimum -7.3041 -11.7730 -3.7062 -5.6811 -6.7451 -6.9822
mean of I ê* * I 0.4916 0.5573 0.2065 0.2872 0.3111 0.3465
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Figure 4.1; An illustration of the Transaction Data File
DATE TIME BUY SELL BUY SELL PRICE QUAN-
FIRM FIRM CAP CAP TITY
01/04/96 11 09 ABC DE F M A 379.00 55
01/04/96 11 09 ABC FGH M A 379.00 440
01/04/96 11 09 U K LMN M A 379.00 400
01/04/96 11 09 U K OPQ M A 379.00 3045
01/04/96 11 09 RST UVW M A 380.00 25000
01/04/96 11 09 OPQ U K A M 381.00 783
01/04/96 11 10 U K OPQ M A 379.00 880
01/04/96 11 10 U K U K M N 379.00 1000
01/04/96 11 10 U K LMN M A 379.00 1270
01/04/96 11 10 XYZ CAE M A 379.00 550
01/04/96 11 10 XYZ OPQ M A 379.00 1500
01/04/96 11 10 RST EWP M A 379.50 130000
01/04/96 11 10 FEN RST A M 380.00 3000
01/04/96 11 10 OPQ U K A M 380.50 2267
01/04/96 11 10 LOU ABC A M 381.00 700
01/04/96 11 10 OPQ U K A M 381.00 796
Figure 4.2: Example of regression, piece-wise regression and cubic spline
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Figure 4.3: Means of absolute standardised errors of ten-minute intervals
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Figure 4.4: Estimated time splines of the spreads
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Figure 4.5: Estimated size splines of the spreads
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Figure 4.6: Average of prediction residuals for each minute
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Figure 4.7: Correlogram for prediction residuals
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Figure 4.8: Observed and smoothed fundamental price of Glaxo Wellcome
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Figure 4.9: Observed and smoothed fundamental price of BT
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Figure 4.10: Observed and smoothed fundamental price of Shell 
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Figure 4.11: Fundamental price for one specific day
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Figure 4.12: Comparing mean absolute residuals by size
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Figure 4.13: Comparing mean absolute residuals by time
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Figure 4.14: Residuals and splines of Shell Transport and Trading
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS
5.1 M ain results
This thesis has investigated the trading and quoting behaviour of market
makers extensively. The major contributions of this thesis are
1. This thesis clearly demonstrates the relationship between order flows 
and quote status. By taking account of the straddhng quotes, the mar­
ket order imbalance, and the number of market makers on the yellow 
strip, quote status clearly determines the amount and the balance of 
orders.
2. Posting the best quote attracts orders bigger than the quote size shown 
in the SEAQ screen, which imphes the presence on the yellow strip has 
signalling effects. Furthermore, not only the quote spreads but also the 
effective spreads matter: the order flows are negatively related to the 
effective spreads for the medium and large trades.
3. There are two different types of quote revisions. The first type of the 
revision is to quote one side of the yellow strip aggressively in order 
to attract unbalanced order flows. The quotes are often made by price 
leaders in response to public information. The upward quote revisions 
are often associated with the arrival of buy trades, and the downward 
revisions are often with sell trades. The second type of quote revision 
is to deliberately straddle the yellow strip or to quote both sides of 
the strip. The revision is often made by a price follower soon after the
quote change of price leaders. The benefit of straddhng the yeUow strip 
is to avoid receiving unbalanced order fiows; the drawback is the order 
flows received tend to be less than standing on the strip.
4. The variables suggested in the hterature successfuUy explain part of the 
effective spreads, but they cannot explain most of the costs difference.
5. Market makers change quotes after customer trades, which imply those 
trades have certain inventory or information implication. IMM trades 
also tend to trigger the quote change which imphes those trades contain 
information. On the contrary, the posters of IDB trades change their 
quotes to the opposite direction of the one predicted by the hterature.
6. A model is proposed and implemented to estimate the spread by the 
non-sequential trade data. The model fuhy takes accounts of the time- 
series properties and the volume effects of the fundamental price, and 
the spread is estimated at the same time by considering the size effect 
and the intraday effect. The estimation uses Kalman filter to handle 
the with variables of non-constant dimensions. The model outperforms 
the alternative approach of using the mid-touch as fundamental price 
in several criteria. Nevertheless, the intraday effect does not exist in 
either the Kalman filter spread or the effective spread.
5.2 Other findings
By attempting to explain the quote revisions of the market maker, to resolve 
the puzzle of cost structure, and to achieve a better estimation of the fun­
damental price and bid-ask spread, this thesis has come across several issues 
which may help understanding the trading environment of the LSE.
5.2.1 The com petitiveness of the LSE
The SEAQ screen is designed to encourage the competition among market 
makers. The market makers who post best bid and ask prices are highhghted
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on the yellow strip, right in the middle of the screen. Market participants 
can never avoid knowing that who are posting the best quotes. Furthermore, 
the best-execution rule enforces the brokers to find the best deals for their 
chents. The consequence is that almost all of the trades smaller than the 
quote sizes are executed at or inside the touch.
The fact that trades are at least as good as best quotes does not follow 
that customers get good deals. If the spreads are wide, then the deals are 
bad (Peterson and Fialkowski 1994). Huang and Stoll (1996) argue that 
preferenced ordering reduces the incentive for the market makers to narrow 
the spread. Chapter 2 reports the presence on the yellow strip has httle 
effect on attracting small orders, so presumably order preferencing is most 
common among small trades. Chapter 3 reports that the majority of the 
small trades come from brokers on behalf of individual investors, and the 
costs of those trades are high. Moreover, market makers do not compete 
in spreads to attract order fiows. Chapter 2 finds that most of the market 
makers are comfortable with straddling the yellow strip. They do not change 
the quote once somebody moves them oE the strip, and once they are moved 
to the yellow strip they often tend to get off.
On the other hand, there is httle evidence to suggest market makers 
collude. A small number of market makers appear to improve the yellow 
strip often and to stay on the strip for a long time. Second, results from the 
cross-sectional regression of the effective spread in Chapter 3 does not support 
the implicit collusion of market makers suggested by Dutta and Madhavan 
(1997). Most importantly, IMM trades turn out to be at least as expensive 
as agency trades, which could never happen had they collude. If there is 
anything that can be labelled as collusion, it is the order preferencing by 
broker-dealers. When they trade on behalf of investors outside the Exchange, 
the trading costs are high. When they trade on their own accounts, the 
costs are low. It is possible that broker-dealers route the customer orders 
to certain market makers in exchange for better deals for themselves. It is 
worth pursuing along this fine in future research.
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5.2.2 Variables which determine the spread
A few variables are used for the investigations in this thesis in various oc­
casions. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 use cross-sectional regression models to 
determine the sources of quote changes, and the number of trades appear to 
perform better than the trading volumes. Chapter 4 uses aggregate volumes 
to estimate the adverse selection effects. Although the results obtained from 
model (4.1) are satisfactory, it might be interesting to see whether the model 
can be further improved by replacing aggregate volumes with sum of trades 
in equation (4.3).
Strong evidence is found to support the fact that spread is a non-hnear 
function of the trade size. The estimated size sphnes in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4 are remarkably similar: the spread is decreasing with the trade size 
when the size is small, and is increasing when the size is large. The decreasing 
part of the size sphne can be attributed to the fixed component of the bid- 
ask spread, and the change in bargaining power between market makers and 
their counter parties. The increasing part of the sphne is consistent with the 
inventory and information hypothesis in market microstructure theory.
The evidence of intra-daily effects is less strong. Apart from the weak 
significance of test statistics, the estimated time sphnes for the three securi­
ties in Chapter 4 and the one for effective spread in Chapter 3 have totally 
different shapes. Furthermore, the variations of those sphnes are very small 
compared with, for example, the size sphnes. The result is different from 
the intraday effects of quote spread found in Werner and Kleidon (1996) and 
Chan et al. (1995) that the spread is bigger in the morning than in the 
afternoon in dealership markets. In fact, Chapter 4 concludes that the wide 
touch spread in the early morning does not have a huge impact on either 
the effective spread calculated by the mid-touch or the Kalman-filter spread 
estimated by model (4.1).
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5.2.3 The components of the spread
This thesis does not attempt to decompose the bid-ask spread as, for exam­
ple, Huang and Stoll (1997) or Madhavan et al. (1997) do. However, some 
of the results of this thesis may shed some hghts on the three components of 
the spread. Although some of the results in the regression models of Chapter 
2 and Chapter 3 do not separate the inventory effect from the information ef­
fect completely, there is evidence supporting information effect, while there is 
httle evidence suggesting strong inventory consideration plays an important 
role in determining the behaviour of market makers. The regressions of quote 
changes in Section 2.6 and Section 3.6 reveal that what changes the quote 
is not the change in inventory position, nor the trading volumes; instead, 
it is the number of trades of the market as a whole, especially the medium 
trades, that move the quote. Inventory affects the decision of quote change 
only when there are few firms making the market. Moreover, the inventory- 
related variables in the regression of effective spreads in Section 3.5 are not 
consistent with the inventory hypothesis by Amihud and Mendelson (1980) 
and Ho and Stoll (1981, 1983). As Kandel and Marx (1997) point out, inven­
tory consideration should not dominate the decision of the firms who serve 
for providing liquidity. It appears either the successful inventory manage­
ment reduces the possibility of market makers to face inventory overload or 
shortage, or inventory management is never an issue of the firm.
Chapter 2 concludes that information consideration plays an important 
role in determining the quote revisions of price leaders. Other results, in­
cluding the adverse selection effects shown in Chapter 4, suggest that market 
makers regard the trading activities in the whole market as valuable infor­
mation. If market makers change the quote according to the trades in the 
market, and if the change in fundamental price of the security is affected by 
the aggregate volumes of trades, then it imphes that information determines 
the positioning of the spread. Although it is not equivalent to the statement 
that information determines the size of the spread, theoretical models such 
as the ones in Ho and Stoll (1981) and in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) sug­
gest that what determines the position determines the size, too. Hence, the
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information component of the bid-ask spread is likely to be big. The upward 
sloping parts of the size sphnes in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 also testify the 
importance of information costs.
Nevertheless, the large proportion of order-processing component can 
never be ignored. The downward-sloping part of the size sphnes is con­
sistent with the hypothesis that there are substantial fixed components of 
order-processing costs (Stoll 1978a; Wells 1992), and this thesis will further 
argue that the variation of order-processing costs largely comes from the dif­
ference in the bargaining powers of the counter parties of market makers. 
The market makers who initiate IMM trades are most vulnerable, since they 
reveal that they cannot resort to hquidity elsewhere. The investors who use 
brokers are unable to request the latter to make efforts to negotiate for them 
harder, and their orders are often preferenced. The private clients of market 
makers and the broker-dealers of the Exchange have bigger bargaining power 
against market makers, and they obtain the most favourable deals.
5.3 Final com m ents
The information transmission on the London Stock Exchange is satisfactory. 
Transaction prices reflect the information of past volumes, market makers 
revise their quotes in response to trade information, and inventory consider­
ation does not dominate quote revisions. On the other hand, the Exchange 
has been a trading environment in favour of big investors as they hold big­
ger bargaining powers. While willing to offer better prices for big market 
players, market makers have little incentive to narrow the spread. Orders 
from small investors are often preferenced, and the costs are high. A cen­
tral hmit order book opened to all of the market participants may benefit 
small investors. Before it happens, individual investors may be better off by 
investing in pension funds or unit trusts, instead of trading with a broker.
The fact that Kalman-fllter spread is a better estimator than effective 
spread indicates that trade information is potentially useful than the quotes. 
The good news is that trade prices may reflect a great deal of market infor­
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mation. The bad news is that quotes may not be very rehable. Nevertheless, 
the quotes or the effective spreads are by no means useless. Quotes reflect 
the fundamental price with noises, and it is unlikely that quotes are very far 
away from the fundamental price. If trade information is scarce, for example, 
for the iUiquid stocks, then one has to resort to quotes for information. If 
it is a hquid stock under investigation, then trade information may be much 
more useful.
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A ppendix A
TECHNICAL NOTES
A .l The D efinition o f the Norm al M arket 
Size
The following is an excerpt from Quality of Market Quarterly, Summer Edi­
tion 1995, page 82.
Normal Market Size is based on a percentage of the stock’s average daily 
customer turnover in the preceding year. It is intended to represent, on 
average, 2.5% of the daily trading volume. To calculate the NMS, define
average daily value value of customer turnover
of customer turnover in previous 12 months
value of normal average daily value _=  ^ * 2.5%
institutional bargain of customer turnover
normal institutional bargain value of normal institutional bargain
in number of shares closing mid price on last day of quarter
Then the normal institutional bargain is rounded to one of the 12 NMS bands 
according to the table below.
NMS band shares between
500 0-667
1,000 668-1333
2,000 1,334-2,400
3,000 2.401-3,750
5,000 3,751-6,667
10,000 6,668-12,000
15,000 12,001-18,000
25,000 18,901-33,000
50,000 33,001-60,000
75,000 60,001-93,000
100,000 93,001-160,000
200,000 > 160,001
Note that the NMS data is not available in Transaction Data Service. 
The NMS used in Chapter 3 are obtained from the archive of the Exchange.
A. 2 Files in T r a n s a c t i o n  D a t a  S e r v i c e
The CD-ROM Transaction Data Service is complied by Quality of Market 
Group of the LSE. It contains several files, and those which are relevant to 
this thesis are the Transaction Data File, the SEAQ Price Quote File  ^ the 
SEAQ Best Quote Price File, Securities Masterfile and Firms File.
A .2.1 Transaction Data File
This file was constructed from the complete settlement records of transactions 
reported by the member firms to the Exchange. The relevant fields used for 
this thesis are:
1. Action. It indicates whether the transaction is reported by the buyer 
or the seller.
2. Stock Exchangd Daily Official List code; SEDOL for short. It is a 
unique code for each security.
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3. The d a te  when the transaction occurs.
4. The firm  who reports the transaction. It is a three-digit code.
5. The three-digit code of the counter p a rty  of the transaction.
6. Bcirgain conditions. It indicates various conditions related to the 
transaction, for example, whether the underlying stock is ex-dividended. 
The field is used to identify and to delete option-related trades.
7. Positive/negative  flag. It indicates whether the volum e field should 
be positive or negative. For example, the flag of the contra transactions 
should be indicated as negative.
8. The volum e of the transaction, the number of shares traded in the 
transaction. This is the “volumes” used in Chapter 4.
9. The value of the transaction. The unit of the value is a penny. This 
field is used to calculate “volumes” in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
10. The tim e when the transaction occurs.
11. The source of the record. The record may be retrieved firom either 
Tailsman or Sequal.
12. B uyer deal capacity. The capacity of the buyer of the trade. There 
are five different capacities: A, I, M, N, and P. See Chapter 3 for details.
13. Seller deal capacity. The capacity of the seller.
14. Deed type. It could be a standard transaction, a SAEF transaction, 
a contra transaction, and so on. Stock loans are identified and deleted 
by this field.
15. en try  date. The date in which the transaction was reported to the 
Exchange.
16. The tran sac tio n  num ber given by the Exchange. The number is 
unique for each transaction in an en try  d a te  for a certain stock, so
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one can identify any single transaction by using the fields SEDOL, 
en try  d a te  and tran sac tio n  num ber together.
17. The price at which the deal is transacted. The price is rounded to 
pence, so it is replaced with 100 times value and divided by volume.
18. deal currency. The field is used to discard the transactions not dealt 
in Pound Sterhng.
A .2.2 SEAQ Price Quote File
The quote file contains the bid and ask prices and quantities of the shares 
quoted by the market makers. Those fields used in the investigations include:
1. The SEDOL of the stock.
2. The d a te  of the quote.
3. O ntim e, the time at which the quote became vahd. The times in the 
file are rounded to seconds.
4. Offtime, the time at which the quote ended.
5. The three-digit code of the m arket meiker who posts the code.
6. The ask price in a hundredth pence.
7. The ask size.
8. The b id  price in a hundredth pence.
9. The b id  size.
10. The ind icato r which indicates whether the quote is an opening quote, 
a closing quote, or neither of them.
185
A.2.3 SEAQ Best Quote Price File
The file is constructed by Quality of Market Group to replicate the yellow 
strips of the stocks. Each records contains the following fields:
1. The SEDOL of the stock.
2. The d a te  of the quote.
3. The tim e at which the quote became valid. Unfike price quotes file, 
the times are rounded to minutes.
4. The ask price.
5. The bid  price.
6. The ind icator which indicates whether the quote is an opening quote, 
a closing quote, or neither of them.
A .2.4 Securities Masterfile
The file contains the relevant information about the securities traded on the 
Exchange. Each record includes the SEDOL of the security, the name of the 
com pany which issues the security, the ty p e  of the security, for example, an 
ordinary share, a warrant, etc., and the status of the security in FT SE  index, 
for example, whether the security is included in FTSE-100 index, FTSE-250 
index, and so on.
A .2.5 Firm File
The file contains the relevant information about the member firms of the 
exchange. Each record includes the nam e of the firm, the four-letter abb re­
v iation  of the firm, the three-digit code of the firm, and the time when the 
code becomes valid. It is not uncommon for a firm with several codes, and 
five out of twenty-eight market makers in the data set have different codes 
in the Transaction Data File and in the SEAQ Price Quote File. Therefore, 
the information in Firm File is extremely important for identifying the link 
between order fiows and quote status of the same market maker (Chapter 2).
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A . 3 Scunple sections
A. 3.1 Trade data used in Chapter Four
The choice of using Glaxo Wellcome, BT and Shell’s trades in Chapter 4 
is arbitrary. All of them are very hquid stocks, where several transactions 
occur at the same time is very common. BT is chosen because it is the most 
heavily traded stock during the sample period. The other two stocks are 
chosen because they belong to different industries.
A .3.2 Stocks used in Chapter Three
Nineteen of the 39 stocks used in Chapter 3 come from the constituents 
of FTSE-100 index. The names of the constituents of the indices are ob­
tained from the Datastream International. It consists of ten stocks with the 
biggest trading volumes (measured in the values of transaction) during 1995. 
Another nine stocks of FTSE-100 constituents are with the smallest trading 
volumes during 1995. The data of trading volumes comes from London Stock 
Exchange (1996), in which there is a hst of 100 stocks with the biggest trad­
ing volumes during 1996. FTSE-100 stocks are not necessary to be in the first 
100 stocks with the biggest trading volumes, so all of the FTSE-100 stocks 
which are not in the fist of London Stock Exchange (1996) are assumed to 
have smaller trading volumes than the ones in the list. There are eighteen 
FTSE-100 stocks which are not in the list, ten of them are randomly chosen, 
and one of them (Schroders) is dropped as the number of inter-dealer trades 
is too small. The list of the nineteen stocks is in Table A.I.
There are two stages to select the rest of the stocks. First, order the 
names of the stocks of FTSE-250 in random. Take the first thirty stocks and 
retain those which have trades everyday, and twenty-seven stocks remain in 
the sample. Repeat the procedure for the rest of FTSE-All Shares stocks 
by ramdomly seleting forty stocks and retain twenty-eight of them. In the 
second stage, the stocks with the sum of IDB and IMM trades less than 150 
are excluded from the analysis, and only twenty stocks are left in the sample. 
The list of the stock is in Table A.2.
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A.3.3 Quotes and trade data in Chapter Two
Chapter 2 uses the data from February and March 1996. The Quahty of 
Market Group provides all the data available between January and June 1996, 
but the data are not complete. For example, quote data before 15 January 
are missing. To conduct the investigations in Chapter 2, it is essential to 
identify the quotes posted by certain market makers and the trades executed 
by them, so the January data are not used. The reason of not using the data 
after April 1996 is similar: the quote data of a medium-size market maker 
are available only between January and March 1996.
Does the missing quote of the firm affect the investigations in this thesis? 
Table A.3 shows the daily duration of the firm being alone on the yellow strip 
of the stocks used in Chapter 3 between February and March 1996. The firm 
is not often alone on the yellow strip, so the constructed yellow strip used in 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 is not very different from the true yellow strip.
A .4 E diting transaction data
The settlement records cannot be readily apphed to data analysis; data edit­
ing is essential and is described below. Much of the editing procedure is not 
different from those documented in Hansch and Neuberger (1993), Board and 
Sutcliffe (1995), and Reiss and Werner (1996, 1997).
A .4.1 Shape trades
Both buyer and seller of a trade report to the settlement system, but not all 
of the trades have only one buy record and only one sell record. For example, 
sometimes the firms may wish to report several records for a trade for the 
convenience of bookkeeping. The trades which are recorded by more than a 
pair are called “shape trades”. Shape trades can be easily identified because 
they always have the same tra d e  num ber within the same d a ta -en try  day. 
There are approximately 17% of records of shape trades in the sample used
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for Chapter 3.  ^ Most of the shape trades contain four records, and one trade 
even has 900 records. The shape trades are supposed to contain even number 
of records. If the firm wishes to report the trade with n records, its counter 
party will also report it with n records, but it will set the volume to zero for 
the n — 1 "dummy" records. For example, if firm A buys 12,000 shares from 
firm B and wishes to report the trades with three records of 4,000 shares 
each, then the firm B will report with three records as well, one record of 
12,000 shares and the other two of 0 shares.
Apart from the declared shape trades, 2.4% of the customer bargains have 
similar features as the shape trades but they are not declared as shapes. The 
similar features include that those trades occurred at the same time, with 
the same trading parties, with the same buyer/seller capacities, and with the 
same price. They are regarded as potential shape trades and are merged in 
the same way as merging the declared shape trades.
A .4.2 Contra trades
If a fault of a trade report is discovered, then the firm and its counter party 
should report a “contra trade” to the Exchange to cancel the trade. The 
records of contra trades are supposed to be exactly the same as the previous 
records except (a) that the mark of contra trades will appear in the deal 
ty p e  field, (b) that the buyers and the sellers are reversed, and (c) that 
there will be a negative sign in the positive /negative  flag field. Both the 
contra trades and the faulted trades should be removed from the data. It can 
be done by tracing the normal trade records identical to the contra trades 
except for the three features above. If all of the contra trades were reported 
as described, all of the contra trades and the faulted trades would be removed 
from the data set. This is not the case. Contra trades constitute 1.7% of 
the data set, only three quarters of them can be removed according to the 
algorithm.
Several reasons result in the failure to identify incorrect records. For
 ^ Unless otherwise mentioned, all of the numbers reported in this section are produced 
from editing the data set of Chapter 3.
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example, there may be more than one fault in a faulted trades, some of 
which are failed to be identified by the firms. The contra trades may have 
their errors, too. The normal trade and the contra trade should have the 
same SEDOL, deal date, deal tim e, buyer capacity, seller capacity, 
price and volume. Because the restrictions of the fields do not detect one 
quarter of the contra trades, later the restriction of capacities, time, price 
and volume are relaxed one by one, and another fifteen percent of the contra 
trades and their corrsponding normal trades are identified. However, it is 
important to note that the relaxation of the rule runs the risk of identify the 
wrong trades. There is no objective way to decide whether the record should 
be eliminated, and any deviation from the standard rules involves arbitrary 
judgement.
A .4.3 Paired trades
After the trade is agreed between the buyer and the seller, both parties 
report the trades to the Exchange for the settlement. After shape trades are 
grouped, each trade consist of exactly one buy and one sell record. Since 
each trade has a unique trad e  num ber in the d a ta -en try  day, so a buy 
and its corresponding sell record can be easily paired.
A .4.4 Sell-and-buy-back trades and put-throughs
For bookkeeping reasons, member firms may agree to report a pair of trades 
with the same prices and quantities where the buyer and the seller are reverse. 
Such trades are called “sell and buy back” . All of these trades are deleted.
A put-through is a cross trade under the name of market makers. The 
essence of the trade is that trader A buys some shares from trader B, but on 
the record there are two trades: trader B sells the shares to market maker C, 
and C sells the same amount of shares to A at the same time. There are less 
than 2,000 pairs of put-throughs in the sample of Chapter 2. Put-throughs 
are not used in Chapter 4, and they are used in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
only for the regressions of quote changes.
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A.4.5 IDB trades
If a firm approaches an inter-dealer broker (IDB) to hit the hmit order dis­
played on the IDB screen, the IDB will inform the firm who places the hmit 
order, and ah of the parties report the trades to the Exchange. For exam­
ple, if market maker X (the hitter) hits a seU hmit order placed by market 
maker Y (the poster), then X wih report a buy record to the Exchange, Y 
will report a seh record, and the IDB wih report a buy record (as if it buys 
the shares from Y) and a seh record (as if it sells the shares to X.)
There is no need to match the IDB trades or to identify the hitters of 
the trades if one is only interested in the inventory or the order flows of 
the market makers, such as in Chapter 2. On the other hand, if one wishes 
to compute the costs of IDB trades, such as in Chapter 3, it is essential to 
identify the posters and the hitters of the trades. The posters are analogous 
to the market makers in SEAQ in the sense that they both prepare to trade 
with firm prices and quantities. The hitters are analogous to the customers 
in SEAQ as they are both regarded to initiate the trade. The costs of the 
trades are often defined as the costs of the posters, and the only way to 
identify the poster in IDB trades from the settlement records is to match the 
trades. As the hitter pays the conunission to the IDB and the price before 
the commission is often rounded, the trading party who reports the odd price 
can be identified as the hitter.
Unfortunately, in the IDB market it is possible for a trade to have n 
buyers and m  sellers, and to identify the hitter and poster the trade records 
have to be merged. Furthermore, there is no other way to match IDB trades 
except to compare the tim e, the volum e and the value of one record with 
the rest of the records at the same day, in order to find the best-matched 
records. The difficulty results from the inconsistency of the report of the 
time, and the difference in commission. The hitter pays the commission 
which is on average 0.045% of the value (of the poster’s record), but it is 
rarely exactly so. The commission can be as low as zero or as high as 0.1%. 
The inconsistency in the reported time is also severe. For the trades with 
two or three trading parties, the reported times are often the same or only
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have one minute difference. For the trades with many trading parties, the 
difference in tim e can be as big as half an hour or even bigger. As a result, 
identifying the trading parties of the trades can be arbitrary. The algorithm 
of matching the IDB trades used in the investigations is as follows:
1. To match as many small trades as possible. For example, suppose there 
are two records of buys, one of 10,000 shares and the other of 20,000 
shares, and there are two records of sells of exactly the same size. Then 
they are identified as two trades with two trading parties, not one trade 
with four parties.
2. The records whose tim es are identical are matched first, and then the 
restriction of the time difference is relaxed gradually. This approach 
is in favour of the records whose tim es were reported closely. It is 
possible, however, for the wrong trades to be matched simply because 
one trade is falsely reported to occur at the tim e close to the other. 
The exception of the rule is allowed when the numbers of trading parties 
are exactly the trades to be matched. For example, if there are exactly 
two buying and one seUing records to be matched at the day, and if the 
sum of the volumes of the buy records equals the sum of the volumes of 
sell records, then the three records are merged regardless of the time.
3. The trades will be matched only if the buyers pay for the shares to the 
IDB at the same price, and all the sellers receive the money for the 
IDB at another price. There is no exception for the rule.
4. The regulation of the Exchange states IDBs should avoid letting the 
market maker hit the hmit order placed by itself. Without knowing if 
the rule is strictly enforced, the buy and sell record of the same market 
maker are not matched if less than five market makers are involved in 
a trade.
99% of the IDB trades can be identified by this algorithm.
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A.4.6 Portfolio trades
Occasionally the customers may find it desirable to buy or sell several stocks 
as a portfolio. This is called “basket” or “portfoho” trading (Wells 1995). 
Because the trades are executed as a basket, the individual prices may be 
arbitrary. TDS does not record whether the trades belong to a basket, so only 
“potential” basket trades can be identified. The trades are identified as in a 
potential basket if the trading parties, trading capacities, and the reported 
times are the same, and a basket should consist of at least ten different stocks. 
Moreover, neither IDB trades nor IMM trades are identified as potential 
basket trades. Unlike Hansch et al. (1999), the prices of potential basket 
trades are not restricted to be equal to the mid-touches, but the percentage 
effective spreads of the trades, defined as (1.1), have to be the same. About 
3% of the trades are identified as potential basket trades and are removed 
from the analysis.
A .4 .7 Capacities
The trading parties report to the Exchange whether they act as principals 
or agents in the trades, and Quahty of Market Group expand the capacity 
into five categories. The capacities reported by the member firms may not be 
correct, and it is extremely difficult if not impossible to correct the wrongly 
reported capacities. For the data used in this thesis, only the capacities 
of IDB and market makers are examined. There are only four inter dealer 
brokers in the markets, and their sole function is to act as IDBs. None 
of the other firms act as IDBs, so any “I” capacity reported by any other 
member firm is incorrect. Regarding the records of market makers, the quote 
data and IDB records are used to determine which firms may have acted as 
market makers. The suspicious records are sent to Quality of Market Group 
to confirm the validity of the capacities of trading parties.
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A.4.8 Time of trades
Member firms report the tim e that they beheve when the trade is executed. 
However, the buyers and sellers do not report the same tim e in about a 
third of trades. The differences are not always very large. Excluding IDB 
and contra records, only 1.5% of the records differ in time by more than 
20 minutes, and the mean of the time differences, if there is any, is around 
564 seconds.^. For the IDB trades, the times reported are the same by the 
market maker and the IDB in only 46.4% of the records, are one minute 
apart in 39.3% of records, and the means of the difference is 256 seconds. 
To determine the time of the trade, the approach is similar to Board and 
Sutcliffe (1995), which consists of the following rules:
1. The mandatory quote period of the market maker is between 8:30 and 
16:30, and the trades which occur well beyond the time are rare. There­
fore, if one party report the tim e which is between 8:00 and 17:00 and 
the other is not, the tim e of the former is used.
2. If the rule above is not apphcable, and if one of the trading party is a 
market maker and the other party is an inter-dealer broker, then the 
tim e reported by the IDB is used. The rationale behind this rule is 
the tim es reported by IDBs are apparently more rehable than those by 
market makers. For example, the sample of Chapter 3 consists of 339 
pairs of IDB trades of which the tim es reported by the IDBs and the 
market makers are at least one hour apart. Of those records, the tim es 
reported by IDBs are always between 8:00 and 17:00, whereas one of 
the tim e by market makers is after 17:00 and another 35 are before 
8:00. It may imply the tim es reported by the IDBs are more reliable. 
Furthermore, if the tim e by IDBs are used, 28 trades are outside the 
touch, whereas 126 trades are outside the touch if the tim es by market 
makers are used.^
 ^The mean of the time difference is large because there are quite a few trades with 
apparently wrong tim e. For example, the buyer reports the trade is executed at 2pm, 
while the seller reports that it is executed at 2am.
 ^ If the touch is not available at the time of reporting, the nearest touch is used.
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3. If the rules above are not applicable, and if one of the trading party is 
a market maker and the other party is not, then the tim e reported by 
the market maker is used. The rationale behind this rule is the tim e 
reported by market makers are apparently more reliable. For example, 
the sample of Chapter 3 consists of 5219 pairs of SEAQ trades of which 
the tim es reported by the market makers and their counter parties 
are at least one hour apart. Of those records, the number of records 
which the tim es are before 08:00 and after 17:00 are, respectively, 90 
and 33 by the market makers, and 224 and 78 by non-market makers. 
Furthermore, if the tim e by market makers is used, 817 trades are 
outside the touch, whereas 1620 trades are outside the touch if the 
times by the other parties are used.
4. If both or none of the trading parties are market makers, then sellers’ 
tim e is used. The rule is the legal position by the Exchange whenever 
there is a dispute between the trading parties.
Moreover, the IDBs may reported different tim es for the same IDB 
trades, that is, the tim e of the trade with the hitter may not be the same 
as the tim e of the trade with the poster. The rules of determining the time 
of the merged IDB trades are:
1. An IDB trade may include m  buyers and n sellers. If more than a half 
of the (m -f n) records are of the same tim e, then the tim e is chosen. 
The rule also applies when exactly half of the records are of the same 
tim e and the other half are of different times.
2. If exactly a half of the records are of one tim e and the other half are of 
another time, then the tim e which is not far beyond the trading hours 
is chosen. If both or neither are beyond the trading hours, the earher 
tim e is chosen.
3. If neither of the rules above is apphcable, then the tim e  in the middle is 
chosen. For example, if there are five trading parties with five different 
tim e, then the third earhest tim e. If there are four trading parities 
with four different tim e, then the second earliest tim e  is chosen.
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Note that trading parties report to the Exchange the time when they 
believe the trade is executed, not the time when the trade is stamped, so 
there is no need to match the trade with the quote a few minutes earher or 
later as Hasbrouck (1988) does. The experiment by Hansch et al. (1999) to 
match the trade and quote with different time shows their regression results 
are not improved by the change in time. Finally, de Jong, Nijman, and Roëll 
(1995) and Reiss and Wemer (1997) beheve the trades executed outside the 
touch have wrong reported time and change the time. They justify the 
approach by the best execution rule of the Exchange. However, this thesis 
holds the view that whether the best execution is strictly enforced remains 
to be investigated, that the change in reported time distorts the data, and 
that the time should never altered according to the touch.
A . 5 E diting quote data
Not surprisingly, there are irregularities with quote data, too. Table A.4 is 
an example of how quote data axe supposed to appear.
1. The ontim e of the opening quote is the earliest of the ontim e of 
the day, which is usually between 8:00 and 8:30. Late opening occurs 
occasionally.
2. The ontim e of the closing quote is the latest of the ontim e of the day, 
which is usually between 16:30 and 17:00. The offtim e of the closing 
quote is 23:59:59, and the prices and quantities of the closing quote are 
zero. However, in 0.04% of the records, the market makers closed the 
quotes at the normal time, apparently reopened later, say at 18:00, and 
the quotes remained opened until the end of the day. Moreover, the 
market makers may not close the quotes at the end of the day, which 
happened in 0.03% of the records, and in such a case the last quotes 
have non-zero prices and quantities until mid-night. Late quotes are 
never used and do no affect the investigation of this thesis.
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3. Between the opening quote and the closing quote, the times of the 
quotes are one after another; the offtime of one quote is just one 
second ahead of the ontim e of its next quote. This regularity is never 
violated in the original data.
4. The quote should have the ask price bigger than the bid price. The 
quotes which have bids bigger than asks are removed, and the next 
quotes are assumed to start at the times when the deleted quotes began 
to be valid. The continuity of the quotes maintains, but the assignment 
of the time is arbitrary.
A .6 N o change for best quote data
There is no revision of the best quote data. When the quote data is available, 
the data is used to construct the best quote. Otherwise the best quote data 
from the TDS is used. It appears that the best quote from the Quote File 
is more rehable than that from the Best Quote File. The main reason is 
that the former is recorded in seconds, and the latter is in minutes. When 
the best quote changes within one minute, the best quote data shows several 
observations of the same time stamp. Therefore, if the best quote data is 
absolutely necessary, for example, to match the trade before 15 January 1996, 
then one of the several “best quotes” has to be randomly selected to match 
the price.
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Table A .l: FTSE-100 samples of Chapter Three
1 British Gas
2 British Petroleum
3 British Telecommunications
4 BTR
5 Cable & Wireless
6  Glaxo Wellcome
7 Hanson
8 HSBC Holdings
9 Shell TVansport & Trading
10 SmithKline Beecham
11 Bank of Scotland
12 Burton
13 Cookson
14 Courtaulds
15 Guardian Royal Exchange
16 Next
17 Rentokil
18 TI Group
19 United Utilities
Data availability 
trade quote
02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 
02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 
02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 
02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 
02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 
02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 
02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 
02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 
02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 
15/04-28/06 15/04-28/06 
02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 
02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 
02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 
02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 
02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 
02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 
02/01-28/06 
02/01-28/06 
02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06
best-quote
02/01-28/06
02/01-28/06
02/01-28/06
02/01-28/06
02/01-28/06
02/01-28/06
02/01-28/06
02/01-28/06
02/01-28/06
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
02/01-28/06
02/01-28/06
02/01-28/06
02/01-28/06
02/01-28/06
02/01-28/06
02/01-28/06
02/01-28/06
02/01-28/06
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Table A.2: FTSE-All Share samples of Chapter Three
Data availabihty
trade quote best-quote
20 BICC 02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 02/01-28/06
21 Booker 02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 02/01-28/06
22 British Land Co 02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 02/01-28/06
23 BunzI 02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 02/01-28/06
24 English China Clays 02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 02/01-28/06
25 Foreign & Col
Invest Urust 02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 02/01-28/06
26 G.T. Japan Invest LVust 02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 02/01-28/06
27 Govett Strategic Invest Ih rst 02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 02/01-28/06
28 Hepworth 02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 02/01-28/06
29 Lonrho 02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 02/01-28/06
30 Lucas Industries 02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 02/01-28/06
31 MEPC 02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 02/01-28/06
32 MFI Fhrniture 02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 02/01-28/06
33 Morgan Crucible 02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 02/01-28/06
34 Scottish American Invest 02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 02/01-28/06
35 TR Smaller Companies
Invest Lbust 02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 02/01-28/06
36 Unichem 02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 02/01-28/06
37 Vickers 02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 02/01-28/06
38 W PP Group 02/01-28/06 15/01-28/06 02/01-28/06
39 Yorkshire Water 02/01-28/06 05/01-28/06 02/01-28/06
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T ab le  A . 3: Price leadership of the  firm with missing quotes 
The time is in (hour:minute).
FTSE-100 samples time other samples time
1 British Gas 0:17 20 BICC 0:05
2 British Petroleum 0:10 21 Booker 0:01
3 British Telecommunications 0:03 22 British Land Co 0:05
4B T R 0:18 23 Bunzl 0:08
5 Cable &: Wireless 0:03 24 English China Clays 0:03
6 Glaxo Wellcome 0:02 25 Foreign h  Col Invest Trust 0:37
7 Hanson 0:11 26 G.T. Japan Invest Trust 0:12
8 HSBC Holdings 1:33 27 Govett Strategic Invest Trust 0:10
9 Shell Transport &: Trading 0:07 28 Hepworth 0:44
11 Bank of Scotland 0.22 29 Lonrho 0:17
12 Burton 0:06 30 Lucas Industries 1:02
13 Cookson 0:08 31 MEPC 0:26
14 Courtaulds 0:00 32 MFI Furniture 0:08
15 Guardian Royal Exchange 0:04 33 Morgan Crucible 0:15
16 Next 0:14 34 Scottish American Invest 0:02
19 United Utilities 0:02 35 TR Smaller Companies Invest Trust 0:05
37 Vickers 0:51
38 W PP Group 0:00
39 Yorkshire Water 0:06
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Table A  4: An example of “Standard” quote data
SEDOL FIRM DATE
ON
TIME
OFF
TIME BID? BIDQ ASKP ASKQ
0067889 000 01FEB96 8:24:30 8:24:50 330 100000 335 100000
0067889 000 01FEB96 8:24:51 8:40:10 328 100000 333 100000
0067889 000 01FEB96 8:40:11 8:44:11 327 100000 332 100000
0067889 000 01FEB96 8:44:12 8:53:20 325 100000 330 100000
0067889 000 01FEB96 8:53:21 9:01:52 323 100000 328 100000
0067889 000 01FEB96 9:01:53 12:50:55 325 100000 330 100000
0067889 000 01FEB96 12:50:56 16:32:46 327 100000 332 100000
0067889 000 01FEB96 16:32:47 23:59:59 0 0 0 0
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A ppendix B
STATISTICAL NOTES
The following are complied from the appendices of Koopman and Lai (1998).
B .l R egression spline functions
The regression sphne function is defined as a smooth function through the 
data points yt which are a response to the scalar series xt, for which xt < xt+i 
and t=  1 , . . . ,  n. The spline model is
yt =  9{xt) + Et, E  (st) = 0, var {et) =  cr^ ,
where 0 (•) is a smooth function which is based on k-\-l knot points {xq, 2/0 ) 5- • - j 
{xl,yl). The smoothness of #(-) is created by setting its second derivative 
with respect to a; as a hnear function of A; +  1 coefficients, that is
^i{^) =  li i^ -  x)/di]ai^i +  [(x -  x]_i)/di]ai
with di = x\ — x\_i and 9i{x) =  9{x) for xJ_j < x < x\ and i =  1, . . . ,  A;. The 
A; +  1 coefficients a* are assumed fixed and they can be identified by solving 
a linear set of equations. These regression sphne equations are obtained as 
follows:
1. use 9”{x) and standard integration rules to get expressions for 9i{x)]
2 . enforce the spline function 9i(x) at x =  x| to be equal to the known 
value of 2/J;
3. restrict the first derivative to be continuous by enforcing 9[(x\) = 
9i^i{x\) for 2 =  1 , . . . ,  A: — 1.
Step 2  leads to a linear expression for 0i(x) in terms of yj and for i =  
0 ,...  ,k. Step 3 leads to fc — 1 linear equations for the A; +  1 coefficients 
flo, • • •, in terms of 2/0 , , 2/1- The “natural” restrictions «o =  =  0
allow solving this linear system with respect to the remaining coefficients 
for z =  1, . . . ,  A: — 1. The sphne function can now be fully expressed in terms
of 2/0 , ' , 2 /1  by
0(xt) = 9i(xt) =  6 0 ,(2/0 +  • "  +  h,tvh 4-1  <x t <x ] ,  =
where the weights 6 0 , , h,t depend on the knot positions 4 , -  - , 4  and 
the value for (or the position of) Xt. For a given set of values yJ, • ••, 2/1, the 
sphne function can be computed for any x \ < x < x\. The regression sphne 
can be expressed as
9(xt) =
where bt =  (6o,(, • ••, h,t)^ and yi =  (yJ,. . . ,  yl)'. Consequently, the sphne 
model can be expressed as the standard regression model
yt =  Ky^-\-eu (B .l)
where parameter vector yi can be estimated by least squares techniques. In 
the case of model (4.1), the parameter vectors for the two different sphnes 
are estimated by generahsed least squares. More details are given by Poirier 
(1973, 1976). The generahsation of time-varying regression sphnes within 
the state space framework are developed by Harvey and Koopman (1993).
B .2 Kalm an filter sm oother
Consider the state space model (4.5) and (4.6). The Kalman filter evaluates 
the minimum mean squared hnear estimator of the state vector, conditional 
on ‘past’ observations, together with its variance matrix. Fohow the treat­
ment of Koopman and Durbin (1998) and exclude the regression vectors 
and Atu from the state space model. Define
at,i =  E{atYt-i),  Pt,i =  var{atYt-i),
~  1, 2/(,l, ' ' ' , 2/(,i—1) , Pt,i — 1 j 2/*,l, • • • , 2/t,i—1) ,
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for z =  2 , . . . ,  Nt, where
^  Î • • • » vifNi j 2/2 , 1  ) • • • 5 yt,Nt I" •
The filtering equations are given by
o>t,i+i = at,i +  Kt i^F i^^Vt i^, Pt,i+i = Ft,i — (B.2)
where
=  Vt,i — Ft^ i = Zt i^Pt^iZ[ i +  CTj j, =  Pt,iZ[ i^  (B.3)
for z =  1, . . .  and t = 1, . . . ,  n. This formulation has Vt^ i and Ft^ i as scalars 
and Kt i^ as a colunm vector. The transition from time t to time t +  1 is 
achieved by the relations
flt+1,1 =  PtO>t,pt+ii Pt+1,1 = TtPt,pt+\Ft +  PtQtP'f (B-4)
These forward recursions are initialised by ai^i =  a and Pi^i = P  as given by 
(4.7).
Minimum mean squared linear estimators using all observations Yn are 
evaluated by a smoothing algorithm which require output of the Kalman 
filter. The basic smoothing recursions operate backwards and the equations 
are given by
(B.5)
where Lt^i =  I  — Kt^iZt^iF^^, for z =  iV*,. . . ,  1 and t  = n , . . .  ,1. The initial­
isations are =  0 and Nn,Nn =  0- The equations for rt-l^N^ and Nt-i,Nt 
do not apply for t =  1.
The output of recursions (B.5) can be used to construct the smoothed es­
timator of the disturbances, that is, for example, et = E  (SfY^), together with 
their corresponding variances. The smoothed disturbances are computed by
£(,i =  var(êt,i) = ,
Vt = QtRtrtfi, var{rjt) = QtRtNtflRtQt,
(B.6)
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for t = n , . . . ,  1. The proofs and more general results for smoothed distur­
bances are given by Koopman (1993).
The smoothed state vector àt = E(atYn) and variance matrix Vt — 
var (atYn) also use (B.5) and they can be evaluated by
dt =  Of +  PtVt-i, Vt Pt ~  PtP^t-iPti (B.7)
for t =  n , . . . ,  1. A substantial amount of additional storage space is required 
for at and P f Proofe of (B.5) and (B.7) are given by de Jong (1988) and Kohn 
and Ansley (1988). A more efficient algorithm for calculating the smoothed 
estimator of the state vector only is given by
dt+i =  TtOùt +  RtVtJ t =  1 , . . . ,  n,
with â i =  a -f Pro and fjt is given by (B.6); see Koopman (1993) for a 
discussion.
The Kalman filter smoother also provides a general procedure to handle 
missing observations in time series. When no observations are available for 
a certain time period r , or a sequence of time periods, the dimension Pr =  
0 and the updating equation (B.4) is applied. The smoothing recursions 
adjust naturally to this situation. Compared to other treatments of missing 
observations in statistics, this approach is very simple.
B .3 M axim um likelihood estim ation
Consider the state space model (4.5) and (4.6) with system matrices and 
vectors depending on the parameter vector 'ip. For a given vector ÿ , the 
output of the Kalman filter is used to construct the likelihood function. Har­
vey (1993) shows how the likelihood function of the state space model with 
normal distributed disturbances can be calculated via the prediction error 
decomposition. The log-hkelihood function is given by
n pt
logLi'ip) =  constant -  % ^ ^ l o g F t , *  4- vlJFt^i,
^ t=i t=i
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where Vt^ i and Ft^ i are obtained from the (B.3) which depend on parameter 
vector 'ijj. In the context of state space models, maximum likelihood estima­
tion refers to numerically optimising the log-hkelihood function with respect 
to 'ip.
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